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GERMAN PHILOSOPHICAL CLASSICS

FOR

ENGLISH READERS AND STUDENTS.

EDITED BY

GEORGE S. MORRIS.

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON.

IN PREPARATION

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KANT'S

CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON.

A CRITICAL EXPOSITION

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PREFACE.

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THE present volume appears as the first one in a proposed series of "German Philosophic Classics for English Readers and Students," concerning which, in a printed "Prospectus," the following was said:

"Each volume will be devoted to the critical exposition of some one masterpiece belonging to the history of German philosophy. The aim in each case will be to furnish a clear and attractive statement of the special substance and purport of the original author's argument, to interpret and elucidate the same by reference to the historic and acknowledged results of philosophic inquiry, to give an independent estimate of merits and deficiencies, and especially to show, as occasion may require, in what way German thought contains the natural complement, or the much-needed corrective, of British speculation.

"It is intended that the series, when completed, shall consist of ten or twelve volumes, founded on the works of Leibnitz, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. It will thus furnish in effect a history of the most conspicuous and permanently influential movement in the history of German thought, and its general object may be stated to be to render rea-

sonably accessible to the intelligent English reader a knowledge of German philosophic thought in its leading outlines, and at the same time to furnish the special student with a valuable introduction and guide to more comprehensive studies in the same direction."

Whatever judgment may be passed concerning the measure in which the present volume fulfils the promise of the prospectus, its author, as responsible editor of the whole series, refers with confidence to the names of the eminent scholars and teachers, who have promised to prepare other volumes, as furnishing a sufficient guarantee that the series as a whole will worthily realize its published aim.

To the special student of Kant, the difficulties which must attend the attempt to furnish a summary account of the "special substance and purport" of the "Critique of Pure Reason" are well known. Not the least of these difficulties arises from the circumstance that Kant's work marks and conspicuously illustrates a stadium of transition in the history of modern thought. It is far more eminently the story of a process of inquiry and demonstration than a didactic exposition of finished results. And with reference to this process the *terminus a quo* and the *terminus ad quem* are widely different. Hence, as the inquiry proceeds, words and phrases acquire, and have attached to them, new meanings. This produces an air of variability and uncertainty in the use of words, which Kant, owing, doubtless, in part, to the haste with which his work was written, has not taken

care to reduce to a minimum. Add to this the fact that Kant's intellectual attitude, in some of its most essential aspects, remains, to the end, thoroughly confused, and the reader will have some conception of the hindrances which lie in the way of an attempt to produce a "clear and attractive statement" of what Kant has to say. These things are mentioned, not to excuse any deficiencies in the work of the present author, but that the critical reader may not at the outset form a wholly unreasonable notion of what may justly be demanded in any professed exposition of Kant.

The author has had at his disposal a copious collection of works, old and new, relating to Kant. But as his primary object in the preparation of this volume was not to make a new contribution to "Kant philology," they could not serve him, or influence his judgment, in any such conspicuous measure as to make further, specific mention of them necessary. His best and most earnest wish is that this volume, and the series which it inaugurates, may serve the end of promoting genuine philosophic intelligence.

GEO. S. MORRIS.

May 3, 1882.

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INTRODUCTION.

THE works that have marked epochs, of one kind or another, in the history of philosophy are very different in character. Some of them are constructive, and lead to positive conclusions; others are destructive, and end mainly in negations; others, still, are "critical," marking periods of transition in the history of philosophic intelligence, from negative or skeptical to more positive and affirmative convictions. Examples of the first class are found in the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Leibnitz, Hegel, and others. Hume's "Treatise on Human Nature" illustrates conspicuously the second class; while of the third, Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" furnishes the most noteworthy instance.

This apparent oscillation of philosophy between contradictory extremes of affirmation and negation has, as is well known, given abundant occasion to its enemies to blaspheme. If, it has been plausibly argued, philosophers persistently contradict each other, it is safe to infer that none of them have demonstrative knowledge of that whereof they affirm. And yet this inference is extremely superficial, as all know who have thorough comprehension of the true nature of philosophy's peculiar prob-

lems, and of the results which have attended their investigation.

All science involves two elements: knowledge of the particular, and knowledge of the universal. A particular fact is not scientifically known until it has been classified with some other fact or facts. This means that it is not an object of scientific knowledge until there is discovered something — a nature or law — which is common to it and to other facts. And that which is thus common to all is the so-called "universal." It is the universal quality, or mode of existence, or of activity, of the class of facts or objects in question.

Now, it is peculiar to all objects of knowledge that, in some form or other, they exist. To all of them Being of some kind is ascribed. This is their universal predicate. The peculiar object of philosophic science is the determination of the meaning of this predicate. What do we mean when we say that an object of knowledge *is*, that the universe *is*, that man *is*? What is it to *be*? *What* is? What is the universal nature of existence? And if there are more *kinds* of being than one, what is that universal kind which includes and explains them all? Such are the first and cardinal inquiries of philosophy, which, accordingly, was with perfect accuracy defined by Aristotle, more than two thousand years ago, as the "Science of Being as such."

Now, that the results of such a science,—far from being, as is often thoughtlessly supposed, merely "speculative," and so unpractical and useless, — are

of the highest consequence, both for the universal enlightenment of intelligence and for the direction of conduct, becomes upon reflection perfectly obvious. A science so universal in its range as philosophy, by its definition, is, must contribute something to our comprehension of every object of knowledge; and inasmuch as conduct depends on knowledge, it cannot be without its powerful influence upon the practical direction of human affairs.

Let us look at the case more concretely. The answers which, as matter of historic fact, have been given to philosophy's central inquiry, are implied in such expressions as theoretical Materialism, practical Materialism, or Scepticism, or Agnosticism, and Spiritualistic Idealism. The theoretic Materialist holds that whatever is, is material. Suppose this principle established, and it follows at once that, if there be forms or spheres of existence which appear to be non-material, we must not allow ourselves to be misled by this appearance, but must train ourselves to look for and to find in them nothing but peculiar manifestations or varieties of that which in essence and mode of action is material. Thus, if the materialistic thesis or principle be true, the knowledge of it serves to prevent or demolish contrary prejudices and to promote universal intelligence. Moreover, it has immediate bearings upon life. When consistently developed, it teaches us to look upon ourselves as mechanically determined, and hence irresponsible, in all our actions, and to correct accordingly those notions of human relations—of man

and man, in Society; of man and the universe, in Art, and of man and God, in Religion, — which, being apparently founded in human experience, are currently adopted among men. The like, in substance, is taught by practical Materialism, or Agnosticism,

"*Nur mit ein bischen andern Worten.*"

On the other hand, the Spiritualistic Idealist holds that the universal nature of Being is spiritual; that the essence of all absolute reality is not materialistic and dead, but idealistic and living; that the universe is an organism of Mind, of activities whose ultimate origin is in Will, of purposes whose explanation is Intelligence, of laws and of orders whose reason is the Good. This is in substance the doctrine, in the maintenance of which all of the philosophers of the first, or constructive, class above mentioned agree. It is the catholic doctrine of philosophy. It represents the positive results of scientific inquiry respecting the problems peculiar to philosophy. It is true to all the sides of human experience, and so is capable of comprehending and being just to whatever of relative truth may be contained in theoretical Materialism or in Agnosticism. Nay, more, in the relative and hence only partial truth of Materialism and Agnosticism, Spiritualistic Idealism sees its own larger lineaments prefigured and implied, and so sees in the whole history of philosophy nothing but consentient witness to its own truth. How this can be, will, it is hoped, presently be made more definitely to appear. It suffices here only to remark that the positive fruit of the idealistic doctrine, in contribut-

ing to the intelligent comprehension of all experience and the guidance of life, is (surely!) not less conspicuous, and, in its range, universal, than that of Materialism. Whatever be true, then, in philosophy, its importance can be denied only by an intelligence that is absolutely blinded by prejudice or by unculture. That something *is* thus true, or that the cardinal question of philosophy must receive, and is capable of receiving, some sort of an intelligent answer, is implied in the fact that all men, by their conduct, virtually adopt one philosophy or another. Practically they give to its fundamental query either a materialistic or an idealistic answer; and this — since all men are or would be rational — is tantamount to a mute assertion that the answer in question can be justified before the forum of intelligence.

Philosophy is the Science of Being. But Being, or the Universe of Reality, is given only in the realm of experience. The Science of Being can therefore be studied only through study of the content of experience. And thus it is studied. Philosophy does not transcend, nor pretend to transcend, the range of experience. And if "philosophies" have differed in their ostensible results, this has been only because their respective advocates have found, or thought they found, some more, others less, contained in experience.

But what is experience? It is only by a figure that experience can be likened to a vessel, which "contains" objects or the knowledge of objects. At

all events, the relation between experience and its so-called contents is not purely mechanical and accidental, so that the nature of the latter may be studied apart from the former. No, the "study of the content of experience," considered absolutely, cannot be carried on without studying experience itself. Now, experience is nothing other than our real or implicit knowledge, or our real or implicit consciousness. It results, therefore, that the Science of Being and the Science of Knowledge are organically one and inseparable. The study of the one can be prosecuted only through, in, and along with, the study of the other. The recognition of this fact is of capital importance for him who would understand the peculiar nature of philosophy's problems, and comprehend the historic methods and results of philosophic inquiry.

The interdependence of these two, ideally, but not really, distinguishable sciences is illustrated in the whole history of philosophy, and contains the key to the explanation of the apparently conflicting results of philosophic investigation. The germs of the science of knowledge lay scattered — in no great profusion, it is true — in the pre-Socratic "philosophy" of Greece. Such as they were, they furnished the impulse for that intellectual movement which resulted in the classic philosophy of Greece,— the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. Plato's "Theory of Ideas" is at once science of Knowledge and, through and in it, of Being. The philosophy of Aristotle has its real strength in his science of

Knowledge. The great merit of the modern German movement in philosophy, from Kant to Hegel, lay in the new development which it gave to the same science. It was through this science that the final leaders in this movement rehabilitated the science of Being. It was through it that, in the language of a recent German writer, these men rescued the modern mind from the barren heath of purely arbitrary reflection and subjective uncertainty, and brought it back to the green pasture of objective reality, restoring us to rich and concrete knowledge of ourselves and of the world. And the impulse to the modern movement was the same in kind with that which brought forth the ancient one. It consisted in the intense cultivation, on the part of earlier "philosophers" (Locke, etc.), of certain rootlets, or first beginnings, of the science of Knowledge, with results which were so far from corresponding with human knowledge, or experience, in its actual organic wholeness that they contained a direct challenge to further and more complete inquiry. Outside of the two historic movements of philosophic inquiry which culminated with Aristotle and Hegel, it can hardly be said that the science of Knowledge, organically one with, and absolutely inseparable from, the science of Being, or from philosophy proper, has ever been investigated in such way as to take complete account of all the elements of the problem as presented in conscious experience. It is certainly true to say that, independently of these two movements and of their influence, the problem in question has never

been thus investigated. And it is also true that the result of the modern investigation was confirmatory of the result of the ancient one, but enriched with fuller detail and more copious demonstration.

The science of knowledge is the key to the science of Being, and the different conceptions respecting the nature of Being, or of absolute Reality, which have been propounded in the guise of philosophy, all result from different conceptions respecting the nature of knowledge. The different views which have been held respecting the nature of knowledge are simply so many views respecting the nature, conditions and range of experience. Further, these differences of view are—if the expression may be allowed—rather differences of more and less, than of contradiction. Knowledge is a complex process, and the different views held concerning it result from the circumstance that some look only at one or two sides of the process, while others—the true philosophers—look at all sides. The former, of course, see in knowledge or experience less, the latter more. Those who see the more see also and recognize the less. There is here no contradiction. Apparent contradiction arises only when those who see only the less declare that the less is all, and so deny the more. Such contradiction, however, is purely dogmatic, and does not arise from the nature of the case itself which is under examination. In other words, the positive, scientific results of inquiry are not contradictory, but complementary.

Of the whole nature of knowledge, or conscious

experience, the theoretical materialist sees least, and it is he whose inquiries into the subject are most superficial. He observes, in common with all men, that knowledge, in one of its characteristic aspects, is an affair of sensation; it is "conveyed to us in through the senses." This he adopts as the whole account of knowledge. The senses he looks upon as reporters—and the only reporters—of that which we know, and consequently of that which we must believe to be. But the senses report a "material universe." Consequently, a material universe, and nothing else, exists. Whatever truly *is* consists of atoms of material substance, about whose origin or end no rational inquiry can be raised.

Theoretical or absolute materialism is purely dogmatic. It has no scientific standing whatever. It is refuted by its own premises. Accordingly, whenever in the history of philosophic inquiry it has reared its head, this has been only for a brief period. The witness of scientific inquiry has speedily demolished it.

Materialism says, All knowledge is sensible knowledge, and consequently all existence is purely sensible, i.e. material. It is indeed by such reasoning that materialism must justify itself, if justification be possible. It is on such a theory of knowledge as is enunciated in the foregoing premise, that the theory of Being affirmed in the conclusion must be founded, if foundation it is to have. But the peculiarity and defect of materialism is, that it substitutes dogmatic assertion for scientific inquiry into the meaning of

its own premises. There have been plenty of men, in ancient and modern times, who have adopted the materialistic premise, and who, in addition, have inquired into its meaning. They have examined the nature and conditions of sensible knowledge as such, and have set up a science — true enough as far as it goes — of such knowledge. And the uniform result of their investigations has been, not that because (as assumed) all knowledge is sensible knowledge, therefore all existence is material, but that, in the words of Mr. Herbert Spencer, "our own and all other existence is a mystery absolutely and forever beyond our comprehension." The inference of theoretical materialism was hasty, superficial, illogical: that of agnosticism is founded on scientific inquiry, and is true. And if all human knowledge were specifically and exclusively sensible — in the sense in which this term is technically employed and will presently be explained — agnosticism would be the last word of philosophy. But this is the same as to say that philosophy would not, in any positive sense, exist. For philosophy is the science of Being; but agnosticism consists in nothing but a persuasion that no such science is possible.

Now, the question between those who limit all knowledge to sense and those who recognize for it a more comprehensive nature is a question of experimental fact, to be settled, not by mere assertion, but by scientific examination of the facts themselves. It is in this way that the true philosophers have sought to settle it. Knowledge is a conscious pro-

cess. The question is, What is the nature and true description of this process? and what are the terms or factors involved in the process?

The process of knowledge most obviously involves the distinction of two factors, termed subject and object. It is in these factors that Being inheres. The process into which they enter is, in its results, knowledge (knowing), consciousness, experience. What is the relation between the factors as involved in this process? This may be termed the fundamental question, or problem, of the *science of Knowledge*. Upon the answer given to this question depends the answer which must follow the further inquiry, What is the nature of the factors themselves? Are they knowable, and, if so, as what are they known to be? Or, otherwise expressed, Is a *science of Being* achievable by man, and, if so, what does it teach?

The sensationalist, looking at knowledge in its sensible aspect, finds that the relation between subject and object is here, apparently, a purely mechanical one; and, in truth, this appearance is the essential characteristic of sensible knowledge, *qua* sensible. The technical meaning, above alluded to, of the phrase "specifically sensible knowledge" is precisely this, to wit, Knowledge resulting from, or at all events depending on, a purely mechanical process. The sensationalist, dogmatically assuming from the start that all knowledge is sensible, and only sensible, maintains that the only relation subsisting between subject and object is a mechanical

one; or, *vice versa*, dogmatically maintaining that no other than a mechanical relation exists, or can exist, between subject and object, thence concludes that all knowledge is necessarily of a purely sensible nature. A "mechanical relation"— what does this imply? It implies that the terms of the relation — in this case the subject and object of consciousness — are not only numerically different, but are also *per se* wholly independent of and separate from each other. A mechanical relation is a purely external and accidental relation. It consists in mere coexistence, or, at most, in superficial contact. It is such a relation, only, which the sensationalist conceives as existing between subject and object in knowledge. The relation obviously presupposes a materialistic conception of the probable absolute nature of subject and object. There, without, is an aggregate of varied objects; here, within, is another object, which plays the rôle of subject, having originally no determinable nature, but being rather "like a piece of white paper on which nothing has been written." And now the objects begin to play upon the subject in the only way which is possible for them, namely, in the way of contact or impression. And then, as if by magic, the impression becomes illuminated with the light of consciousness. By a wonderful transfiguration it becomes an element of knowledge, part and parcel of our conscious experience. But where in this result are the factors which produced it? They are not contained in the product, but are left behind or without it. By virtue of the very nature

of the terms in which they were conceived, and of the relation posited as existing between them, it is impossible that this should be otherwise. Materialistically conceived, and incapable of entering into any other than a purely mechanical relation, neither of them can enter into the other, nor into a *tertium quid*, termed consciousness or knowledge. They can at most only be imagined as coming into contact with each other, or, so to speak, with consciousness; they cannot become a part of consciousness itself.

What have we, then, as the result of this theory? We have, not a scientific explanation or comprehension of conscious knowledge, but an act of thaumaturgy. We have, on the one side, contact of object and subject, or, if you please, communication of motion from the environment of a nervous organism to the organism itself; on the other, something *toto cœlo* different, namely, conscious states. How the former can be transformed into or result in the latter, it is forever impossible to see. The two terms, mechanical contact, or motion, and consciousness, are absolutely incommensurable. And so it is no wonder that the sensationalists themselves unanimously confess the case to be involved in a baffling mystery, thus virtually admitting the failure of their own theory as ostensibly a complete *science* of knowledge. And how about object and subject? These were assumed as factors of consciousness, and consequently as something lying within consciousness, or as real terms, and hence objects, of knowledge. But in the result they have disappeared. They remain without

the pale of consciousness, and hence of knowledge. They are unknowable. There remains nothing but a series of conscious states, each of which, while one and indivisible, is yet — by another miracle! — not one, but two, being at once subject and object, or conscious (as subject) of itself (as object). Thus the purely sensational theory of knowledge explains (?) knowledge, or consciousness, by explaining away, as unknowable, its real factors, and then making consciousness itself (conceived as a series of passive states) do duty in place of those factors, at once as its own subject and object.

The result of this theory is that which in the history of philosophy is called Subjective Idealism, Scepticism, or Sceptical Idealism, or Agnosticism. According to it, knowledge, strictly speaking, is confined to the mysterious consciousness which each individual has of his own inward states. An objective world without, as true object of knowledge, and a real mind within, as subject of knowledge,— these are not known. If existent, they "lie forever beyond our comprehension." Still, along with this theory, and in spite of its negative results, its upholders always maintain the ineradicable "belief" that world and mind — especially the former,— the latter seems to be considered of less account,— indeed exist. But if they exist, they must, it is held, exist behind consciousness, beyond experience, out of the reach of sense. Now, as the sphere of sense is called the sphere of things physical, world and mind must exist beyond or behind what is physical.

In other words, they are metaphysical entities. Now, the question arises with the sensationalist, how he shall justify his confessed or practical belief in these entities. The belief is confessedly opposed to the results of his theory, and so strictly "unscientific." Still, as it cannot be got rid of, it must somehow be made at least to *seem* rational. And thus the need of a new "science" is made to appear — a science called "metaphysics," whose "great problem" is to prove the "existence" of something which lies wholly without the range of experience, as "scientifically" defined, namely, the "existence of the external world." Observe, now, that this problem is an artificial one, created by and resulting only from the negative results of a highly artificial and incomplete theory of knowledge. For a broader and complete science of knowledge, or of conscious experience, this problem does not exist. What is called the "external world" already exists and is given in man's (not merely *sensible*) experience, and the problem of philosophy, or of the Science of Being, in this regard is not to "prove" its existence, but to comprehend it as it exists. The "metaphysical" problem, which sensationalism thus creates for itself, is of course really insoluble on the basis of the sensational theory of knowledge. And so the "metaphysics," which seeks to solve the problem, can really only consist in covering it up with a cloud of meaningless words and hair-splitting, but wholly nugatory, distinctions. This illustrates perfectly what has to the greatest extent been understood in modern times,

and most of all in British climes, by "metaphysics." The number of its problems is increased by the "Intuitionist" of the historic type, who asserts his possession of rational intuitions, compelling him to believe in the existence of God, the soul, absolute moral distinctions, etc., as well as of the external world. All of these beliefs are indeed highly rational, and nothing is to be said *per se* against the assertion of the corresponding intuitions. But the Intuitionist's conception of the nature of the fundamental relation between the factors of consciousness is identical with the sensationalist's conception. Hence, for him, God, the soul, etc., are what the external world is for the sensationalist, namely, something lying beyond "experience," metaphysical quiddities, whose metempirical reality must, if possible, be "proven,"—not simply comprehended as it is given *in* experience. Such a conception of metaphysics, as the foregoing, philosophy wholly repudiates. The great philosophers have never had anything to do with it, except, possibly, to point out its absolute absurdity. It is this conception which, as we shall see, Kant adopts, but mercilessly riddles and demolishes, thereby, in so far, preparing the way for the new life of positive *philosophy* in the works of his successors.

Theoretical Materialism, as we have seen, is overthrown by the very science to which it appeals for support — the science of sensible knowledge. If matter possesses absolute substantial existence, as a form of real being *sui generis*, it can only be known

through sense. But the analysis of sense — the science of sensible knowledge — shows that through sense matter can neither be known to exist nor not to exist. The absolute assertion of its existence,— and still more, the unqualified assertion that all existence is material,— is therefore pure dogmatism. What survives the destruction of theoretical materialism is, then, as we have further seen, Agnosticism, which we have once above designated "practical Materialism." The justification of the designation will be at once obvious. Agnosticism — the science of the unknowableness of Being — rests on the purely sensational science of knowledge. It assumes this to be the whole science of knowledge. This science rests on certain presuppositions, namely, that the relation between the terms of knowledge, subject and object, is mechanical, and only mechanical, and that, consequently, the terms themselves must, at all events, and can only be materialistically conceived, — which lead, it is true, only to negative and apparently self-destructive conclusions. But since it is arbitrarily assumed that no other presuppositions are admissible or agreeable to experimental fact, since the categories of matter and mechanism, notwithstanding the sensationalists' demonstration of their ontological "inscrutableness," are dogmatically declared to be the only categories admissible in scientific thought, it follows that either science must be renounced, or it must continue to speak the language of Materialism, and of Materialism alone. If matter be unknowable, yet phenomena, which may

be termed phenomena of matter, are known, being indeed strictly identical, in the last analysis, with those states of sensible consciousness which are declared to constitute the whole sum and substance — the whole subject and object — of all our real knowledge. And so the Agnostic makes all our science or knowledge to be in the last resort conversant only with so-called phenomena of the "redistribution of matter and motion." Hence he is to be termed a practical Materialist.

So, then, the purely sensational theory of knowledge ends by making a science of Being impossible, while practically it compels us to adopt the attitude of mechanistic materialism. This result cannot rationally be resisted — it must the rather be unhesitatingly adopted, — if the theory in question corresponds to all the facts involved in the process of conscious experience. That it corresponds to some of the facts, and is thus relatively true, is not to be doubted. There is such a thing as sensible knowledge, or a sensible aspect of knowledge, and the sensational analysis is correct which discovers in such knowledge and in all its objects the presence of mechanical relations. And so, too, there exists for man a realm of existence, or of phenomena of existence, which may most conveniently be termed material. The only questions are, Is all knowledge purely sensible, or, is the sensible, i.e. the mechanical, aspect of knowledge its only aspect? And then, what is the real nature, or what the true explanation, of the realm of apparent existence

termed material? This last question, it will be noted, cannot, in view of what has above been shown, be answered, except on condition that we really find in knowledge something more than sense, as above explained. This is one of the oddities of the history of speculation, namely, that philosophic materialism, with its mechanico-sensible theory of knowledge, being always suicidal, not able to defend itself, turning all its ontological science into nescience, and changing the real material universe, which it set out to magnify and defend, into a spectre, has at last to turn for protection, or for its relative justification, to another doctrine, apparently the precise opposite of itself. It is Spiritualistic Idealism alone which, finding in knowledge something more than mechanical sense, rescues the material universe for us as a scene of objective and knowable, though dependent, reality. The real, objective truth of "Materialism," or the true defense of "matter," is found, not in the doctrine which calls itself "Materialism," but in Idealism.

The first and main question, then, is a question of fact. Is it experimentally true that the sole relation between subject and object in knowledge is a mechanical one; and, if not, what other relation do the facts disclose? What are the facts? The facts are that subject and object are distinguished within consciousness, or knowledge, and not simply outside of it. This means that, while numerically different, they are, in some real and effective sense, one. And this, again, means — "discloses," demonstrates, shows

—that the relation between them is not simply mechanical. Things which are only mechanically different can in no real sense be one. They can at most be one only in the sense in which we say that stones thrown together form one heap, or aggregate, of stones. But this unity, the unity of mere aggregation, is not of the kind which is revealed in conscious knowledge. Subject and object are not indifferent to each other. It is not pure matter of accident whether they come together or not. The rather, they are inseparable from each other. Each implies and is most intimately one with the other. The object becomes object only as it becomes a part of the subject;—all consciousness is *self*-consciousness. On the other hand, the subject becomes subject only as it merges itself in its object;—all consciousness is objective consciousness. These *facts* of conscious experience cannot, without contradiction, be stated in terms of mere mechanism, or conceived with the aid of its categories alone. And yet they are patent and ever-present facts of living experience. And the work of a truly objective *science* of knowledge is not to insist that the facts shall square with the requirements of a preconceived and extremely narrow theory, on pain, if they resist, of being declared absolutely mysterious, and so no further object of science, but to let them speak for themselves; or, in other words, to look the facts squarely in the face and simply learn from them what relation they disclose as subsisting between the subject and object in knowledge, and then, further,

what ontological *nature* of subject and object (whether materialistic or spiritualistic) this relation itself discloses. It is only in this way that the true science of knowledge, and, in and through it, of being, can be attained. It is, as we have above intimated, by their pursuit of this way, that the two great movements of philosophic inquiry, which reached their culminating points with Aristotle and Hegel, achieved their durable, positive and commanding results. The series of "German Philosophical Classics," in which the present volume is the first one to appear, will have it for their joint task to show, with some detail, by what steps, and with what results, the authors, whose work is to be exhibited, pushed on in this way, and so succeeded in answering the question and interpreting the facts which we have before us. And right here a digression may be allowed, to make place for the remark, that the "steps" which Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel took, mark a progress. Kant took the first step away from, or in advance of, the sensational theory of knowledge, but only the first. Fichte took another, and Schelling still another, the final one being accomplished by Hegel. The last step reached a goal to which the first one logically pointed. In this sense it is perfectly true to say that Hegel is the true interpreter of Kant, and that the cry now prevalent in philosophical circles, "back to Kant," means, and can only mean, when logically interpreted, "back also to Kant's successors." Let it further be expressly remarked, in

this place, that because one recognizes and insists upon what a given philosopher, or set of philosophers, has positively achieved, it does not therefore follow that one must have a partisan's blindness to all the possible defects or incompletenesses of the achievement, or to the possibly erroneous inferences which the philosophers themselves, or their admirers, may have drawn from their achievement. The authors engaged upon this series of "Classics" swear by no name. They simply see in the works, which they undertake to expound, a notable *contribution* to the science of knowledge and of being. The value of this contribution is not determined by the names of its authors, but by the measure of its correspondence with ever-present facts of life and experience, and of its agreement with the positive results of all really scientific — comprehensive, catholic, not partial or prejudiced — inquiry into the nature of these facts in all time.

The relation between subject and object is not essentially mechanical, and hence subject and object are not to be materialistically conceived. If all consciousness is at once self-consciousness and also objective consciousness, so that subject and object, while experimentally presented as different, are also experimentally presented as in some real and effective sense one, the fundamental relation between subject and object must be, not dead and inert, but living and forceful; not material, but ideal, or, rather, spiritual. It is a relation which can only be called organic, or the relation of particular to

particular through the organic identity of both in the universal. This is by no means a purely sensible or mechanical relation, though it is not exclusive of such relation, rightly understood. Nor is it an unintelligible one. On the contrary, it is the most *intelligible* of all relations, being present wherever there is life. For illustration of it we refer the reader to the last part of Chapter IV below. In view of the fact that the relation is of the kind above described, it follows that its terms, subject and object, cannot simply be space-occupying atoms. They are not merely sensible entities, or "substances," mechanically separated from each other. They reveal themselves primarily as activities. They actively unite in one, and at the same time keep themselves differentiated, the one from the other. More especially they reveal themselves as forces of the only kind which man has ever been able to conceive without contradiction, namely, as spiritual forces, self-illuminated by intelligence and rooted in will. It follows, then, that *being* is not simply inertly existing in space; no *such* existence, considered absolutely, is known or knowable. Being is Doing, and Doing is, in the first and last resort, the operation of Spirit. But the activity of Spirit is Life, and so Life in some sense is coextensive with the realm of Reality. It is in the contemplation of such results of inquiry as these, that Plato terms the Absolute the Good; Aristotle, pure Energy, which is the same as Mind (and he adds, "Energy of Mind is Life"); St. John, Love; Hegel, Spirit; and

all of these designations, rightly interpreted, express the same truth of absolute fact or of absolute experience.

The full truth of these results of philosophic inquiry, thus fragmentarily stated, is appreciated in all its significance only as the result of an appropriate scientific discipline of intelligence; or, in other words, of persevering, objective study of facts. The same thing is, in its measure, true as regards the results of any science. And yet they lie demonstrated in the history of philosophy, or of scientific inquiry into the nature and real content of our conscious experience, or knowledge. The further proof of their truth is found in their agreement with man's whole and undivided experience, and in the circumstance, demonstrated by the whole history of thought, that, except on worthless grounds of purely dogmatic, wilful assertion, no other resolute philosophy or Science of Being has been, or can ever be, maintained. To attend to the latter point first. The only doctrine other than the one above sketched, which has a scientific character and somewhat resembles a philosophy, or a Science of Being, is Practical Materialism,—otherwise termed, nowadays, Agnosticism. We have seen that this doctrine is nevertheless, as its new name implies, not philosophy, but the denial of the possibility of philosophy. But this is only the negative and purely dogmatic part of Agnosticism. The positive substance of Agnosticism is nothing other than Physical Science. It adopts the just and admitted

principles, methods and limitations of physical science, and consists then, on its positive side, in seeking to show what are, or must be, the highest generalizations or results of such science, and to demonstrate their truth. Now, the subject-matter of physical science is coextensive with the sphere of sensible existence, *qua* sensible. The general nature, or theory, therefore, of physical science, considered as pure *science* or *knowledge*, is determined by or results from the science of sensible knowledge, *qua* sensible. In agreement, accordingly, with the results of this latter science, we find that physical science, in its highest generalizations and ideals, remains ever within the category of pure mechanism, and that it limits the objects of its knowledge — the subject-matter of its inquiry — to conscious, sensible phenomena. It knows no absolute substance or entity, whether material or otherwise, and it knows no force. It only knows sensibly conscious phenomena of figured space and motion. Now, it were, of course, ludicrous to say that this nature and these limitations of physical science detract in the least from the positively scientific and fruitful character of such science. And so far as Agnosticism simply makes common cause with physical science and seeks to promote its development, it is itself positively scientific. But when it says that physical science is all science, sensible knowledge all knowledge, it becomes dogmatic. It denies, as it must then do, the possibility of philosophy, and, in doing so on the ground which it alleges, it virtually declares that

within the field of real, positive philosophy Spiritualistic Idealism has no rival. If it have such rival, it must find it in physical science. But physical science here declares its impotence. Its "realism," the realism of sense, or of sensible knowledge as such, turns to the most intensely subjective "idealism"—an "idealism" falsely so called, that limits all knowledge to subjective sensible appearance, and knows nothing of the true, objective Ideal or Spiritual, which is the true and ever-present Real, and the living seat of Efficiency, of Power, of Being. But such "idealism" falls far short of the realism of experience. Even the popular consciousness of mankind—nay, the very consciousness of the Agnostic himself (who postulates an "*inscrutable* force" underlying the universe) sees in the world something more than conscious phenomena of configuration and motion. And now to this side of experience, philosophy, or Spiritualistic Idealism, shows itself true. Philosophy has, with reference to physical science, nothing to do but to acknowledge and confirm the justness of her results, as far as they go. But she supplements them by showing what they mean. She shows that sensible phenomena point to and *manifest* a reality which is within, and not without, experience. The physical or so-called material universe is real,—real not only in the abstract and ontologically shadowy sense in which physical science, or the "philosophy" reared in its name, depicts it, but in a concreter and more vital sense. It is real, not simply as the subjective con-

scious product of assumed forces, but as the objective scene of the action of real forces, which, being true *forces*, are of spiritual origin, subject to laws of perfect purpose, and consequently of invariable order, and which work together for the production, not simply of "one far-off divine event," but of myriads of present and ever-continuing divine events. The whole truth, such as it is, of materialism is not only recognized by philosophy; it is also explained, and that, too, in agreement with the essential nature of human experience.

But the characteristic side of human experience is not materialistic, mechanical, sensible. Man has a life, and this his characteristic life, in religion, art, society, and even in communion with and mastery of nature herself. In all these relations his experience confirms and is explicable only by that organic-spiritual theory of experience which results from the completed science of knowledge, and which philosophy adopts. In all of them the individual, while retaining all his individuality, is yet organically one with a larger life, which imparts to his own individual life its true substance, giving it a fixed and inspiring purpose, and a character founded in the universal, the abiding, the true. Such facts as these, mechanism, which knows no organic unity, no true life, no spirit, is unable to explain. It can analyze, on their phenomenal or sensible side, the factors involved in the relations noted, and trace their outward mechanical history,—and this is well; this is valuable and, for complete knowledge, neces-

sary. But exclusive mechanism misses the one thing which above all others it is needful to recognize,—the "spiritual bond," the common, coöperant, efficient life, the effective purpose, the synthetic, inspiring power. And yet this one thing is here and with us, ever present in conscious experience. And it loses its mystery as an object of knowledge or comprehension just so soon as we recognize that the fundamental relation in all conscious experience is a relation of members which are in organic unity, which exist only as terms of a living process, in and through each other, or in and through a universal, a *power* and life of spirit, which (as God) indeed transcends them both, but still does not exclude them; the rather, in agreement with its essential nature as Love, includes them in its own embrace, and so gives light and being to everything that "cometh into the world."

Such, in general and all too vague outline, is the only ontology known to philosophy. It is the only ontology which has in it positive, nay, universal and all-comprehensive substance, being founded on the whole of experience and mutilating or cutting off no member thereof. It alone makes the universe to be, for intelligence, not merely a universe of brute fact, (and so in truth not a universe for intelligence!) but of overflowing meaning and of absolute, because spiritual, and so effective and self-illuminating, reality. And of such order is the truth demonstrated in the classic philosophy of Greece, and in German philosophy from Leibnitz and Kant to Hegel.

The first step in the modern, German demonstration was taken by Immanuel Kant, who, born of humble parents (the father was of Scottish origin) in the city of Königsberg, in the year 1724, died there in the year 1804.

Modern philosophy, before Kant's time, had, as a whole, been effectually stunted in its growth. This in consequence of two circumstances: first, that as a general rule, the so-called founders of modern philosophy made it a principle of their procedure wholly to "break off from the past," i.e. haughtily to ignore ancient philosophy, rather than to comprehend it and learn the true lesson of its merits as well as of its deficiencies; and secondly, that modern philosophy took its rise at a time when the mathematical and physical sciences, which are specifically concerned only with the facts or conditioning forms and relations of sensible existence, were being, or were beginning to be, cultivated with unusual zeal and success. The contagion of the influence and example of these sciences inspired the disposition, on the part of philosophy, to imitate their method and adopt their theoretical presuppositions. So it came about that in modern philosophy, down to the time of Kant, the category of mechanism reigned well-nigh supreme. But the category of mechanism, as we have seen, corresponds to and expresses the characteristically sensible side or aspect of conscious experience, and its exclusive adoption implies the adoption of a purely mechanical theory of the process of knowledge and an essentially mate-

rialistic conception of the terms involved in this process.

All this is signally illustrated in the general complexion and results of the philosophy of Descartes and Spinoza, notwithstanding the garb of dogmatic idealism with which their doctrine is more or less completely invested. We note here only one point. Philosophy, as Science of Being, seeks, of course, an adequate conception of the nature of being, as such, and an adequate expression for the conception. The expression naturally follows and conforms to the conception. Now, the Cartesian and Spinozistic synonym for absolute Being is Substance. The term substance suggests only mechanical and sensible relations. One may term the Absolute, or Absolute Being, "God," with every breath, as Spinoza does. But as long as the Absolute is conceived and defined only as a "substance," the word "God" will be but an empty name. The relations expressed by the term substance are abstract, mathematical, dead. They are relative to the concrete, living, spiritual, from which they are abstracted. God is a living Spirit, or he is nothing. The Absolute is spiritual, or else, as the history of philosophy shows, unknowable. To term and conceive it simply as substance, is really to lose sight of it, and to treat as absolute that which is in fact only relative, dependent, phenomenal. A "philosophy" which does this is dogmatic — a description commonly given in the history of philosophy to the doctrine of Descartes and Spinoza. Leibnitz, the one man who,

thoroughly conversant with the mathematical and physical science of his time, and also with ancient as well as modern philosophy, towered above all others of the two centuries between which his life was divided, in the matter of positive philosophic insight, continued, while correcting Descartes's and Spinoza's error of conception, to employ for the Absolute the term which they had used. He called it substance, but then declared, "Substance is Action." All absolute existence, he saw and held, is an energy of intelligence. The conception was correct, but the above terms in which it was expressed, involved, when taken literally, a patent paradox. And we may say that, corresponding to this defect in expression, the grand defect in Leibnitz's whole doctrine arises from the presence in it of a mechanistic element, not reduced into harmony with the main spiritualistic tendency.

Even more signally, though in a very different fashion, is our thesis respecting the prevailing character of philosophy before Kant's time illustrated in the history of British inquiry. From the time of Francis Bacon down almost to this day, the leading and dominant current of British speculation has run in the channel of sensational empiricism. It has been a self-styled "experimental philosophy," a philosophy founded in experience, as, rightly understood, all philosophy must be and is. But then experience has been identified with "sense," and sense has been considered only, or in the main, on its *modal* side, as a physico-mechanical process, to the

exclusion of its other, *essential* and conditioning, side,— the side which Kant proceeded anew to point out, and the one whereby sense, or sensible experience, reveals itself as grounded in an energy, or energies, of spirit. Thus "experience" has been, in principle, reduced to a superficial minimum, being regarded as a process in which the subject is essentially passive, and only mechanically acted upon by environing "objects." So, in Britain, the mechanical theory of sensible knowledge was developed as the theory of all knowledge, ending, with Hume, in those results of purely Subjective Idealism, Scepticism, or Agnosticism,— a veritable atony or astheny of thought,— which have been noted in the earlier part of this Introduction, and have been repeated by notable followers of Hume in Great Britain to the present day.

Such, then, was the speculative atmosphere of the modern world, into which Kant was born, and in which he was reared. How completely he came under its pall-like influence will appear in connection with the following biographical details. What efforts he finally made to break through its spell and to regain the *terra firma* of man's living experience, his monumental works disclose.

Kant was educated at the university of his native city, and for nearly a half-century lectured within its walls. Never in his life going more than a few miles away from his birthplace, he studied men and events, at home and abroad, with the relish of a keen and thoughtful observer. In classical litera-

ture, especially that of the Latin poets, in mathematics, and in the physical science of his time, he was a vigorous adept. Of the truth of the last part of this statement Kant's earliest writings, which are almost all devoted to special or general physical problems, give abundant evidence. Indeed, the very first work of Kant, published when he was only twenty-three years of age, aimed at the composition of the strife between the Cartesians and the followers of Leibnitz respecting the true formula for the expression of the constancy of the physical universe, and belonged to the same general order of discussions with those which have latterly resulted in the enunciation of the law of the Conservation of Energy. In this and other early writings Kant indicates the most comprehensive familiarity with the names and investigations of leading naturalists and physicists at home and abroad,— including, especially, Newton,— and an absorbing and active interest in them. In 1755 he published a mechanical "Theory of the Universe," which has caused him to be ranked with Laplace among the fathers of the modern nebular hypothesis.

The original direction of Kant's mind was thus not exclusively, or even mainly, toward "metaphysical," or technically philosophical, problems; although in his physical works he indicates more or less a constant consciousness of metaphysical questions. He had been bred in the current metaphysics of his time, the so-called Leibnitz-Wolffian philosophy, in which the living thought of the acknowledged

master. Leibnitz, had been reduced to a systematic, but lifeless, and hence comparatively uninstructive, formalism. Through this, as will be subsequently seen, Kant nevertheless imbibed many a germ of real philosophic thought, but he was not hide-bound in this or in any other so-called metaphysical system. On the contrary, in his very first published work he expresses incidentally his distrust of all current metaphysics, by declaring that "our metaphysics, like many other sciences, has in fact only come to the threshold of real and solid knowledge, and God only knows when we shall see it step across the threshold."

The growing influence of his predilection for physical inquiries, and of his increased and absorbing study of British writers, such as Newton, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Hume, in increasing this distrust, and in leading him, for the time being, to identify "metaphysics," through psychology, with physical science, and the whole method of the former with the method of the latter, is indicated in growing measure in the succeeding products of Kant's pre-critical thinking, and especially in a series of works belonging to the years 1763–1766.* Here we find Kant declaring that "the genuine method of metaphysics is substantially identical with that which Newton introduced into physical science, and which

* The works referred to are especially the following: The Only Possible Ground for a Demonstration of God's Existence, 1763; Inquiry concerning the Evidence of the Principles of Natural Theology and Ethics, 1764; and Dreams of a Visionary, illustrated by Dreams of Metaphysics, 1766.

has there been followed by such useful results. This method consists in seeking out, by assured experimental methods, and also with the aid of geometry, the rules according to which certain natural phenomena occur." Metaphysics must find its place "on the lowly ground of experience [*sic*] and common sense." Its "principal" work is to analyze the "confused" contents of consciousness, or our "ideas." True, the "metaphysician" will not in this case get beneath the surface of the case under investigation, so as to understand its whole nature; he will still know only the phenomena. But he will have the consolation of reflecting that, once in possession of laws or of the final results of analysis, he may thereafter, for his varied profit or instruction, employ them as a basis for the deductive determination of obscure questions of fact or for the practical guidance of life. As for those convictions which are "in the highest degree necessary for our happiness," and which do not concern or depend on the ascertainment of "the rules according to which phenomena occur" (since in fact they relate to the ultra-phenomenal or to the truly metaphysical), these have not been left "by Providence" to depend on subtle ratiocinations, but "immediately communicated to the natural common sense of mankind." They are written immediately upon "the heart," and are the subject of a "moral belief," which is quite sufficient for all practical purposes, even though it may defy all theoretical justification.

Here we find Kant adopting completely the atti-

tude, and even copying the style and language of the British moralists and psychologists. Here he touches philosophical low-water, reaching a point in his mental history where he must choose between floating henceforth upon a tide that never rises to philosophical knowledge, or making strenuous efforts to stem the tide and gain the rock-ribbed eminence that overlooks and sets bounds to its movements. We shall find that he chooses the latter course, and that he indeed "practically" (as he would term it) conquers a seat upon the eminence referred to, but that, half dazed by the brilliant prospect, half blinded by the old psychological prejudices, he does not literally believe his own eyes, but continues to the end to ascribe to an invincible moral "faith" what he dares not and, owing to the continuance of an equally invincible mechanistic prejudice, knows not how to hold as matter of "theoretical" knowledge.

But the fact that Kant had thus at one time so completely identified himself in sympathy and conviction with the British type of speculation, lends peculiar interest and instructiveness, for us English readers, to the history of the labor by which he sought to supplement and correct it. Only, as above noted, we have not learned our whole lesson from Kant until we have learned what those successors of Kant have to teach, who, in their turn, supplemented and corrected him.

It is interesting to note that, in the works of the brief period above alluded to, and especially in an "Attempt to Introduce into Philosophy the Concep-

tion of Negative Magnitudes." published in 1763, Kant already gives marked evidence of the disturbance in his thought caused by Hume's negative conclusions respecting the nature of scientific causation or law. It is well known to students of Kant that it was especially this disturbance, which immediately provoked Kant to the inquiries that resulted finally in the composition of the "Critique of Pure Reason." According to Hume, cause and effect meant only phenomena, which habitually succeed each other. Of "necessary connexion" between them there was asserted to be no discoverable trace. "Anything might be the cause of anything." In this way scientific law was eviscerated of all rational significance.

Kant, now, was early struck with the singularity and apparent gravity of this conclusion, which, however, he was unable to disprove, and so, for the time being, apparently accepted as final truth for man; but only for the time being.

From the year 1755 until 1770 Kant's position in the University of Königsberg had been only that of an independent lecturer, or "Privat-docent," privileged to draw as many students to his lectures as he could, and to receive from them the usual fees, but holding no official appointment. In 1770 he was made professor of logic and metaphysics, and in the Latin "inaugural dissertation," (on the "Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World,") with which he entered upon the performance of his new functions, first gave

evidence of a newly-beginning revulsion from the psychological dogmatism in which, according to his own later confession, he had been "slumbering." Then followed a period of ten years, in which "the Königsberg thinker" rested almost wholly from literary activity and meditated the work which he finally composed, according to his own account, within four or five months, and gave to the world, in 1781, in a bulky volume entitled the "Critique of Pure Reason." In 1783 followed the "Prolegomena," a smaller, explanatory volume, or popular exposition of the *Critique*. A second edition of the *Critique*, revised and enlarged, was published in 1787.

As soon as the nature and purport of the *Critique* began to be perceived, the work was studied with the most absorbing attention, and through the press and in university lecture-rooms was discussed with the liveliest interest. The pedantries of scholastic formalism and other perplexing obscurities of style, in which the book was not deficient, could not conceal the fact that here a living, earnest voice was crying out of the wilderness of eighteenth-century formalism and superficialism and uttering a message, not lightly conceived, but thought out through years of patient study, and addressed, not to the past, nor to some remote and abstract future, but to the immediate present and to its urgent intellectual needs. Whether, therefore, to be condemned and reviled or to be approved and lauded, Kant's *Critique* quickly became the common theme

and starting-point for philosophical discussion.* Of no other single work can it more truly be said that it created an epoch in the history of philosophic thought.

Besides the "Critique of Pure Reason," Kant wrote and published two other *Critiques*, the one (1788) on the "Practical Reason," and the other (1790) on the "Faculty of Judgment." The first of the three *Critiques* seeks to define and demonstrate the nature, conditions and limits of scientific or "theoretical" knowledge; the second, to ascertain the ground and enumerate all the implications, or necessary postulates, of our moral or "practical" conviction; and the third, to exhibit the nature and significance of those judgments of men, by virtue of which they undertake to declare, on the one hand, that some objects are beautiful, others sublime, etc., (Æsthetic judgments,) and, on the other, that the operations of nature in general, and of organic nature in particular, are purposeful or denote intelligence (Teleological judgments). The three *Critiques* constitute an organic whole, and must all be considered together, in order rightly to estimate Kant's historic achievement and its relation, as stepping-stone and prophecy, to the completer work of his successors.

The "Critique of Pure Reason," however, taken by

* An interesting brochure by Prof. Matern Reuss, published in 1789, and in which a favorable answer is given to the question (of the title-page), "Shall Kant's Philosophy be Explained at Catholic Universities?" gives suggestive details in evidence of the general attention which was already given to Kant's Criticism at the German Universities and elsewhere.

itself, not only points the way to the other two works, but anticipates, in compendious form, their leading results.

The main starting-point of the "Critique of Pure Reason," now, is to be found in the results of British sensational empiricism, as formulated by Hume. The work has then a double object or result, a proximate or immediate and a remote or indirect one. Of these, again, the former is two-fold, consisting (a) in establishing the at least formal dependence of sensible knowledge, and especially of pure mathematical and physical science, on intellectual or spiritual, as well as mechanico-sensible, conditions, and (b) in enforcing the truth that the conceptions and method of physical science, *as such*, are irrelevant for the demonstration or disproof of truths which lie deeper than, or beyond, the immediate sphere of purely sensible phenomena. Through the first or immediate result, especially the second part of it, the remote or indirect one is reached, which is, to "secure a place for faith" (*Crit. of P. R.*, Preface to 2d ed.). For, Kant holds, not as a result of his inquiry — the rather, in express opposition to its logical implications — but as a result of the influence upon him of a blinding mechanistic prejudice of his age, that there is no knowledge, in the strict sense of the term, except such as is characteristically dependent and consequent upon the mechanical process of "sensible affection." Whatever may be the influence of our own mental mechanism (as Kant conceives it) in determining the form which our

knowledge may take, the latter is, in substance, so far as it is to be called true, objective knowledge, wholly physical. But the range of physical knowledge does not extend beyond the sphere of *sensible phenomena.* Noumena, or "things-in-themselves," are hence strictly, or "theoretically," unknowable. By knowledge, i.e. by physical science, we can determine nothing about them. If, therefore, we find ourselves subject to certain indefeasible moral convictions, respecting God, Freedom, Immortality, and the Objective Beauty and Reason of the universe, we are left at liberty to fill up the space left vacant by knowledge, as the exigencies of our moral conviction or of a "rational faith" may require. And this is what Kant proceeds to do in his second and third *Critiques.*

Philosophy, as theoretical *Science* of *Being*, is thus not brought by Kant out of the woods of mechanism and formalism, and consequent subjectivism. But he, like a blind Samson, with powerful blows removed many obstacles of prejudice which lay in her way, giving an impulse and a cue to others who came after him, and who led philosophy further on "into the green meadows of objective reality." In particular, it is the merit of Kant to have enforced (after Leibnitz) the first and simplest lesson which modern times had to learn, as a precondition to the existence of philosophy in an independent and energetic form,— we mean the lesson of the exact ontological limitations of physical and mathematical science, and consequently of the

restricted range within which the peculiar methods of such science suffice for the exhaustive ascertainment or demonstration of experimental truth. Whenever, therefore, and so far as the attempt is made to lift physical and mathematical science into the place of philosophy, the lesson of Kant has but to be pondered anew. Forty years after Kant's death this lesson was widely forgotten in his own country, and precisely the attempt just noted became very generally prevalent, though, as might have been foreseen, its results were only negative results. It is, therefore, one of the happier signs of the times — and in no sense surprising — that during the last ten or fifteen years "return to Kant" has been in Germany more and more the common watchword. The result has been, among other things, a voluminous addition, in the way of criticism, exposition, and commentary, to the literature about Kant. The more important result must, and undoubtedly will, be a return to those successors of Kant in whom his thought is completed; or, still better, a return to philosophy and its peculiar method, irrespective of all the names, whether ancient or modern, which stand for its highest achievements.

English psychology, which had most to learn from Kant, has learned least from him. It has known little of him, and comprehended still less. It is only latterly, since the study and illustration of Kant have been taken up by British scholars, who have traveled far enough in post-Kantian German

philosophy to appreciate Kant's limitations as well as his merits, that solid and valuable contributions have been made in English to Kantian interpretation. And, as relating especially to Kant's first *Critique*, the subject of this volume, it is a real pleasure to be able to point the English reader to works of such substantial merit as Edward Caird's "The Philosophy of Kant" (Glasgow, 1877), Robert Adamson's four lectures "On The Philosophy of Kant" (Edinburgh, 1879)*, and John Watson's "Kant and his English Critics" (Glasgow and New York, 1881).

Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" has been twice translated into English,— first by F. Heywood (London, 1838), and next by M. D. Meiklejohn (London, Bohn, 1855). Of these the latter is in common use, though quite inadequate to conduct the English reader to the full sense of the original. A new translation, by Max Müller, is promised.

In the present work the author has preferred to translate directly from the original such passages of the *Critique* as it was necessary to quote. By quotation-marks, and generally by the context, these passages are indicated.

* Cf. Prof. Adamson's article on Kant, in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 9th ed., vol. xiii.

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON.

CHAPTER I.

THE QUESTION STATED.

WHAT is Experience? It is, at all events, something of which we are conscious. It is surely nothing of which we are not, either really or potentially, conscious. Perhaps, then, if we can succeed in making our ordinary consciousness and its whole history lie, as it were, before us, as a fixed, and determinate, and motionless object, like the dead body on an anatomist's table, capable of being dissected and otherwise analytically investigated, we may be able to answer the question. This is the "Baconian method," which works well in physical science: why should it not be followed with equal success in the present case? It is the historic method of English and Scotch psychology, and the final answer which it authorizes to our question is, that experience, or consciousness, is made up of an indefinitely numerous collection of conscious states, which differ among themselves only in respect of vividness, and which, while capable of being partially analyzed and described, are abso-

lutely incapable (from the psychological point of view) of genetic explanation.

The tautology of this conclusion—"consciousness" made up of "conscious states,"—is sufficiently obvious. Its insufficiency, when compared with actual experience, is no less apparent. For experience is a living whole, rich in variety, but having its parts bound together in organic unity, while in the results of psychological analysis we find only a monotonous aggregate of lifeless "states,"—the disconnected and independent atomic constituents of a consciousness which we must "murder," and hence absolutely disfigure, "to dissect." In real conscious experience there is synthesis, which means simply that our consciousness is not atomically simple and incomplex. It is complex, and each element is bound to all the rest by relations inherent in the nature of them all (logical or "objective" relations, or syntheses), while all are also held together and sustained through their living and organic relation to the one and self-same, or ever personally identical, agent or "Ego," which is conscious or thinks. But among the conscious states which alone empirical psychology leaves us, there is no inherent synthesis, or relation. Each is, as Hume tells us, an "independent existence," a sort of atom of consciousness, which might exist by itself, even if there were no other atoms of like nature. It needs nothing beside itself for its own explanation. Indeed, it is incapable of explanation, and stands complete in itself as simply one unrelated, brute, inexplicable fact. Moreover, since these states

are in a constant flux, since no necessary relation is admitted among them, and since no self-conscious and ever self-identical agent or Ego is recognized, with power to hold them all together in its intelligent embrace, it follows strictly that at any given instant consciousness must consist only of one indivisible state; it must be, as it were, an incomplex conscious point, without breadth or thickness, i.e. without distinguishable content. Thus, consciousness at any given instant, having no distinguishable content, is practically nothing, and consciousness as a whole is made up of such nothings,— all of which, unquestionably, is sufficiently absurd.

Accordingly, empirical psychologists always postulate, either expressly or by implication, certain synthetic "operations" of "mind," such as memory, comparison, etc., as being necessary to account for the obvious syntheses among conscious phenomena, though not strictly given among the latter: and then go on to cover up this evidence of their recreancy to their own principles by treating of these postulated "powers" as if they, too, were only a special order of the phenomena or states which they were to explain. They take advantage, however, of what they have thus gained, or stolen, from rational psychology, to the extent that they allow conscious states, or "impressions" and "ideas," to come and to be perceived, not singly—which would be impossible — but in "bundles" or loose aggregates. A landscape is indeed practically perceived by us as a whole, and not simply as a succession of the sensible impres-

sions which the different points of the landscape must produce. The setting of the sun is indeed viewed by us as one connected process, and not simply as a pure succession of perceptions, the presence of each of which implies the total exclusion from consciousness of all which preceded it. There are, indeed, at least such "*phenomena*" as memory and expectation. So much of synthesis is practically admitted. But then the contention is that any constant relations which apparently subsist among the phenomena are fortuitous and mechanical, or purely "empirical," and that they are in no sense inherently necessary and universal, or at least cannot be known to be so. All our knowledge is from, of, and strictly confined to, "experience," they say,—meaning by experience the whole collection of our sensible, but wholly unaccountable, "impressions and ideas," and nothing else. The world, it is held, is not incarnate reason, nor is the knowing mind or spirit of man impersonated reason. At all events, if this is so, it cannot be known to be so. It is not implied or given in the facts, or, consequently, in the true theory or account of knowledge or experience. Knowledge or experience is a mechanical accident, and nothing else.

Now, Kant at the very outset takes issue with this account of experimental knowledge. He declares that, as matter of obvious and notorious fact, while all our knowledge, considered with reference to its objective or material substance, may begin with, and ever depend on, sensible impressions, or "experi-

ence," as understood by the sensational psychologist, there is nevertheless an element contained in it which does not spring from this source. Kant does not, as he well might, stop to contend that that minimum of merely mechanical, and hence lifeless and accidental, synthesis which the empirical psychologists admit under the name of "association" or "habitual succession," is not contained in the original data of empirical psychology — namely, sensible impressions and their copies, or atoms of conscious state,— but is abstracted by them from that realm of *living* and ultra-mechanical experience into which they, like all other men, are born, but to which they resolutely seek to shut their eyes. He does not stop now to point out that thus experience, as finally viewed by the empirical psychologist himself, already contains an element which, from a strict interpretation of the psychologist's own premises or point of view, is non-empirical or "*a priori*." He concedes the so-called "principles" of accidental association and habitual succession as something which, for the time being at least, it is not worth while to strive about, and declares that, as matter of fact, our knowledge does contain elements which these principles — or which the empirical psychologist's "experience," of which these principles express the highest reach — cannot explain. Through no observation, namely, of the accidental association of sensible impressions and ideas, however long continued, could we ever become aware of truths which are

strictly and self-evidently necessary and universal.* Habitual association and succession can never induce the perception of an absolutely necessary and universal connection of ideas. This indeed was also asserted by Hume, who accordingly denied that such connection was in fact ever perceived. We might think that we perceived it, but in reality we were subject to a delusion, which habit was sufficient to explain.

Nay, but, says Kant, it is not a delusion, or, if the contrary be true, then are we deluded in all our most valued and solidly demonstrative sciences. All of the propositions of pure mathematics express truths which, by universal consent, are absolutely necessary and universal. Nay, the commonest understanding constantly employs principles of like character, such as, for example, this, that "all change must have a cause." Not only is mankind in possession of manifold propositions, principles, or "judgments," which, being intrinsically universal and necessary, must be termed *a priori*, or independent of contingent experience, it also possesses single notions to which a like quality and name must be ascribed. Such, for example, are the notions of space and substance, which remain, indefeasible and irremovable, when abstraction has been made from every possible impression of sense.

These facts, Kant in substance maintains, are too

* Necessity and universality were the marks by which Leibnitz had taught that "eternal," non-empirical or intelligible "truths" were to be distinguished from contingent truths of merely empirical or sensible "fact."

obvious and notorious to be affected by the denials or destructive "explanations" of the sensational psychologist. The only, and the important, question is, what do they signify? or "how are they possible?" To what mechanism or constitution of knowing mind do they point, and to what conclusions as to the nature, or ontological significance, and the consequent range, or possible limits, of human knowledge? What sort of a process is knowledge, and what can and do we know? This is the question for which the "Critique of Pure Reason" proposes to find an answer.

The highly scholastic and technical form in which Kant summarily states the question is as follows: "How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible?" This form results with him from a brief analysis of the following distinctions.

All our knowledge is either *a priori* or *a posteriori*. *A posteriori* is whatever knowledge is given in uncriticised sensible experience,— or in sensible experience as including sensible impressions or states, *plus* the, for the present, unquestioned, so-called principles of association and habit. *A priori* is whatever knowledge is not thus given, or whatever is universal and necessary.

Again, all knowledge, or its expression, assumes the form of a stated proposition or logical judgment. But all judgments are either analytical or synthetic. In an analytical judgment the predicate is contained in the subject and flows from it according to the principle of identity. For example, "All bodies are

extended." We have but to reflect upon what our notion of body implicitly contains, to see that, in thinking "body," we think also the attribute "extension." Such judgments are all *a priori*, but are thought to present no difficulty and to call for no further explanation of their "possibility."

In a synthetic judgment, on the contrary, the predicate does not flow from an analysis of the subject. Here there is true syn–thesis, or putting together, in one proposition or assertion, of terms that at first sight are not homogeneous or inseparable. For example, "All bodies are heavy." Our first notion or sensible impression of "body" carries with it and includes in it no notion or impression of "weight." Weight is not attributed to body by virtue of our possession of the simple idea or sensuous image of body, but on the ground of objective experience and investigation, which, accordingly, enables us to enrich our original idea by adding to it something that it did not originally contain.

Now synthetic judgments are either *a posteriori* or *a priori*. The former, being founded on contingent experience, are permitted, along with this experience, to pass, for the present, unquestioned, as requiring no further explanation of their "possibility." The latter, or synthetic judgments *a priori*, being ideally independent of contingent experience, must be challenged, and inquiry must be instituted (a) as to the ground of their possibility, or the mechanism or constitution of a mind which is actually "in possession" of them, and (b) as to the

warrant of their applicability, or the conditions upon which we may rely upon them as leading us, not into error, but into truth, or into trustworthy knowledge.

Such is the explanation of the form of the main question —"How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible?"—and such are its implications. But since "synthetic judgments *a priori*" are found in, and indeed constitute the substance or basis of, several different (real or alleged) sciences, the question is capable of subdivision, according as it is viewed in its relation to the case of these sciences, severally.

In mathematics Kant maintains that all judgments are synthetic, and at least all of those which belong to pure mathematics are also *a priori*. Similar *a priori* judgments are attributed by Kant to physical science, as specimens of which he cites the doctrine of the persistence of matter, without increase or diminution of quantity, in the midst of all the physical changes of the universe, and the law of the equality of physical action and reaction. These two sciences really exist; they must, therefore, unquestionably be possible, and the main question in its relation to them may be formulated in the two following questions: (1) "How is Pure Mathematics possible?" and (2) "How is Pure Physical Science possible?"

There exists, further, an alleged science, called Metaphysics, which professes to establish synthetic propositions respecting such non-sensible or *a priori*

matters as the World in its Totality, or considered with reference (for example) to its limitation or non-limitation in space and time, God, Freedom, and Immortality. Now, even if we admit that this profession has, up to the present, been wholly vain, yet it is a perfectly serious and earnest profession, and flows from a natural quality of human reason, or from a disposition to inquiry and a need for speculative satisfaction, so indestructibly innate in man, that we may be sure that in some form or other metaphysics will always be cultivated. We are justified then, at all events, in asking, (3) "How is man's Natural Propensity to Metaphysics possible?"

But, finally, even if metaphysics as a true and demonstrable science has never yet existed, yet surely it must in the end be possible to come to some sort of final decision respecting the questions which it raises, so that metaphysics shall finally exist, either as positive science of the objects of metaphysical inquiry, or as science of the limits which are interposed between human reason and the highest objects of its search. And so the fourth and final question will be, (4) "How is Metaphysics as a Science possible?"

It is thus that Kant, in the "Prolegomena," and in the second edition of the "Critique of Pure Reason," maps out the ground of his inquiry. This inquiry he terms "transcendental," and its results "transcendental knowledge." This does not mean that the discussion turns on the nature of "things," which

may lie beyond and so transcend the limits of our experience, and consequently of all our possible information. The pretended investigation and knowledge of such "things" Kant terms "transcendent" and, of course, wholly fanciful. Transcendental knowledge relates, not to the "things" or "objects" known, but to the process by which they are known, or to the knowing mind. It is the knowledge, science, or theory, of knowledge itself, but with especial reference to that side or aspect of knowledge which "transcends" the contingent or mechanico-sensible element in experience. It regards that element in knowledge, or, at least, that *form* of knowledge, which is *a priori* or ideally independent of such contingent element. A complete "Transcendental Philosophy" would be a systematic exposition and demonstration of all that is *a priori* in human knowledge, or of "all the principles of pure reason." The "Critique of Pure Reason" is less than this, for it takes account only, or but principally, of the synthetic element or quality in *a priori* knowledge.

Or, to put the whole matter (following Kant) in another way. The tree of human knowledge has two trunks, the roots of which, being invisible, are beyond the range of possible investigation, but may, for aught we know, be identical. Each trunk gives off its separate branches. Neither is or can be without the other. Each is necessary for the existence of the other. Of one of them the name is Sense; of the other, Understanding. Through the

former objects of knowledge are *given*, through the latter they are *thought* or "*understood*," i.e. are made or become real objects of knowledge. The one furnishes the contingent or "empirical" material of knowledge, the other its necessary and universal form. Understanding transcends sense, just as the necessary and universal transcends the contingent. But it does not transcend real experience, any more than sense transcends it, since, the rather, it is, like sense, an indispensable part and condition of experience. We may foresee, therefore, that the sensational psychologist's conception of experience will have to be revised and enlarged, so as to take in the necessary and universal, as well as the accidental and particular. Nay, more, we may find that sense itself, the peculiar alleged faculty of the contingent, contains, as essential to the fixity and reality of its own nature and functions, a necessary and universal element. However this may be, the fact is that in all experience there is a rational, or necessary and universal, element. Knowledge, or knowing mind, has a fixed and determinate nature, and this nature is revealed or discoverable in real experience. Transcendental philosophy does not therefore need or profess to attempt the impossible by seeking to transcend experience. It is simply (so far as it goes) the revelation of experience to itself.

CHAPTER II.

THE NON-CONTINGENT FORM OF SENSE.

UPON close inspection it turns out that the facts of the case confirm the suggestion that sense itself, which sensational psychology treats as being not only the sole faculty, and hence the whole, of mind, but also and peculiarly a faculty of the contingent, contains a necessary and universal element. How, indeed, could this be otherwise? For sense, surely, is not simply identical with the objects of sense, or the materials of sensitive knowledge. Grant that the latter are contingent, yet there must somewhere be something — some invariable element, form, or quality — by virtue of which they are all designated by the common name of *sensible*. In other words, sense, if it mean anything, must be definable; in which case it must have some fixed character or characters by which it may be once for all described and known. Of the absolutely changing and contingent there is no definition, no name, no knowledge.

Or, to return to the peculiar language of psychology. Conscious states, which are the original units and mark the final limits of knowledge for sensational psychology, must have something in common, by virtue of which they are all called con-

scious. And it is easy to see that this common element will be found not in the changing matter or felt content of these states, but in their form. It will be something which can be abstractedly conceived apart from or independently of the states, though the latter cannot be conceived or "had" apart from it; and so it will be, according to the Kantian sense of this expression, *a priori*. Further, it will be some thing which holds or binds together in real organic unity the conscious elements—"impressions," "states,"—which without such unity are so inherently diverse and independent of each other, so absolutely unrelated, that they cannot be parts of one *common* consciousness. Sense is, indeed, *receptive*—as Kant terms it, and as sensational psychology regards it;—it is receptive *form*, and it is, with reference to what it receives (conscious states or impressions), an *a priori* receptive form. But it has not, or is not, therefore the form of a *receptacle* or vessel, into which "materials" of knowledge may, as it were, be dumped, or may dump themselves, without any reference to their order or arrangement, and without having any new mark placed upon them. In this case the materials, after being caught and confined, would continue to be merely what they were before, namely, nothing but materials, still unused, still unreduced to consciousness, not yet made materials *of knowledge*. No, it is not enough that the diverse elements of consciousness be collected together in the superficial and mechanical unity of a mere mass or aggregate. Their unity

must be organic. Each element, like each member of any living organism, must, in its due way, place and relation, bear the impress and express the idea or form of the whole. The "form" of sense must not be merely receptive, not merely a mechanically-fixed and lifeless shape or mould; it must be *formative*, capable of communicating itself to all that it receives, just as the creative idea of any organism — of a tree, for example — communicates itself to, and expresses itself in and through, the materials which it takes up into its own life. It must make its "objects" veritable parts of itself, so that it may live and be visibly present in all of them, while they all, in their turn, live or exist only in and through it. So it will be actively all-pervading, all-comprehending, all-moulding, and will consequently be in the true sense a living, i.e. ideal, spiritual principle or function. It will be necessary and universal with the true or concrete necessity and universality of mind. It will hold or bind together its so-called "contents" in a synthetic or unifying embrace, whereby it will so identify these contents with itself and itself with them, that it will become indeed necessary to the reality of all, and so universally present in all. In short, being truly synthetic or *organic*, it will be truly "transcendental," or a subject for "transcendental" inquiry.

So, then, sense itself cannot be wholly "empirical" or contingent. It is not simply changing state; it is also, on another side, definite and fixed, yet living and active, function. Sense itself trans-

cends the provisional conception of it which was adopted at the outset from sensational psychology. In sense itself mind is present with an unchanging nature, law and power of its own. To this extent, therefore, sense, which was at first contrasted with understanding, must the rather be assimilated to it, and Kant's suggestion, that these two trunks of human knowledge may spring from a common root, begins to acquire more than the probability which belongs to a mere guess. At all events, there is a non-contingent element in sense, the nature and implications of which furnish a subject of transcendental inquiry and investigation. Such Kant finds to be the case, and so he is able to entitle the first section of the "Critique of Pure Reason," which treats of this element, "Transcendental Æsthetic," or *doctrine of the transcendental element in "sense" itself.*

The Transcendental Æsthetic contains, in germ and in necessary intention, all that has been above said respecting the relation which must exist between the fixed form of sense and its contingent content, and respecting the necessary nature of the former. Kant's own conduct of the discussion, which is somewhat mechanical and dogmatic, is as follows.

In order to ascertain what the form of sense is, we are first required to distinguish sharply between it and understanding. Sense perceives, the understanding conceives. The form of sense will then be something peculiar to immediate perception, as distinguished from mediate or reflective conception.

Next, we must separate from perception every element that is not involved in all perceptions, i.e. the variable or contingent element, whereby conscious states are particularized and differentiated from each other: the element which, as we say, implies and flows from the presence or agency of an object impressing or affecting us; in short, that which is called particular or material sensation. If perception of particular objects through the appropriate particular sensations be called mixed or contingent perception, the universal and necessary form of all perceptions will be fittingly termed pure perception, or pure form of perception.

When these two conditions have been complied with, Kant asserts that there will be found remaining (a) "two pure forms of sensuous perception," which, as such, are (b) transcendental, and hence "principles of *a priori* knowledge," and that these two forms are Space and Time.

(a) By what he terms a "metaphysical exposition" of the ideas of space and time, separately, Kant seeks to show that space and time are both pure forms of sensuous perception.

It is to be noted first that, whatever else may or may not be true respecting space and time, the one of them is known only in, or in connection with, external perception, and the other only in internal perception. "Time cannot be perceived externally, nor can space be perceived as something in us." If both are forms of sensuous perception, we may infer

beforehand that space will be the peculiar form of external, and time of internal, sense.

"What, now," asks Kant, "are space and time? Are they real entities? Or are they attributes or relations of things, such as would belong to things, even though the latter were not perceived? Or are they, finally, attributes or relations belonging only to the form of perception, and flowing consequently from the subjective quality or make-up of our minds, so that, but for the latter, these predicates could not and would not be applied to any thing?"

The form and substance of these questions have upon them a strong flavor of eighteenth-century psychological "metaphysics." It will be noted, further, that the last of them foreshadows the kind of ontological inference which Kant will draw from his promised demonstration that space and time are pure forms of perception.

In the "metaphysical exposition," which furnishes Kant's answer to the foregoing questions, it is urged that

(1) Space and time are not empirical notions, derived by abstraction from particular external and internal experiences as such. On the contrary, these experiences, or the perception of objects as existing externally to each other or following each other, all presuppose in their respective cases the ideas of space and time. The perception of particular coexisting objects presupposes and is only possible through the logically antecedent and independent idea of space. The perception of particular objects,

as succeeding the one the other, presupposes and is only possible through the logically antecedent and independent idea of time.

(2) Space and time are necessary *a priori* ideas and the conditions of all particular perceptions. From the latter and their objects we can in imagination, without exception, abstract; from the former we cannot. Space and time are therefore to be regarded as the necessary *a priori* preconditions of the possibility and reality of all phenomena.

(3) Space and time are not general or "discursive" conceptions of relations of things, but pure perceptions (*Anschauungen*). A general conception is derived from comparison of several specimens of the class or collection of objects to which the conception applies. But there is no class or collection of either spaces or times. We may indeed, and do, speak of different places and times, but with the consciousness that these are all only limitations and portions of one universal or absolute space and one universal or absolute time. Space is one, and time is one, and the only idea we can have of an object, of which only one specimen exists or can exist, is necessarily a perceptional one. Space and time are, with reference to all perceptions or conceptions of particular parts, limitations or qualifications of space and time, simple *a priori* perceptions, which underlie them all.

(4) The foregoing view alone is consistent with the necessity we are under, of ascribing "infinity" or non-limitation to space and time. If all special

places and times are conceivable only through limitation of one universal space and time, it is obvious that these latter, as such, are and must be only conceivable with the attribute of non-limitation. Further, it is argued that if space and time were discursive conceptions, and not perceptions, or intuitions, we could not, as we do, regard them as containing each an infinite number of parts. A conception represents, after all, only a fictitious whole or aggregate, made up exclusively of individuals, which are first known and in which alone reality resides. To have, in this sense, a conception, which should include in itself an infinite number of individuals or "parts," it would, strictly viewed, be necessary to have taken previous account of each one of the individuals,— an obvious impossibility, human life being too short for such a task. But in the case of space and time, as we have seen, the ideas of the parts are logically posterior to the ideas of the continuous and undivided wholes; and we do, as matter of fact, and are compelled to, think of the number of parts as potentially unlimited, although we have never counted and can never count them. Hence it appears with added evidence that our original ideas of time and space are immediate and not derivative, perceptional or intuitional, and not conceptional, *a priori*, and not contingent or "empirical."

In short, space and time seem to constitute demonstrably the peculiar form of sense which was required. This becomes more evident through the

"Transcendental Exposition," to which Kant next proceeds, and in which he shows that space and time are "principles of *a priori* knowledge," and that, too, of a synthetic character, in those sciences in which the most complete certainty is, by universal admission, reached.

(b) There is a science called Geometry, which sets up axioms and demonstrates truths *a priori*, respecting absolute spatial relations. Such axioms could not be declared, and such truths could not be demonstrated, if space were not such a form of perception as has above been indicated. For the "judgments" on which geometry is founded and to which it proceeds, being necessary and universal, possess a quality, which could never belong to them in our knowledge, if space and its attributes, to which those judgments relate, were simple matter of contingent perception or "experience." In the latter case, we should not be able to affirm (for example), as a truth of absolute necessity, that any two points are joined by one, and by only one, straight line. We could at most merely say that such we find to be the case in all instances that we have examined, but that concerning the infinitely numerous instances which we have not examined, and can never examine, we can assert nothing. The truth in question would possess for us thus only comparative, and not necessary and absolute, universality. The *a priori* nature of geometrical judgments confirms, therefore, our conclusion respecting the *a priori* nature of space, and the latter, in turn, explains

the possibility of the former. But, further, geometrical judgments, in common with all the propositions of pure mathematics, are in the first instance synthetic, and not analytical. Through no mere analytic contemplation of the abstract conceptions of points and straight lines, exclusively and strictly by themselves, can we deduce the conclusion that the straight line is the shortest one between two points. Subject and predicate are not here abstractly and analytically identical. The judgment is synthetic, and can result only from direct comparison in the field of immediate, perceptive intuition. Except, therefore, the idea of space constitute an *a priori* and synthetic,— nay, more, a constructive,— form of our sensibility, neither the synthetic nor the universal and necessary character of geometrical judgments is at all comprehensible. The foregoing explanation of space, therefore, alone accounts, in Kant's view, for the possibility of pure geometry.

Similarly, the analogous explanation of time is shown to account alone for the possibility of other branches of pure mathematical science, and especially of arithmetic, "which produces its conceptions of numbers by successive synthesis of units in time," and pure mechanics, whose notion of motion is only possible in and through the idea of time. Indeed, this "idea," or, rather, this actively synthetic, formative, ideal principle of sensitive mind, is the condition of geometry itself, as it is of all "external" or objective "sense." For, as Kant points out, the so-called external is known, universally, only through

the internal, the sensibly objective only through and in the sensibly subjective, i.e. as a part of consciousness, of which time is the universal form. Moreover, the spatial intuition, whereby pure geometrical relations are perceived, is an *actively* synthetic one. It involves a sweep of perceptive imagination, whereby, as Kant says, the mathematician "constructs" his objects, placing them in a pure space which he creates for them; and this action, or ideal motion, like all motion, is possible only through time.

Kant, then, through his doctrine of space and time, solves, or claims to solve, the essential or characteristic difficulty involved in the first subdivision of the main question of the *Critique*, namely, How is Pure Mathematics possible? And in so doing he has indicated the first and fundamental condition of all purely physical *science* whatsoever. For, as Kant somewhere says, the amount of real science contained in any physical science is strictly measured by the amount of mathematics which it contains. For the objects of inquiry, with which physical science is concerned, are phenomena, all of which are essentially qualified by their dependent relation to time and space and to their relations. Indeed, mathematics may, in all strictness considered, even be itself regarded as pure or idealized physical science. It determines those absolute relations which all physical relations must approximately illustrate, and by which, as the standard of comparison, the latter can alone be estimated and known; and for its absolute relations mathematics finds an accurate

expression in formulated equations, which physical science is compelled to emulate as its only and indispensable model of expression.

But have not the conclusions which Kant has reached still wider bearings? Apart from their service in explaining the mental machinery, without which certain actually existing sciences could not exist, have they no relation to the philosophical question concerning the absolute nature of things? Unquestionably they have, and Kant, in setting forth his view of this relation, gives abundant evidence of the fact that the struggle in which he is engaged against the narrownesses and misconceptions of modern thought, while not a mock-heroic one, but genuine, is yet, in his case, still far from being ended; the rather, it is only begun; the adversary — psychological and sensuous or mechanistic prejudice — has him still by the throat and is throwing dust in his eyes; philosophic truth is not through Kant's efforts yet completely victorious. Brute, dead, abstract *fact* of mechanical or sensible consciousness is not yet illuminated, and so set in its own true light, by *truth* of living, spiritual, concrete and all-conditioning self-consciousness. Mechanistic dualism, such as the earlier and, in Kant's time, still current metaphysics and psychology had assumed, has not yet been merged in organic unity. The notion of dead, inert, opaque Substance, as synonym of absolute reality, has not yet given place to that of living, forceful, self-luminous and all-illuminating Spirit.

And yet it is in the direction of all these transformations that Kant's work is pointing.

What, then, is Kant's own conception and statement of the ontological bearings and results of his "Transcendental Æsthetic"? It is that space and time are in no wise "things," entities, real and independent existences, nor are they in any way related to such existences, as attributes or qualifications of any sort. They are nothing but conditioning forms of human sensibility or of sensuous consciousness. They are purely and only subjective. They are indeed universal and necessary for us. They are a part of the determinate and indefeasible nature of *our* minds. No "objects" can be given us for knowledge, except we receive them into these unchanging forms of ours. But when we thus see or are aware of objects, when we perceive them in space and time, we see them, not in their own light or form, but only in our own. A being, privileged to perceive things independently of the conditions of human sensibility,— a being, the form of whose perception should not be, like ours, simply receptive, but creative (or, at least, re-creative), not sensible, but intellectual, and so adequate to the knowledge of things in their absolute reality, or of "things-in-themselves,"— would see and realize that space and time have nothing to do with them.

All our sensible experience, therefore, and hence (as Kant dogmatically affirms) all our knowledge, is ontologically limited to phenomena, or to apparent, not absolute, objects clad in the determining forms

of space and time. The contingent element in consciousness, our particular sensations, is that which corresponds to and suggests the invincible belief in real things, but in no wise resembles or truly reveals them. Indeed, our sensations are, as such, so far from truly revealing to us any absolute reality, that they are absolutely unintelligible, except so far as order is introduced among them, through their injection into the absolute framework of ideal relations involved in our intuitions of space and time. All that is *intelligible* to us is thus strictly confined to or determined by the form of our own ("sensible") knowledge. The world of "theoretical" knowledge and the world of physical science, or, what is the same thing, of sensibly conditioned consciousness, are identical, and in this world we find absolutely nothing but phenomena of extension, or "configuration," and of motion, or "change of place," *plus* the rules or "laws," according to which such change, whether habitually or necessarily, takes place. Space and time possess for us "empirical reality," and, in the only sense in which anything can be objective for us, "objective validity." But absolute reality, or absolutely objective validity, they have not. They are transcendental, because they constitute an *a priori*, or necessary and universal, form of our knowledge. But, since this is all that is true of them, they are also, and only, intrinsically "ideal" (= "subjective"), and we must ascribe to them, in Kant's scholastic phrase, "transcendental ideality."

As against Locke, now, and the whole so-called philosophy of empiricism, Kant, thus far, sufficiently demonstrates that in our sensible experience we, or our "minds," are not wholly like *tabulæ rasæ*, or like "pieces of white paper, on which nothing has been written." This comparison has a certain degree of justness, but to make it complete we should invest the "white paper," in imagination, with the qualities of a powerful chemical reagent, which transmutes into wholly unexpected forms whatever comes into contact with it, or with kaleidoscopic properties, whereby materials, existing in confused and changing order, are made constantly to appear in forms of definite and beautiful relation. Mind, or, rather, knowledge,— for of mind *per se* we are held to be as ignorant as of any other "thing-in-itself,"— has a fixed and determinate,— nay, more, a self-determining,— nature, even when its objects are what are termed "sensible"; and so it is made out, as against Hume and sensational psychology, that in no kind of knowledge are we left completely to the mere mercy of chance and blind habit. All knowledge is subject to absolute *a priori* forms, which are independent of the contingent matter of knowledge, and to which, as we have seen, this matter must adapt itself, in order to become even relatively knowable.

On the other hand, Hume and empirical psychology must, if Kant is to be believed, be justified by us in their assertion that matter *per se* or mind *per se*, or any other absolute "substance" or "thing-in-

itself." is beyond any possible range of our knowledge. Nothing can be known, we are told, unless it be "given" or sensibly presented to us for knowledge, or "affect" us, and nothing can be effectually given unless it be received: — we cannot be affected unless we consciously receive the affection. But both the *receiving* and the consequent *affection* or impression are alleged to be purely subjective; the one as pertaining to the form, the other to the matter, of human sensibility or sensitive consciousness. This doctrine is "idealistic" (in the all too current modern sense of this term), but it is the doctrine of a Critical or Transcendental Idealism, and so, as Kant claims, advantageously distinguished from the Sceptical or Agnostic Idealism of empirical "philosophy."

Of Kant's "Critical Idealism," in its substance and motives, we shall have occasion to treat more in detail in a subsequent chapter (chap. VI). Here we have only to remark upon it, so far as it is ostensibly distinguished from Sceptical or Empirical "Idealism" by Kant's peculiar doctrine respecting the nature of space and time. In this connection we have to consider two things,— (a) the positive substance of Kant's account of space and time, or what he positively demonstrates respecting their real nature, and (b) the limitation which he places upon them with reference to their ontological significance. Let us take up the latter point first.

Kant declares that space and time are exclusively "subjective," meaning by this that they are only

forms of our sensible consciousness. They correspond to nothing which is contained in the real nature, whether of the absolute subject or of the absolute object. The latter are both "things-in-themselves," and, as such, are, together with all that pertains to them, unknowable.

Now, this negative part of Kant's doctrine is purely dogmatic. It does not flow from anything which he has demonstrated respecting the positive nature of space and time. Nor is it novel. It is the ordinary doctrine of Subjective Idealism, and results, for Kant, from his tacit assumption, at the outset, of the premises, which always lead to Subjective Idealism; or, rather, it results from Kant's failure to question them. What these premises are, has been indicated in our Introduction (above, pp. 11 et seq.). They are, in brief, the purely mechanical conception of the relation between conscious subject and object, and the consequent purely materialistic conception (in spite of all protests to the contrary) of the absolute nature of subject and object. These are Hume's premises, and that Kant also still adheres to them is naïvely indicated by him in arguments by which he seeks to prove what he calls the "transcendental ideality," or, in other words, the purely phenomenal, "subjective" quality of space and time. If, he argues, space and time were really and absolutely objective,— if they possessed or were related to absolute reality or being,— they must be either independent entities or "things," or else inherent attributes of such entities.

They must be either "subsistent" or "inherent," i.e. either substances or properties of substances, and against both of these alternatives Kant easily finds persuasive arguments. Here, then, Kant, for the purposes of his argument, adopts as a conception of the absolutely real, the conception of "thing" or "substance." This is a materialistic, sensuous, mechanistic conception. It is Kant himself who perceived and wrote, seventeen years before the publication of the "Critique of Pure Reason," that "if the conception of substance is an abstracted conception, it is without doubt derived by abstraction from material things" (see *Werke*, ed. by Hartenstein, 1867, vol. ii, pp. 294–5). And it is he, also, who will demonstrate for us anew, in the next chapters of the *Critique* itself, that in view of its demonstrable applicability to express, or to enable us to "think," none but material, i.e. sensuous, mechanical relations, the conception of substance or thing is relative only, and not absolute. It is good only for the realm of phenomena, but cannot legitimately enter into any thought of ours, even though our thought be merely tentative, concerning the non-phenomenal or absolutely real.

Kant argues, therefore, in disproof of the participation of space and time in absolute reality, on the basis of a purely mechanical and materialistic conception of the nature of the absolutely real. He adopts this conception without criticism, hence purely dogmatically. He adopts it, further, in spite of the result of his own later critical examination of the

conception, whereby the latter is shown to possess, itself, only phenomenal validity. In view of the nature of this result, therefore, it is obvious that the above-cited argument of Kant tends rather to raise a presumption that space and time participate in the nature of absolute reality, than that they are purely phenomenal and subjective. If the conception of substance or "subsistence" is applicable only to phenomenal — not to absolute — existence, and if the relation of "inherence" is a purely phenomenal relation, then the proof that space and time neither fall under the mentioned conception nor exhibit the mentioned relation is surely no proof that they, too, are purely phenomenal!

The true way to proceed in ontology, as in any other science, is, not dogmatically to presuppose or anticipate, but to await, the results of inquiry. Kant's primary inquiry in the *Critique* is ostensibly directed to the problem of knowledge. Until this problem is settled he has no right, in view of the relation between the sciences of knowledge and being, as indicated in our Introduction, to assume, as a basis of argument, a particular conception of being. He must wait and find out what conception of being the science of knowledge authorizes and enforces. By his pursuit of a contrary course he falls into—or, rather, he continues in—that snare of dogmatism and logical fallacy, which with his soul he professes to abhor and with his "criticism" he claims to have avoided. In this way he is prevented from reaping the full fruits of his own positive in-

vestigations and discoveries, and the harvest is left to be gathered in by the leaders of a subsequent generation. But in this way, too, his work is marked at the outset as the reflex of an epoch of transition in thought — of transition which is only begun, but not as yet completed.

Secondly. If, instead of arguing, with Kant, about the ontological nature of space and time on the basis of a preconceived and indefensible notion of the nature of absolute reality, we simply look, as we must, at the positive facts respecting space and time, as *forms of knowledge*, which Kant "discovers" and declares, with a view to seeing to what notion of the nature of absolute reality they point, we shall find ourselves led directly away from the mechanistic and materialistic premises of Subjective Idealism. The positive substance of Kant's "discovery" and doctrine respecting space and time, so far from supporting his assertion that they are merely "subjective," and so, in spite of all their demonstrated necessity and universality, still contingent (contingent, namely, on the way in which *human*, in distinction from any other *possible*, intelligence happens to be constituted), tends directly to contradict it. It furnishes evidence, when considered simply by itself and independently of any and all preconceived opinions, that the relation between subject and object is one of organic identity, and not of mechanical separation and opposition. And in this way it conducts, in its measure, to the conception of both subject and object as not

shrouded in the dead stillness and mystery of purely sensible, material, "substantial" existence, or of so-called "things-in-themselves," but as instinct with a universal and all-illuminating spiritual life, and having in this life the essential root of their being.

Kant demonstrates, first, that time and space are ideal forms of knowledge or of sensible consciousness, and not what we, in our undisciplined thought, choose to call material substances or attributes of such substances. This their ideality is their reality. Secondly, he shows that time and space, as forms of knowledge, owe their existence to an activity of intelligence or mind. Indeed they exist only through such activity, and in no sense independently of it. Nevertheless this activity is, on the part of the individual subject, a "blind" or unconscious one. Man, knowing, sensitive, imaginative mind, the alleged subject-agent of this activity, works the miracle of time and space spontaneously, without conscious purpose and without knowledge,— the rather, as a pre-condition of the possibility of all his knowledge. Thirdly, Kant finds that the conditioning forms of our sensible knowledge are the conditioning forms of all objects of our sensible knowledge. All such objects presuppose space and time. And not only so, but all such objects are really intelligible to us, as sensible *objects*, only by virtue of, or in and through, their time and space relations. Still further, it is only through our consciousness of objects in such relations that we become conscious of these "forms"

— space and time — which we are taught to look upon as peculiarly our own. We find our objective consciousness, so far as it concerns space and time, to be self-consciousness, and our self-consciousness to be, in this respect, equally objective consciousness.

Here, then, we find ourselves confronted with a state of things, the attempt to explain or judge of which in the light of purely mechanical or materialistic conceptions and relations can only result — as we may learn from Kant's example — in rendering them wholly unintelligible. Space and time, Kant finds, are, in effect, "energies of mind." This is one point gained. They are, on our part, unconscious energies. This, too, is to be admitted. They are purely "subjective." *Non sequitur!* This conclusion can only follow on condition that subject and object are mechanically separate and opposed to each other, so that what belongs to the one must *eo ipso* be excluded from the other. But to view them thus is to prejudge the case, instead of waiting, as scientific honesty requires, to see whether such is the actual relation between subject and object, as disclosed by the facts of the case themselves. Now the facts, as discovered by Kant, show that, so far at least as the forms of space and time are concerned, subject and object are of a common nature. The bond of their identity, further,— in this case, the forms of space and time,— is a living bond, for it is founded in an activity, an *energy* of mind, a *spiritual* function. The relation between them is therefore not the life-

less, abstract relation of mechanical separation and opposition, but rather the relation of organic oneness. Each is distinguishable from the other, as particular from particular, but both are one in and through that which is universal about them,—namely, in the present case, the ideal forms or spiritual functions called space and time. Viewed in this light of evident fact, we can see how we, as individuals, should be unconscious of the activity whereby the forms of space and time are generated and maintained. For this activity does not belong to us as individuals, or particular "subjects." Nor does it belong to any one particular "object," or to all particular objects, as such. It is, in kind, as Kant finds, a spiritual activity, but it is also a universal and for us a necessitated activity. Nothing remains, therefore, but to see in it the activity of universal Spirit, whose life and being at once transcend, and yet also include and reconcile, all particular distinctions of subject and object.*

Thus the positive substance of Kant's doctrine respecting space and time points, so far as it alone is concerned, toward a spiritualistic conception of

* In the light of the facts which Kant discovers, when these are viewed simply by themselves and independently of any mechanistic, or other, prepossessions, it were more natural to suppose space and time to result from a joint activity of subject and object, than to ascribe them to the subject alone. Such indeed is the first view which would suggest itself, and it is relatively correct. But in view of the particularity of both subject and object in our conscious sensible experience, and of the universality and necessity of space and time within such experience, these "forms" must be ascribed to the activity of a universal Spirit in which the empirical subject and object — each in its peculiar way — only dependently share.

the nature of absolute reality. It points to this conception by virtue of the organic and living nature of the relation between subject and object, which the doctrine, and the facts on which it rests, imply. In the same way it leads necessarily to the conception of the absolute nature of particular subject and particular object as also spiritual. Each must be regarded as dependently sharing in an universal spiritual life and being, whereby each subsists and moves and has its own essential and characteristic being.

In this way space and time appear as logically dependent functions of the absolute, but not as self-subsistent and pre-existent conditions thereof. They appear as such conditions, only when we arbitrarily regard the absolute materialistically as "substance." But the conception of substance, as Kant will show us, is purely relative, and possesses only "phenomenal" validity. The Absolute can only be conceived as Spirit.

CHAPTER III.

THE UNDERSTANDING AS A NON-CONTINGENT FACULTY OF SENSIBLE KNOWLEDGE.

KANT, it will be remembered, distinguished Sense and Understanding as complementary opposites. Through sense objects were declared to be *given* for knowledge and *received;* through understanding they became objects of *thought* or were definitively known. The necessary implication was that neither sense nor understanding, taken by itself, could be an effective factor in knowledge. Each required the coöperation of the other.

The contrast of these two functions, and yet the absolute necessity of each to the effectiveness of the other, is strongly emphasized by Kant, at the beginning of the section of the *Critique* specially devoted to the examination of the Understanding. Sense and understanding, first, are contrasted. The former is a receptive faculty. It denotes a capacity of being affected or receiving ideas. It is a faculty of involuntary perception. A process takes place, the initiation of which is not due to ourselves, who perceive. The movement is from without — from an assumed world of external objects, or, at all events, of reality mechanically independent of individual conscious-

ness,— into and upon such consciousness, or into and upon our "minds." Our own mental attitude is in this regard strictly passive. Understanding, on the contrary, denotes a process initiated within our minds and proceeding outward, so to speak, to meet the received impression and to take cognizance of it. It is a "spontaneous" faculty of thought. "The understanding can perceive nothing, and the senses can think nothing." But, for this very reason, sense and understanding are necessary to each other. For it is only through the union of perception and thought that knowledge can arise. "Thoughts, without the content which perception supplies, are empty, and perceptions, separated from the conceptions which thought supplies, are blind." Or, as Kant puts the case in his "Anthropologie," the understanding without the senses is like a ruler without subjects; and — to complete the figure — the senses without the understanding are like a people living without rule in absolute, unintelligible confusion.

In insisting thus anew upon the apparently unqualified contrast between sense and understanding, Kant simply adopts an expedient for drawing the reader's attention away from the subject treated in the "Transcendental Æsthetic," and enabling him to concentrate it exclusively upon the topic next to be taken up, namely, the understanding and the noncontingent or "formal" and *a priori* element in it. Just as, before, we were required to consider sense and its necessary forms, making complete ab-

straction from the forms of intellectual conception, so now we are called upon to contemplate the latter to the exclusion of the former.

But the reader will upon reflection readily perceive that this is only a device, and that the contrast depicted is by no means so unqualified as to a casual and forgetful observer it might appear. The language, in which sense is here described, is completely adapted to that conception of it, and indeed of all mind, which is current in purely sensational psychology. But we have seen — Kant has shown us — that this conception must be revised and corrected. Sense may be receptive, but it is not wholly contingent, nor is it wholly passive. Sense receives, but in receiving it does something. It not simply stretches out (so to express it) its two arms of space and time to take into its embrace whatever objects may fall into it, and to hold them there in undistinguishable and unrecognized order. It puts — thus it appears to one who, like Kant, contemplates the subject from the point of view of purely individual consciousness — it puts upon those objects a nature which does not belong to them, namely, its own nature; it reduces them under relations which are necessarily involved in its own nature; it effectually moulds and shapes them, and that, too, as the only condition upon which they can be received by it or become objects of sensible consciousness at all. In other words, sense itself is not the mere accident of outward mechanical circumstance, nor like a mere "piece of white paper," to be written on, but

a function of mind. Not only is it receptive; it is also, like the understanding, spontaneous and formative, and, like it, has its universal and necessary, or ideal, nature. Through this it establishes its descent from the same root as the understanding. This nature, indeed, turns out to be all that is strictly definable in or concerning sense, and it must not surprise us if we find (as we shall), in the discussion of the understanding, further evidence of its intimate organic oneness with the latter.

The function of the understanding was stated by Kant to be Thought. The science of the laws of Thought is called Logic. Hence the name "Transcendental Logic" is appropriately given to that portion of Kant's inquiry which concerns those elements, laws, forms, or principles of thought, which, pure from empirical admixture, are native to the understanding and inseparable from it, and hence reappear with determining, form-giving influence in all sense-conditioned knowledge. This inquiry, which occupies in the *Critique* vastly more space than was devoted to the "Transcendental Æsthetic," is divided into two parts, the one concerned with the pure or *a priori* "Conceptions" of the understanding, and the other with the "Principles" of their application. Our concern in this and the next chapter is solely with the former.

Sense was represented above as "receptive" or passive; understanding as "spontaneous" or active. In the former we were acted upon or affected, and the result was Perceptions. In the latter we were

active or (clumsily expressed) performed functions, and the result was Conceptions. Hence Kant's present averment, that "all perceptions, in view of their sensuous character, depend on affections, and all conceptions on functions." A function is an action, and an action by which a definite work is performed. Thus the work of grasping objects is a function of the fingers. The understanding may be likened to the fingers of the mind, whereby many ideas are collected in one grasp, and so brought under a single and common idea or denomination. For the *grasp* (or "conception") of the understanding is itself an idea, and the work of the understanding is simply (in logical language) to subsume under its ideas — no matter whence or how these may be obtained — the manifold ideas which are presented to it in consciousness, and so to reduce them to a kind of unity. Thus the understanding, provided with the conception of "body" or "material object," and contemplating in consciousness the ideas of various metals, subsumes the latter under the former, *judging*, and so affirming, that "every metal is a material object." This is a logical judgment, and so we may say that the function of the understanding is to judge, or, the understanding is the faculty of judgment. This is what Kant means by "thinking."

Now, the ideas or conceptions which the understanding employs, or with which it grasps, may be either empirical and dependent on *contingent* sensuous consciousness, or original and native to the mind. Thus, the conception of "material object,"

above employed, is of the former nature. The conception itself is indeed not given through the senses or in simple sensuous consciousness,— it is not a conscious image or state,— but the understanding executes its function upon material thus contingently or empirically given, and only thus does it effectuate or frame for itself the conception in question. But, before the understanding could execute this, or any other function whatever, upon material thus supplied, there must have been something in its own nature which determined antecedently and conditioned the direction or kind of its own activity. If the understanding *is* anything, we can ascertain what it is only by examining the understanding itself, and not the material upon which it works. Furthermore, if the understanding is an activity, we can learn what is peculiar to itself, only by ascertaining what is characteristic or peculiar about the various forms of its activity. Now, all that is visible or discernible in the understanding is its ideas. It "grasps" with its ideas, its activity is an *ideal* one, and its original ideas are itself (as here considered). If, then, we can have before us a complete table of the various forms of the activity of the understanding in its peculiar work of judging, we may anticipate that the aspect or idea peculiar to each form will be an idea native to the understanding; there will be as many ideas of this kind as there are different forms of logical judgments, and no more, and these will be the peculiar object of our "transcendental" inquiry.

Now, the logicians have concerned themselves to ascertain and classify the various possible forms of logical judgments. Kant, without further inquiry, accepts and adopts, with one or two minor modifications, their work as correct and complete, and lays before his reader, accordingly, the following table of the different possible kinds or forms of logical judgments, reduced under four heads :

Logical judgments are, as regards

1. *Quantity:*
   Singular,
   Particular, or
   Universal;

2. *Quality:*
   Affirmative,
   Negative, or
   Limitative;

3. *Relation:*
   Categorical,
   Hypothetical, or
   Disjunctive;

4. *Modality:*
   Problematical,
   Assertory, or
   Apodictic.

If we examine, now, each of these forms, we find involved in every one a peculiar idea, which is the characteristic thing about each form, is necessary to it, and may seem to define it. A "singular judgment," in which the subject of discourse is a single object, involves obviously the special idea of oneness or unity; a "particular judgment," relating to several objects, implies the idea of plurality, etc. The whole list of these ideas, then, will constitute the

complete table of the "fundamental conceptions of the understanding," regarded as the faculty which *judges*, or, as Kant also terms them, of "categories." The following is the complete

TABLE OF CATEGORIES.

1. *Of Quantity:*
   Unity,
   Plurality,
   Totality;

2. *Of Quality:*
   Reality,
   Negation,
   Limitation;

3. *Of Relation:*
   Substance and Accident,
   Cause and Effect,
   Action and Reaction;

4. *Of Modality:*
   Possibility — Impossibility,
   Existence — Non-Existence,
   Necessity — Contingence.

These, then, are the fundamental, primary, or native conceptions of the understanding, which flow from, or constitute the mechanism of, its nature, are inseparable from its activity, and are hence, for human thought, universal and necessary, or *a priori*. They are not contingent states or images of sensuous consciousness, and hence not to be thence derived. But they are not known to us independently of such consciousness or of sensible experience. On the one hand, they are exclusively involved in, and hence come to our knowledge exclusively through, the spontaneous activity of the understanding. But, on the other hand, the understanding is never active,

until sensible data are furnished as material for it to act upon, and so it may truly be said that they become known to us "only on the occasion of sensible experience."

These categories are "pure" conceptions of the understanding, inasmuch as they are independent of all that is contingent in sense. They are not derived from what is called the "matter" of sense, or from particular, variable sensations. But they are not independent of the universal and necessary *form* of sense. The reader must be expressly reminded that Kant, in the "Transcendental Logic," is professedly engaged with the search for an answer to the second main question of the *Critique*, How is pure physical science, or sensible knowledge, possible? Kant, now, has said, and, with reference to the kind of knowledge mentioned in the foregoing question, has said truly, that "thoughts, without the content which perception supplies, are empty." This is not less true of "pure" thoughts, than of any others. The content which the pure conceptions, as categories of pure physical science or sensible knowledge, cannot derive from the matter of sense, they must and do derive from its pure form. And in this relation between the pure conceptions of the understanding and their pure content there is involved, as we shall see, the most intimate community of nature and origin between sense, on its formal side (space and time), and the understanding itself.

Let us consider the case more narrowly. We must keep in mind constantly our main question,

"How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible?" How is necessary and universal connection among "impressions" possible? How is knowledge, or — which is the same thing — experience. possible? Empirical psychology, as represented by Hume, left us no answer to this question.

Kant, it will be remembered, found the first part of the general answer to this question in the recognition of space and time as universal and necessary forms of sense. Now we must carefully resist any tendency on our part to give to the expression, "forms of sense," a materialistic interpretation. Sense is not a physical organ, nor a receptacle of any sort, in which space and time inhere as accidents, just as the color denominated red seems to inhere in or be a quality of the rose. Sense is first a function and then a consequent state of mind. It is just as ideal, and consequently non-material, as is knowledge, of which it is but an aspect or incident. Of the same nature are space and time, and it was found that the very notion of them was a notion of *synthetic* wholes, or of wholes in which possible, ideally distinguishable parts were *united*. Space was one grand whole and time was one grand whole; and the fact that they could not otherwise be conceived, and that in having the ideas of them we necessarily have, by implication, the ideas of the various geometrical and mechanical relations (dimensions, motions) involved in them, was held to explain the possibility of apodictic mathematical knowledge.

Now, space and time, like sense, of which they are said to be the forms, were separated from the understanding. On examination, also, it turned out that they were not the creatures of contingent sense, but rather its conditions, and so when they were called "forms *of* sense," the expression was simply a misnomer. They were forms supplied by mind, in order to make sense or sensible knowledge possible. They should therefore be termed, the rather, "forms *for* sense." But supposing that mind had supplied these forms, and nothing else, would it then have *knowledge* of them and of those relations or qualifications of them which are the subject-matter of mathematical science? The answer must be that it would not, and that therefore Kant, in deducing from the forms of sense the possibility of mathematical science, presupposed, without mentioning it, the presence and activity of the understanding.

The understanding is, as Kant also declares, the peculiar faculty of *knowledge*. Knowledge implies the distinct recognition of the objects of knowledge. Each object must be distinguished from all others, and recognized in its peculiar nature as the *one* object which it is. And so Kant also speaks (substantially) of the understanding as the faculty of *unity*, or the faculty whereby a mental object, whether simple or complex, is for us *one*. So it was the understanding which really enabled us, in the "Transcendental Æsthetic," to distinguish space and time from each other and to recognize and declare

each to be the one real or potential whole that it is. Apart from this clear discrimination and recognition of them by the understanding or intellect, what were space and time, or, rather, what must they have been? Clearly nothing but abstractions, obscure and unperceived possessions or creations of our minds, of which we could neither know nor say anything. Kant nevertheless so considers them — namely, apart from understanding, and hence, since they have a mental origin and so must be ascribed to some faculty, attributes them to the imagination, "a blind, but indispensable function of the soul." The imagination, then, or the mind working spontaneously under the guise and name of imagination, blindly spreads out the synthetic mental wings of space and time, and understanding sees what it has done and clearly discriminates space and time, each as the *one* mental reality and whole that it is. The imagination, in like manner, blindly and confusedly provides for recognition by the understanding minor "syntheses" *in* space and time, which again the understanding clearly distinguishes and recognizes, each in its own peculiar nature. Thus the imagination blindly creates that "synthesis" of lines in space, which is called a triangle. The understanding fixes the synthesis in one distinct and unalterable conception. The conception of the triangle may thus be termed a "synthetic unity," determined or clearly defined by the understanding on the basis of material (lines in space) blindly brought together for it by the imagination. The imagination is thus

the active mental principle and condition of perception, whose results, as we have been rightly told above, are as "blind," until the understanding has conceived them, as the conceptions of the understanding are "empty," until provided with a perceptional content. Such content constitutes the definable meaning of every conception. The conception simply defines, or *distinguishes*, and so enables us to recognize, or *know*, the content.

Now, the pure conceptions of the understanding, or categories, are, as regards their "transcendental content," or their necessary and universal and hence *a priori* significance, such "synthetic unities" as the triangle above considered, only of a more general and abstract order. They indicate those universal forms or aspects of pure "imaginative" synthesis or relation in space and time, without which no synthesis and no judgment whatever are possible. Whatever syntheses imagination may present, all have the aspect of unity, plurality, or totality, of reality, negation, or limitation, etc., virtually inherent in them. Understanding simply fixes these aspects in determinate conceptions; it distinctly recognizes, defines, and names them. And it fixes upon precisely these aspects, and no others, simply because the forms of its own peculiar activity as an universal faculty of *judgment* determine it to do so. These, then, are the aspects or ideas which were found in the beginning to be peculiar to, or involved in, the several forms of judgments as such. But a judgment is only an assertion of knowledge

concerning some "object"; or, at least, whatever we may profess to know concerning objects can be expressed only in the form of logical judgments. It follows, therefore, that the form of all our assertions about "objects" of knowledge, and consequently the form of our conceptions, or of what we call our *knowledge*, of objects themselves, is predetermined by the categories, or, the categories "have an *a priori* reference to objects."

The foregoing is the substance of what may be termed, in view of its correspondence with the similar first portion of his treatment of space and time in the "Æsthetic," Kant's "metaphysical exposition," analysis, or deduction of the categories, as *a priori* notions of the understanding.* This is followed by a "transcendental deduction" or demonstration of them, before proceeding to which one or two observations are in place.

First, it is extremely important for the student never to forget that the "table of categories" is set up by Kant only as a table of the fundamental conceptions of *physical* science *as such*. Kant's present inquiry is simply, "How is pure physical science possible?" and he prosecutes this inquiry by seeking to determine what are the conceptions peculiar to physical science, what is their nature, and what their precise and specific significance. But physical science exists primarily and characteristically in

*In the "Transcendental Deduction," Kant himself, referring back to this portion of his discussion of the categories, speaks of it, for the first time, as a "Metaphysical Deduction"; this title or description was not employed by him at all in the relevant place.

and through — or it is an analytic transcript of the content of — sensible consciousness, the latter being *considered* simply as the given product of two factors, subject and object, acting only mechanically upon each other. Accordingly the "content" or meaning of each of the categories, as here contemplated by Kant, is, as we have seen, and as further developments in coming chapters will more explicitly show, purely and simply some mode or relation of space and time, and that, too, of space and time regarded quite independently of their demonstrable philosophic or spiritualistic significance, and as mere mechanical forms of the phenomena of sensible consciousness. Any richer content which any of these categories may have derived, for popular or philosophic consciousness, from sources of rational experience which lie deeper than the mechanical forms of sensible consciousness, must be excluded from consideration, in regarding the categories as Kant here defines them. Thus, to mention only one example, if the word "causation" suggests something more than a mere irreversible relation of order in time between one phenomenon and another, if it thus implies purpose and efficient spiritual activity, this deeper and richer significance of the term, though elsewhere in this very *Critique* recognized by Kant as that which is "practically" known to constitute "true causality," must here be abstracted from, and the word must be restricted to express only the time-relation. The like is to be said with regard to the other categories.

The foregoing caution is doubly necessary since, on the one hand, the young philosophical student is often found resorting to Kant, and especially to the study of his exposition and deduction of the categories, for light respecting the unqualified philosophic significance of the conceptions named in Kant's table; while, on the other hand, he is encouraged to do so by Kant himself, whose mechanistic prejudices lead him constantly to assume, dogmatically, that, with the determination of the exact significance of the categories as categories of purely physical or mechanico-sensible knowledge, their whole "theoretical" significance is exhausted. The true nature of the discussion and of its limitation, is further obscured by the circumstance that Kant, while treating of the categories of physical science, occasionally associates with them a meaning which is foreign to his own "deduction" or account of them. Thus it occurs to him to speak, in passing, of an "influence" which the cause exerts in producing the effect. Now, the notion of "influence" may and does indeed belong to the completed conception of causation, as derived by philosophy from the examination of the whole nature of our conscious experience. But it is not included in the conception of causation, which is founded on the contemplation of the purely mechanico-sensible aspect of our experience. It is not comprehended in the conception of causation as a "category" of "pure physical science." Here, as Kant himself has in substance already found, and will subsequently enable us more clearly to compre-

hend, the term "causation" has to be restricted to denote nothing but a mode or relation of order in time, from which, as such, all notion of force or influence is to be rigidly excluded. Such inadvertences, therefore,— if it is accurate so to term them,— on Kant's part, as the one just alluded to, are only confusing and misleading.

Secondly, Kant's above-mentioned doctrine — we have termed it an "assumption" — that the categories have no other valid use or significance than that which they possess as categories of pure physical science, rests on a supposed demonstration that the understanding, considered universally, operates as a "theoretic" or strictly cognitive faculty only in, through, or upon the forms of space and time, as dead and abstract forms of mechanically given sensible "objects." Kant has, however, demonstrated, and will demonstrate, nothing of the sort. He has simply chosen to consider how the understanding operates when the conditions are purely mechanical and sensible, or viewed exclusively in their mechanical and sensible aspect. The nature of the problem immediately in hand requires him indeed to do this. But the fact that this particular problem is and must be thus limited naturally proves nothing with respect to the existence of other problems. The mere fact that our conscious experience, or a part of it, has a mechanical and sensible aspect contains, surely, no proof that it has no other aspect. The fact that the understanding is seen to operate in a given restricted way, or that its conceptions are

found to have a given restricted and abstract content, when attention is directed to one of these aspects (and that a relative and superficial one), has no power to prove that it will not be found exercising a more comprehensive function and that its conceptions will not acquire a richer and more concrete content, when regarded in the light of other and more fundamental aspects of experience. But this is the only sort of "proof" (?) which Kant furnishes. Nay, we shall find that what Kant discovers respecting the nature and operation of the understanding, as a faculty of sensible knowledge, really tends, like his discovery concerning space and time, to overthrow the limitations which he arbitrarily seeks to place upon knowledge — and here, more especially, upon the significance and use of the "categories." It tends to show that the mechanical relation between subject and object implies the organic one, that the materialistic conception of subject and object (which is shown by Kant to be purely relative and phenomenal) implies the spiritualistic one, and that the categories of sensible or phenomenal knowledge imply the categories of spiritual or real knowledge. And thus, again, Kant's work will show itself to be a "critical" one, as marking a *crisis* or turning-point in the progress of modern thought,— a point of real, though uncompleted, transition from profitless and baseless negations to the recognition and demonstration of positive truth of living experience. For the present, the foregoing general reminder respecting the real nature

of Kant's work may suffice. Fuller illustration will follow in the next chapter.

Finally, Kant himself calls attention to the circumstance, that in the tabulation of the categories under four heads, there are three under each head. This circumstance, he declares, is a "challenge to reflection, inasmuch as it furnishes the only exception to the rule that *a priori* logical division is dichotomous" (e.g. A and non-A; no third term). Further, "the third category of each class results from a combination of the first and second categories of the same class"; — not, however, from a merely mechanical combination, which would imply that the category was not a primary one, but derived from mere composition; but from a combination effectuated by a "special act of the understanding," which adds to it a significance not contained in either or both of the categories combined in it.

Kant, however, does not take up this "challenge," and the fact that he calls attention to these peculiarities in the table of categories, need only be mentioned for the sake of reminding the student of post-Kantian German philosophy, that here we have the first — at least superficial — suggestion of the form of that method which, partially developed and applied by Fichte and Schelling, attained with Hegel the rank of a universal method for philosophic thought.

CHAPTER IV.

THE "TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION" OF THE CATEGORIES.

THE "transcendental exposition" of space and time, in the "Æsthetic" (pp. 64–66, above), consisted in showing how, on the supposition — and only on the supposition — that time and space were of the nature indicated in the "metaphysical exposition," pure mathematical science, with its universal and necessary propositions, was possible; and so answer was given to the first general inquiry raised by the *Critique* (see above, p. 52).

The "transcendental deduction" of the categories consists, in like manner, in showing that on the supposition — and only on the supposition — that the categories are such *a priori*, or universal and necessary, synthetic conceptions of the understanding as has been indicated in the last chapter, knowledge through sensible experience, or pure physical science, which is nothing but "determinate knowledge of phenomena in time and space," is possible; and so the second question of the *Critique* is answered.

The question of fact has been settled. The categories, as pure conceptions of the understanding which "borrow nothing from [contingent] experience," have been demonstrated to exist as elements

which enter, with form-determining influence, into the whole structure of our "experimental" (= here, *sensible*) knowledge. There remains only the question of right. By what right does the non-experimental mix with the experimental and constrain the latter to obey its laws? And the answer consists in showing that on no other conceivable condition than this can the "experimental" be in any way known, or — which amounts to the same thing — exist for us. The result is (as foreshadowed in our first chapter) that the psychological empiricist's conception of experience and of experimental knowledge has to be radically revised and extended.

In Chapter II we had to ask, What is that, common to all sensible consciousness, and consequently to all "objects" revealed in sensible consciousness, by virtue and on account of which both it and they are all alike called sensible? And the answer was, Sensible consciousness and sensible objects are such by virtue of their all wearing, necessarily and universally, a garment woven for them by "mind" out of relations of space and time, themselves its own "creation."

But does sensible consciousness *know* itself and its objects simply in virtue of this ideal garment that it wears? No; for we have been seeing that "sensible consciousness," *qua* sensible, is but the receptive condition of knowledge, and not knowledge, or intelligence, itself. Strictly speaking, sensible *consciousness* is an abstraction and a misnomer. *Pure* sensible consciousness is the same as no consciousness. It

is not *sense*, but *self*, or *mind*, or "understanding," that is conscious or knows in and by means, or on occasion, of what is called sensible consciousness. This is what has been incipiently, yet distinctly enough, implied in the result of the analysis of space and time. These are not "ideas" received by us through sensation, but forms of perception, due to the productive activity of the imagination, which, as Kant perceives and declares, is a manifestation of one and the same spontaneous, *mental*, *self-activity*, which manifests itself otherwise in the "functions" of the understanding. But imagination and all its works are, as we have seen, blind and for us as good as nought, until distinguished by the understanding. It is the understanding, then, which makes sensible consciousness and sensible objects real for us; and understanding, as we are about to see, is nothing apart from the unity and identity of *self*-consciousness. There is no real consciousness, accordingly, which is not, or does not involve, self-consciousness, and no real "experience" which is not, or does not essentially involve, *self-experience*. If, then, we now ask, What is that, common to all sensible or experimental *knowledge*, by virtue and on account of which alone it is really knowledge for us? the answer is, that, since all such knowledge must take the form of distinct ideas or conceptions, and since no conceptions are possible except in agreement with those master-forms, the "categories," which determine the nature and universal form of all our conceptions, therefore no experimental knowledge, no knowledge

of "objects," no experience, is possible for us, except, as a predetermining condition, it be clad in the forms of the categories as pure conceptions of the understanding or of the self-centred, self-knowing, and spontaneously active human mind. Just, therefore, as mind, working under the guise of imagination, creates, in space and time, the fixed form and condition, or the only intelligible element of sense, so, working under the guise of understanding or intellect, it creates the like form and condition, or the truly and preëminently intelligible element in experimental knowledge — the element by virtue of which it is indeed, or is capable of becoming, *knowledge*. The understanding is thus the "author of experience" and of its objects, in any and every sense in which these latter are intelligible, or are real objects of conscious knowledge, for us. It is thus the author of "nature, regarded as the sum of all phenomena," and prescribes to it *a priori* its universal and necessary, if not its particular, laws: it prescribes to nature the laws, to which all its special laws must conform.

In order, now, fully to understand Kant's "deduction" of these truths, it is specially necessary to recall and to bear in mind just what sensible consciousness, taken purely by itself, as a series of passive states or impressions, is, and what are its limitations. The truth in regard to this matter Kant learned through Hume, and we are to consider Kant as having this constantly in mind as he proceeds with his deduction. The relevant facts of the

case have been repeatedly alluded to in the foregoing pages (and the reader may compare, in particular, pages 45–47). It is enough to repeat here, that the states or impressions, for the whole aggregate of which sensible consciousness is but the collective name, are, in Hume's phrase, so many atomically "distinct existences," and that, if these make up the whole of "mind," knowledge is impossible. For (a) these impressions or states are passive and can do nothing; but knowing is an activity; (b) had they the power to know, each could know only itself, since each is distinct from and out of "real connection" with the other; but (c) one impression — to say nothing of the other absurdities of the supposition — could not even know itself, for the reason that every original impression is atomically simple; it is not only out of relation to all other impressions, but is void of relation or distinction in itself; and where there is no distinction there is no knowledge. But now let us suppose that these impressions are not the whole of mind, but that there is, as Hume practically assumes, an indefinable mental power or, better, *eye*, to which impressions — otherwise called "objects" — are simply presented for observation, and that all that this "eye" does is passively to view the impressions as, with "inconceivable rapidity," they pass before it. This "eye" or "mind" could still never be aware of more than one impression at a time, and each impression, as it came, would immediately vanish, leaving no trace behind it, and be followed by another quite "dis-

tinct" from it. Still there would be no knowledge — not even a conscious "picture" or "image" of an "object." For to such an image a simultaneous combination of several simple impressions is necessary, and to such combination an active *work* of mind, called *remembering*, would be necessary, in order to keep the evanescent impressions from completely vanishing, and so to hold them together in one embrace or view. But to suppose such a power and reality of active mind as memory, is to add something to the data of sensible consciousness, and the necessity of making this addition — which sensational psychology always, but surreptitiously, makes, and which Hume thus made (cf. above, pp. 46–47) — is the first and simplest, and the universal historic proof that a purely sensational or "empirical" psychology and a purely sensational theory or explanation of knowledge are absolutely impossible.

A summary name, therefore, for all that sense, considered on its material side, or sensuous consciousness, with its purely receptive nature, does not include, is *combination* or "synthesis." Sense furnishes a multiplicity of elements ("impressions"), for the material of knowledge, but these elements, as they are simply given and received, absolutely lack that connection which is, as matter of fact, necessary to render them really conscious objects of knowledge. This deficiency of sense is perceived and declared by Kant, who adds that of all our ideas, the idea of combination, union, or synthesis among the manifold elements of our sensible consciousness,

is the only one which is not and can never be immediately furnished us by such consciousness.* It "can never come into us through the senses" or be "given" us through impressions. Combination, relation, synthesis, is not a mere inert, finished, objective, and observable "fact," impressed upon us from without through the action of "objects" upon our "minds," nor is it a "conscious state" induced upon us through the like agency. It is not a "fact," it is an *act*, a synthetic or combining or relationing act, accomplished by the spontaneous and independent activity of "the knowing subject itself." A line, for example, is a combination or "synthesis of manifold elements" or parts, which is not seen by the eye of the body or by the imaginary eye of sensuous consciousness, but only by the eye of the mind, which is the understanding. The line is not seen till it is thought, and "we cannot think it without *drawing* it, in thought." We can — to make this clear — and, from the abstract point of view of mere sensuous consciousness, we must, imagine the line as made up of an indefinite number of points joined to each other. For sense each of these points gives off its separate impression, and these are received, not simultaneously, but in succession. Physically speaking, we cannot see all of the points together, we can only

* What Kant more exactly means is, of course, that the idea of combination *includes* all ideas not furnished by sense. The progress of the argument will show that it thus includes all ideas, or conceptions proper, whatsoever, since there is no conception without combination. Sense, as here technically regarded by Kant, furnishes in fact no "ideas" whatsoever, but only material for them.

see one at a time. There is and can be no purely physical or sensuous vision of the *line*. The physical organ and its function are only the condition of vision, which is a synthetic act performed by the intellect, the mind's true eye. The intellect, namely, or "understanding," *attends* to the multitudinous impressions in their order and brings them to a *stand*, keeps them from fleeting, fixes them in the field of mental vision, which is memory, and so holds them together in a true synthesis or union, whereby the *impression* of their multitudinousness is lost in the clear and distinct *thought* of their unity, or of the one true *object*, which they conditionally compose. This thought, as such, is strictly the product of our thinking, or of the "spontaneity of our understandings." The line is no object of thought or knowledge, until, by actively "drawing the line in thought," we really think and so know it. And the like is true for all sensible objects of knowledge. For in all of them there is involved a like combination or synthesis of multitudinous parts or "impressions."

But to say that all synthesis in sensible knowledge is the work of the understanding, is the same as to say that all distinction in knowledge and all unity are to be ascribed to the same active and efficient source. For synthesis is nothing but viewing that which is intrinsically, or at least sensibly, manifold as *one*. So Kant declares that "the conception of combination involves, in addition to the notion of multitudinous elements and their synthesis, the no-

tion of their unity. Combination may be abstractly defined as the idea of the *synthetic* unity of the manifold."

Let it not, now, (a) be said or imagined, after the manner of the uncritical descriptive psychologist, that *this* idea of complex unity is not original, but derived and transferred from an idea of simple unity, which is involved in the idea of a simple impression, and is conveyed, along with the impression, through the senses into the mind. For we have seen, abundantly, that there can be no such conveyance of the single, simple impression itself, nor, consequently, of the mathematical or numerical unity which alone belongs to it. On the contrary, the simple impression and its unity are, in the order of our knowledge or conception, late products of analytic abstraction. All sensible objects of knowledge are synthetic wholes, and it is we who, having, by the very act and process of our knowing, made them such wholes, afterwards analyze them into imaginary elementary units. Nor, on the other hand, (b) can the idea of this unity be logically or historically posterior to the idea of combination. On the contrary, as Kant declares, it is the very superinduction of this idea upon the multitudinous elements to be combined, which first makes combination possible; so that the idea of unity is logically prior to, or the condition of, the idea of combination. And, finally, (c) the unity in question is not identical with the mathematical "unity" mentioned in the table of categories. The latter unity

is essentially the same with that referred to under "(a)." It results from a "logical function," or process of thought, in which such combination of ideas is presupposed as, according to "(b)," must follow and depend on — not precede and condition — the "qualitative" unity under discussion. The origin of this unity must be sought, Kant declares, "in a higher region, namely, in that which itself first renders the understanding, as a judging faculty, possible, by rendering possible the union of different conceptions in one and the same judgment." The unity in question must transcend all other unities, and must be at once their universal condition and, as such, present and discoverable in or through them all.

This unity is none other than the unity of pure self-consciousness. Wherever there is thinking, "having of ideas," or being conscious in any shape, there is a *somewhat* that thinks, has the ideas, or is conscious. This somewhat calls itself *self*, *a* self, one identical self, or person. It uses the pronoun of the first person and says: "*I* think, have ideas, or, am conscious," or, "All these thoughts and ideas are *mine*." Accordingly, Kant declares the condition of all thought and of all real or completed consciousness to be this, that it be either explicitly and actually accompanied by the reflection expressed in the phrase, "I am thinking," or that it be possible for this reflection so to accompany it. I need not, of course, stop to reflect that all the thoughts, ideas, or "objects of consciousness," of which I am aware,

belong to me; but unless it were true that, if I did thus reflect, I should find that they were indeed thus all *mine*, they would have no existence for me; and, not existing for me, they would not exist at all. The one common aspect, then, that belongs so essentially to all thoughts or ideas, that without it there would be no thoughts or ideas at all, is this, that they all belong to a *me* — to a me whose nature is to be always one and the same, or identical. So that I may say that the "*common* expression" for "all my ideas" is, that "*I* am thinking." The consciousness thus expressed is pure self-consciousness. The unity involved in it may be termed the "transcendental unity of self-consciousness," inasmuch as it conditions, and so explains, as we shall see, the possibility of certain forms of knowledge *a priori*.

The unity of pure self-consciousness, it is seen, is present in and comprehends all other consciousness. It is the true and original unity, without which no other unity in knowledge is possible. It is the synthetic or comprehensive unity in which all other syntheses are strictly included, and on which they depend. Whatever may be necessary to this unity, or intrinsically involved in it, will bear a like relation to all our knowledge whatsoever.

Pure self-consciousness is distinguished from all other consciousness. The "I" who thinks, regards all his thoughts as belonging to him, but not identical with him, as being his possessions, but not himself. The expression, "I," denotes nothing which is sensibly perceived, no conscious image, like that

of a tree, for example. It is not definable or describable in terms of sensible consciousness. The idea is not *received*, and no object corresponding to it is *presented*. It can, therefore, originate only in the pure "spontaneity" of mind. It denotes a pure, ideal, strictly continuous, self-originating and self-illuminating *act* or *activity*, and not a "substance,"—in which latter case it would have to be sensibly perceived, presented in the forms of space and time, and exist before it was perceived. And the context shows that it is a *synthetic* activity, since it draws within its embrace all other activities and holds them together in one organic whole.

On the other hand, and from another point of view, self-consciousness is identical with all consciousness. Whatever may be our thoughts or ideas, whatever our consciousness and its "objects," the consciousness of "the identical self" is in them all and they are all in it. It permeates all other consciousness, and, by making the latter its own, at the same time makes it to be real consciousness. Thus pure self-consciousness gives itself a content, which it makes practically identical with itself, while it remains master of the content and so ideally distinguishable from it. In short, consciousness in general and self-consciousness in particular reveal themselves as organically one, separable only through abstraction, bound up in a living, actively synthetic and complex unity, of which the determining element or original unity (or, better, source and creator of unity) is that universal "act of spontaneity"

expressed in the phrase, "*I* am thinking." Thus we see that, at least in some sense, all consciousness is necessarily, or involves, self-consciousness, and the former cannot be conceived, even in abstraction, except as subject to the forms which the latter imposes.

All combination of ideas or of their elements in unities, in wholes, or in "objects," is, then, a work of the understanding, and is consequently *a priori*, or primarily and ideally independent of the elements combined; and the understanding "is itself nothing but the faculty of thus combining." The original and master combination, on which all other combination depends, is the union of all consciousness in the synthetic embrace, or "under the synthetic unity," of self-consciousness. "Thus the synthetic unity of self-consciousness is the highest point of all, on which all use of the understanding, even all logic, and, after it, all transcendental philosophy, must depend; nay, the faculty of such unity is the understanding itself." And the "highest principle in all human knowledge" is, that the manifold elements presented in sensible consciousness must, in order to become elements of a real consciousness, be in relation to "the original synthetic unity of self-consciousness" and conformed to the conditions of the latter.

Now let us look, by way of recapitulation, at the ground as it lies at present before us. The deficiency of sensible consciousness, conceived as independent of understanding and its activity, consisted in the utter unrelation and absence of union among

its elements. Owing to this deficiency, sensible consciousness, as thus conceived, could not furnish, since, as such, it did not contain, any ideas of things or objects; for such ideas always consist of a definite and orderly combination of elements. Still less could it furnish or account for our ideas of relations among different objects, or ideas of objects, such as causation, interaction, etc. Yet we have such ideas, of both kinds, or, what amounts to the same thing, we are aware of what we call objects as existing, and of fixed and even necessary relations as subsisting among them. Or, in other words, combination, both among the elements of our ideas, and among our ideas themselves, is a fact, and this combination exists in determinate forms, without which it would be indefinable and unrecognizable. Now, we have found an explaining source of apparent combination in the peculiar activity of the understanding, which is nothing but a pure, combining activity, effectuating a reduction of that which is *per se* chaotically multitudinous (namely, elementary sensuous "impressions") under the synthetic unity of orderly wholes (ideas of objects and their relations), and, further — as a work absolutely essential to the completeness and effectiveness of the foregoing — bringing all these wholes under the all-comprehending unity of one identical self-consciousness, which permeates and dominates them all. So essential, indeed, and so fundamental has this latter work appeared, that we have been enabled to recognize in it the characteristic nature, nay, the very essence, of

the understanding itself, and to perceive that, instead of the grand synthesis of self-consciousness being simply incidentally necessary to all other syntheses, all other syntheses were the rather but necessary and incidental parts of the synthesis of self-consciousness, and must accordingly adapt themselves to its requirements.

On what condition, then, is sensible experience, and the knowledge, thus derived, of what we call nature, possible? Or, on what condition is "pure physical science" possible? The condition is obviously an important one, and has been plainly indicated in the foregoing. It is that our consciousness of nature be, at least in form, strictly a consciousness of self — a *self*-consciousness — or necessarily involved in and determined by that combining activity of the understanding, whose highest and original, essential and universal, potency is manifested in the realization of self-consciousness. Would we know an object, it is not enough that we simply feel or have the impressions it produces. Indeed, *simply* to feel them is impossible. In order to know the object, we must also think it. But to think it is simply to combine the elements suited to compose it in the synthetic, conscious unity of an idea; and to do this implies the combination of this idea, with various others of similar nature, in the grander unity of one unbroken and uninterrupted consciousness; which latter, again, is impossible, except it be brought under the one central, unifying, and all-pervading light and activity of self-consciousness.

The activity, by which an object is thought, is part and parcel of the activity whereby consciousness is made and continues to be *one;* and the latter, again, is but part and parcel of the activity whereby self-consciousness constantly creates and sustains itself. Objective reality — or, that an object should be real for us, or really enter into our consciousness — depends on the "union, in the notion corresponding to it, of the manifold elements contained in a given perception." This union is effectuated by the understanding, and that only under, within, and by means of, the synthetic unity of self-consciousness. Consequently this unity is the determining source of all unity in objects as known by us, and so of the "*objective* validity," truth, or reality of all our ideas of objects. "The transcendental unity of self-consciousness is that unity through which all the manifold elements given in a perception are united so as to form the notion of an object. It is therefore to be called *objective*"— or, this unity is identical with the unity of consciousness, regarded as a consciousness of "*objects*."

So, then, whatever a natural object definitely is for us, namely, its distinguishing form and relations, is determined, at least in its larger and vital lineaments, by the nature of the combining activity of the understanding, as centring in, and radiating out from, self-consciousness. The very notion of "object" is *a priori*, created from within and not received from without, and whatever is essential to the notion of an *object*, as *such*, or of objects as exist-

ing in relations of coexistence and sequence, must, in like manner, be, on the one hand, *a priori*, and, on the other, enter into and form the condition of the very possibility of all our experimental knowledge, however otherwise determined. The "categories" express whatever is thus essential.

Our ideas of natural objects are, considered with reference to their matter and not to their form, sensuous perceptions, containing multitudinous elemental impressions of phenomena in space and time. When the understanding combines them, it exercises what, logically described, is an act or function of judgment. Through this act it puts the perception in one of those determinate, but universal, synthetic forms, which it must assume, in order to become a part of real consciousness. These forms are, as we saw in the last chapter, nothing but forms of syntheses, or combinations and relations, in space and time, wrought by the imagination under the determining influence of the understanding. They are essential to the respective forms of logical judgments, in which they are employed, determining the characteristic nature of the latter, and alone rendering them possible. They are called categories, or pure and primary conceptions of the understanding. So, then, the elements of perception can be combined only by the understanding: the understanding can combine only by judging; and it can judge only through the use and application of the categories. Consequently, "all sensuous perceptions are subject to the categories, as conditions, under which alone

their diverse elements can be united and enter into any consciousness whatever."

The "transcendental deduction" is now completed. It is shown that, and how, sensible experience, or the foundation of pure physical science, which is the determinate knowledge of phenomena in space and time, is impossible, except through the categories as pure conceptions or functions of the understanding; and it is shown that, and how, these conceptions all depend on "the original synthetic unity of self-consciousness, which is the form that the understanding assumes in relation to space and time, as themselves original forms of sensible consciousness." If we would know a sensible or physical object, it must first be clad in that form of thought which thought supplies, and without which it cannot enter into the presence-chamber of thought or be known. In other words, it must take the form of a substance. Only as a substance can it be conceived, and, on the other hand, it is only in consequence of our conceiving it, or operating upon it with the synthetic activity of the understanding, that it appears to us as a substance. We do not perceive substances, we only conceive them; the notion of substance is not introduced into our minds through the senses. But it is a necessary and universal notion for sensible knowledge, or physical science, and that because it is, in the way indicated in the transcendental deduction, *a priori* and an essential form of the activity of the understanding in creating sensible or "natural"

objects of knowledge, out of the confused elements of sensuous consciousness.

In like manner, the notion of a causal relation as existing between successive phenomena, or between successive aspects of the same phenomenon, is the result, not of our perception, but of our conception. Hume is right in saying that we never "*perceive*" any necessary, or any other real, connection between phenomena or "objects." We do not and can not, as has been pointed out, even *perceive* the phenomena themselves, unless we also conceive them. And so the "causal connection" which we recognize between them, is but a form which they must necessarily assume in our conception and consequent knowledge of them. *This* relation of cause and effect, which is but a relation of necessary and irreversible order in time, is necessarily conceived by us as universal, because the category of causation, *as thus defined*, is one of those *a priori*, mind-determined forms of our conception of sensible objects, which the latter must adopt, in order to be known at all. And the demonstration of the necessity and universality of this relation among phenomena is only tantamount to a demonstration, from a particular point of view, that no knowledge of a universe of sensible objects in time is possible, unless the relation among these objects be one of determinable "law" or order.

Thus it is that, in Kant's language, it is our general conceptions of objects which render objects, as such, possible for us, and not objects which render

these conceptions possible. And thus, too, it is we who, incapable, through sensuous consciousness,—the only way in which "nature" is here held to affect us or communicate herself to us,—of reaching nature herself and deciphering any laws which may belong to nature as a complex of "things-in-themselves," "prescribe laws to nature *a priori*," compelling her, in *our* knowledge of her, to conform herself to them, and not allowing her to dictate them to us. Indeed, the notion of nature itself is *a priori;* it is *our* notion, our creation: and the categories, which determine the form of the universal laws of nature, are but the constituent elements of this mind-created notion itself.

Should this result still seem incredible and enigmatic to the reader, Kant replies by reminding him anew of that commonplace of sensational psychology which the Transcendental Æsthetic has reaffirmed, namely, that all our knowledge of sensible nature is, after all, only a knowledge, not of things as they are or may be in themselves, but of things as they appear in our ideas of them, i.e. of phenomena. It is no more difficult, he declares, to understand how the laws of phenomena (thus understood) in nature should agree with the *a priori* combinatory forms of the understanding, than how phenomena themselves should agree with the *a priori* forms of sensible perception. "Laws do not exist in phenomena; they only exist relatively to the understanding mind or subject, in which the phenomena inhere; just as, also, phenomena themselves have no independent

existence, but exist only relatively to a being endowed with senses through which he may be affected. If things in themselves have laws, these laws no doubt belong to them necessarily and inherently, and without reference to any understanding that may know them. But phenomena are only ideas of things, of which latter it is impossible for us to say what they may be in themselves. But, as mere ideas, they are subject to no law of combination whatever, except that which the combining faculty prescribes for them." Then follows a very brief recapitulation of the points involved in the general argument of this chapter, from which it results that "all phenomena of what we call 'nature' are, with respect to their combinations and relations, under the law of the categories, which is the original source of necessary law in nature — if we consider nature, not in her more particular and accidental, but in her universal lineaments. * * * Particular laws, which relate to the contingent, and not to the universal, qualifications of phenomena, can, for this very reason, not be completely deduced from the laws of the categories, although they must all be in conformity with the latter. To become informed respecting them we must have particular experience of them: but as to what experience, as such, or viewed in its essential and universal character, is, and as to what must be the universal nature of any object in order that it may be known through experience, the laws of the categories, and these laws alone, give us *a priori* information."

The general result of the "transcendental deduction" is summed up by Kant as follows:

"We cannot think an object, except through categories; we cannot know the object of our thought, except through perceptions, which conform to the categories. Now, all our perceptions are sensuous and all our knowledge, relating, as it therefore does, to objects which, on their particular, sensuous side, we do not create, is empirical. But empirical knowledge is experience. Hence no *a priori* knowledge is possible for us, except in relation to objects of possible sensible experience."

The transcendental deduction of the categories, as it now lies complete before us, contains a notable contribution to the science of knowledge, and so, indirectly, to the science of being. It is nevertheless marred and covered with a needless air of paradox, owing to the peculiar and altogether dogmatic limitations, which we have previously recognized as belonging to Kant's purely mechanistic point of view, and which react with absolutely disfiguring and confusing influence upon his own interpretation of the facts demonstrated by him. Hegel, who is Kant's best critic and interpreter, remarks repeatedly that the whole nature of the Kantian philosophy is determined by the circumstance that its author always ends by contemplating his subject purely from the point of view of "consciousness," as distinguished from "self-consciousness." This is only another way of saying that Kant persists in considering the process of knowledge, or, more particularly, the rela-

tion between subject and object, in its superficial, mechanical aspect, rather than in its essential and organic one. The former is viewed by him as fundamental, and determines the character of his final conclusions.

"Consciousness," as distinguished from "self-consciousness," is what we have termed "sensible consciousness." It is consciousness as considered in empirical psychology — a fixed and finished product, a complex series of "states" or "feelings," a sum of "mental phenomena" which we find already existing, and which, prior to exact investigation, are roughly imagined to be the purely mechanical result of the action, upon one indefinable mental "subject," of "objects" whose nature is wholly foreign to the subject. This is the first appearance, and it is an appearance which has its relative justification.

Self-consciousness, on the other hand, is not a mere product; it is a process. It is a complex and organic activity, and reveals a nature of subject and object, and of the *universe* of experimental reality, in which both subject and object are but dependent terms, quite different from the one suggested by the mere analytic contemplation of sensible consciousness. The scientific examination and explication of self-consciousness were carried further in post-Kantian philosophy. But Kant carries the inquiry far enough to show to one, who regards the facts without prejudging them, that in self-consciousness there is revealed living, spiritual, effective, and *determining* — though not, indeed, materialistically "sub-

stantial" — reality. And, in particular, Kant signally demonstrates that self-consciousness, with its pure, spiritual, organic activities, is the creative condition of sensible consciousness. He shows that no sensible consciousness, no consciousness of sensible objects, is possible, unless it be thoroughly permeated, moulded, and sustained by a self-conscious activity of mind, which creates for it its universal forms and, through these, conditions all its particular ones. Nevertheless, his narrow and prejudiced point of view leads him to give to the facts demonstrated by him an interpretation whereby they are rendered not only paradoxical in appearance, but wholly unintelligible. Self-consciousness he interprets (?) as nothing but a "formal" or "logical" aspect or condition of sensible consciousness. For him the conditioned product is the main thing. The conditioning process and *agency* is merely an ontologically insignificant incident of the former. This is wholly unintelligible and is in direct contradiction of the facts which Kant discovers and declares. Kant finds and declares the self-conscious activity, which conditions sensible consciousness, to be a "pure activity," a "pure spontaneity" of mind; it is livingly efficient, synthetic, organizing. It *does* something. It is the condition of all conscious doing and being. To assert, then, that it is after all only formal and logical and is *per se* only an insubstantial incident of sensible consciousness, or of the dependent product of its activity, is to use words which not only contradict the facts, as he finds and

asserts them, but are devoid of meaning. As well might you say that the organizing forces which build up the tree are only "incidental" or only "logically" necessary to the tree regarded as a completed product, a mere mass of potential timber. Of course you have a right to use such language, if you have special occasion to fix exclusive attention upon the tree in its finished form, but you can only use it metaphorically or with a reservation. And so Kant, in view of the fact that he is here specifically employed with the task of ascertaining and describing the conditions and nature of *sensible* consciousness only, might justly speak of self-consciousness, in its logical relation to sensible consciousness, as merely a formal aspect or incident of the latter, but only on condition that he made it understood that his words were to be taken with a qualification, or as not expressing all that self-consciousness *per se* is demonstrated by the facts to be. But this is not Kant's way. So thoroughly is he mastered by the dogmatic persuasion that sensible consciousness is the alpha and omega of knowledge, that it is in sober earnest that he declares self-consciousness, so far as we can really *know* it, to be a mere shadow cast by us as purely individual human thinkers, or by the human race as an aggregate of such thinkers. It is not an object of real knowledge, it is not revelatory of real being, simply because, instead of being a part of sensible consciousness, it is its transcendent (and self-manifesting) condition. Kant, accordingly, continuing to look at his whole

subject exclusively from the point of view of sensible consciousness and of the corresponding mechanical conception of the nature and relation of subject and object, ascribes self-conscious mind with all its works simply to us as phenomenal individual *subjects*, or to the human race as an aggregate of such subjects. Knowledge, and the activities from which it proceeds, is wholly "within," it is in us as thinking individuals, and nothing intelligible comes to us "from without." And all this because the mechanistic prejudice requires subject and object to have nothing in common, and will not permit the subject, even, to know himself in his true reality, whereby he participates in the universal, and through it in the nature of his particular objects, but only the phenomenon of himself. (We must never forget this point, namely, that, according to Kant, it is never the absolute subject that knows, or that can detect and know himself in the act of knowing, but only the phenomenal subject — a meaningless distinction, whereby the mystery — and nonsense! — of the whole situation, as viewed by Kant, is immeasurably increased.)

Perhaps we can best illustrate the absurdity of Kant's dogmatic interpretations and the deeper truth to which the facts discovered by him really point, in some such way as follows:—

Suppose, for example, the hand in a human body endowed with a particular, sensible consciousness of its own, so that it might "receive" into itself the mental impression or image of any other particular

part of the body, such as the head. The hand would be the "subject," the head the "object," of consciousness. The hand would view the impression of the object "within" itself, and, shaking its own imaginary head, would say, wisely, in the spirit of the sceptical (or even of the "critical"!) Idealist, "Ah, here is an impression of what I call a head, which doubtless denotes what I may term a head-in-itself. But this impression in my *manual* consciousness I perceive to be wholly determined in form by the nature of my consciousness, and the impression itself is nothing but a modification of myself, and so only shows me how I may be modified or 'affected,' but not what is the essential nature of that head-in-itself which causes the affection. Plainly, the head-in-itself possesses a wonderful and inscrutable nature. In it is lodged true reality, and it, whatever it may be, and although it is forever unknowable *to me*, must doubtless furnish the type of such reality, while I am nothing but a fragile mirror; or, rather, I cannot distinguish myself — apart from the wholly insubstantial hand-form which determines and perverts the form of my consciousness — as being anything in particular other than the images of true, but alas! unknowable, objects, which are reflected in me." Should we, from our larger point of view, call these oracular utterances of "the hand" wisdom? Should we not, the rather, term them pitiable nonsense? And should we not be constrained to say to the hand, "O hand, the hard and fast opposition which thou, as conscious subject, pretendest to

find existing between thyself and that nominal object of thy consciousness, which thou termest the head-in-itself, so that the true knowledge of the latter can never enter thy poor consciousness, is wholly an affair of thy own creation; and thy show of meekness, in reducing thyself to the quality of a mere shadow and exalting the 'unknown' object and subject of thy consciousness to the position of sole occupants of the throne of being or sole possessors of absolute reality, is wholly uncalled for, and hence ridiculous. Thou beginnest by wilfully cutting thyself off, in imagination, from all relation to aught but thyself. Thou arbitrarily viewest thyself as one distinct and independent thing, self, or subject of consciousness, complete in thyself, a wholly individual and self-included entity, atomically separate from all other existences, and not needing them in order to thine own existence. Upon this supposition, any impressions which other existences may make upon thee must necessarily appear mechanical and inscrutable. Thou, *as individual*, canst not go out of thyself to see whence they come and know what reality lies back of them. On reflection, thou findest also that all thou knowest or canst know of thyself, in the way in which thou hast determined to look upon thyself, is confined to the consciousness thou hast of the affections or impressions produced in thee by objects other than thyself. It is no wonder, therefore, that in place of thy original supposition of thyself as something, thou art now led to regard thyself or thy consciousness as but the in-

substantial and inexplicable shadow of other things, which must lie forever hidden from thy view. But all this helplessness of knowledge, this conversion of knowledge into ignorance, results only from the circumstance that thou hast arbitrarily chosen to consider the case from the lowest and narrowest, and not from the highest and most commanding, point of view within thy reach. I, who occupy this latter point of view, perceive that thou art not a distinct and independent individual, complete in thyself, nor is thy consciousness a mere shadow. In like manner, I see that the head, the object of thy consciousness, is not simply a distinct and independent thing in and by itself. Both thou and it may indeed be thus regarded, but, when thus regarded, each is viewed only in a light which is partial and incomplete, and hence may and does mislead. Thou, O hand, and thy fancied distinct object, the head, are both inseparably bound together as coördinate members of a complex, but organic and 'synthetic,' unity or whole, namely, the human body. In this whole, thou and all other members are so intimately and vitally united, that the complete separation of any one of you from the rest would involve the complete and immediate extinction of your true, real, and characteristic nature or being. The whole necessarily implies each one of you, and each of you necessarily implies the whole; while all of you, through your relation to the whole, are necessarily related to and imply each other. Since, therefore, to the true existence and function of each one of you, the whole,

to which you belong, and all its other members are necessary, no one of you, in your purely individual and separate aspect, can claim to be a true and completed and independent self or entity. On the contrary, you are each an individual self, or your distinct and separate natures are what they are, only by virtue of the inclusion and participation of each and all of you in a universal self or idea, the self or idea of the whole body. The universal 'self' (the idea of the whole body) is the key to unlock the mystery of your particular selves. *It* is in this sense *your* self, and you are its, and all you different members strictly belong to and *are* a part of each other. Thus, O hand, thou seest that the idea of the head — the special object of thy present consciousness — is but a part of the completed idea of thine own self, since thou canst not adequately think of thyself except as involving the head and all other members of the one body, to which you all belong, as essential to thine own completeness. You all are in one, and one idea, one life, one indiscerptible power and light of soul is in all of you. Thou wilt see, therefore, that thou art what thou art, not solely, nor principally, by that which makes thee numerically distinct from the head and the rest of the body, but by virtue of thy participating in and having as thine own a universal life, an ideal quality, a spiritual force, which is present in every member. Thus, so far as thou and thy object are concerned, 'existence' is obviously not atomic, individualistic, separated off by impassable gulfs into wholly unrelated and unlike realms. And

so, if thou, my friend, wilt cease to fix thy stupid, staring gaze exclusively upon thine own *individual* impressions, and wilt rise to such a completed and *universal* self-consciousness as thou mayest easily attain, thou wilt see that that previously inscrutable object, the head, is indeed thy twin-brother, thine *alter ego*, or, better, a true and complementary part of thyself, and no more mysterious than thou thyself art. Moreover, this sense-begotten mystery, which has shrouded for thee thy own existence, will disappear. Thou seest, indeed, already that thou existest only through, by, and for, an idea, a use, a purpose, which is but an integral part of a larger idea. This idea does not exist as an inert, lonely, sensible object, but as a spiritual force, all-comprehensive, all-permeating, and all-sustaining within its range. Through thy participation in and identification with it, *and through this alone*, thou seest how thou art able to go out of thy separate individual sphere, as a mere hand, and to know the head and all the other members of the body as a part of thy larger and completer self. And thou must now see that it is primarily in this ideal force, this effective power of "spirit"— which is not inscrutable, but self-revealing and translucent as the light of day — that true being and reality for thee reside. In this reality, as thou perceivest, both thou and thine 'object' alike participate. Through it you both exist and are what you are. The talk of a head-in-itself, as a separate and independent entity, was therefore nonsense, and the impressions, which led thee to

postulate its existence, were nothing but the form of thy knowledge of the head, considered on what we now perceive to be its relatively unreal side, namely, the side of its apparent, but in fact unreal and impossible, independence and distinction from the knowing 'hand.' Thus thy 'impressions' or sensuous perceptions pointed to that which is accidental, rather than truly substantial, or independently and abidingly real, or to that which is unknowable because it is, absolutely and independently considered, non-existent, and not because it is transcendently exalted above or removed beyond the reach of 'knowledge.'"

It is in a strain similar to the foregoing that we must address Kant, when he treats the limitations of sensible consciousness and of physical science, which is but the accurate deciphering of the letters and syllables of such consciousness, as universal limitations of all "theoretical" or real knowledge. Individual, sensible consciousness, which is a panorama of so-called impressions, or "internal" *states* of appearance, is, as Kant himself has shown us, absolutely dependent on individual self-consciousness, which is a purely ideal, but none the less real and synthetic, or combining, *activity*. But even this larger interpretation of consciousness, true and supremely significant as far as it goes, falls short of the true and complete interpretation. Individual or unipersonal self-consciousness reveals itself as not merely numerically one and self-identical, but as the one which pervades the many, the individual

which is one with the universal, and which makes or has the many and the universal as an organic part of the consciousness of itself. The self-consciousness of the individual thus leads him directly away from the mere consciousness of himself as purely individual, and sets him down in a land in which he at first appears to himself as a stranger, but where he quickly realizes that he is at home. This land is *his* land; it is the land of his larger self, or of his self on the side of its universality, or of its relation to universal and absolute being. It is the land of universal Self, Reason, or Spirit. It is, I say, his own land, it belongs to him, just as, in our illustration above, the whole idea or "land" of the body belonged to and was involved in the completed consciousness of the hand. Individual self-consciousness thus finds that in that synthetic, combining, universalizing activity whereby alone it grasps objects, it is throwing about them simply the threads of that larger Self, in which both itself and they are included — the self which lives in them, as they too all "live and move and have their being" only in it. This larger self is divine; it is universal living, effective reason, it is absolute Spirit. The individual's sufficiency "to think anything of himself" is, thus, "of God." It comes from his participation in a light which can be, in its completeness, no less all-embracing and all-creative than divine reason.

In this view all reality or absolute "being" is living and spiritual, not dead and merely "substantial." The appearance of the contrary is mere

appearance, which is possible, as such, only for a consciousness which is naturally restricted, or voluntarily restricts itself, to the purely individualistic point of view of "sensible" consciousness. Every particular, finite self is at once a self-realizing, and yet also a dependent intelligence, its individual peculiarities resulting only from its special place or function in the universal realm of spiritual power and reality, of which God is the independent and transcendent, yet omnipresent and all-sustaining, monarch. All of its "objects" are manifestations or "phenomena" of what must in the last resort be regarded as similar "energies of mind," of lower or higher degree.

In this view, too, the absolute distinction, which exists for Kant between subjective and objective, as also between *a priori* and *a posteriori*, falls away. The subjective and objective are organically one. The same ideal life and power are in and constitute them both. The "forms of thought" are not simply *our* forms, having no ontological significance and serving merely to bind sensuous perceptions together in "objects" for our convenience. They are the true life and reality of the objects, as well as of ourselves. We and they are organically one in that Logos, or expressed power of divine spirit, which is not only "above all," but also "in and through all," and without which nothing was or is "made."

"To this complexion" the collective body of Kant's three *Critiques*, as a whole, effectively point, but, at most, only "practically" come. And, more especially, it is to such a science of knowledge and of being

as is roughly indicated in the foregoing pages, that the facts respecting the real process of knowledge and the actual relation between subject and object in knowledge, as discovered and set forth by Kant in his Transcendental Æsthetic and Analytic directly lead. Such a science is immediately founded in and corresponds to experience, to our whole experience, and not simply, like the theories of sceptical idealism and agnosticism, to one superficial part or aspect of experience. It is in such a science that philosophy, in its grander historic forms — the forms which contain a positive, experimentally demonstrable substance, and are not filled with dogmatisms and arbitrary negations — has consisted and ever consists. And it was necessary to indicate here, at least to the foregoing extent, the outlines of this science, in order that we might, on the one hand, see what is the general relation of the facts discovered by Kant to the cardinal principles of philosophic truth, and, on the other, perceive yet more clearly than before, that the limitations which Kant, in the Transcendental Deduction, and in his whole *Critique*, places on all "theoretical" knowledge, are dogmatically asserted, and hence to be looked upon with absolute distrust. When therefore, for example, we find Kant declaring that the "identical self," the "I," which asserts itself in the activity of self-consciousness, knows not *what* itself is, but only *that* it is,— and this, too, simply because, of that which is expressed by the pronoun "I," we have, and from the nature of the case can have, no sensible impres-

sion, perception, or image; when he says that we can "think," but not "know," ourselves, and implies that effective reality or true being belongs only to unknowable things which appear, and yet do not appear, in those sensible perceptions which we call phenomena;— when he says all this, we shall, let it now be hoped, be able to take his utterances at their true worth — or worthlessness. We shall decline to adopt as solemn truth the mere prejudices of that phantom which imagines and terms itself purely and merely individual sensible consciousness.

And, finally, we shall see that the extension of the aforesaid "limitations" to the whole field of knowledge, is irrelevant to the immediate subject of discussion. The question was, How is pure physical science, or sensible knowledge of objects, possible? And the answer was, substantially, Such knowledge is not possible without fixed and definite conceptions and invariable relations or "laws," which can be immediately traced to no other source than the synthetic activity of self-conscious mind. From this source is derived the universal and necessary form of sensible knowledge. Its material, on the other hand, must all be given in the shape of conscious perceptions, appearances, or phenomena. These, on the one hand, *must* be given; and, on the other, beyond them physical science, through its necessary organ, sensible consciousness, cannot go. Thus the question is answered. To go further, and assert that all knowledge is strictly confined to the same conditions, is, compared with the requirements of the

discussion, simply a work of supererogation. Still, this might be endured, were the assertion proven. Not being proven, nor supported by even a shadow of proof, it is a source of double confusion. It diverts attention from the immediate problem in hand, and lands it in a bog of sophistry.

We may recognize, however, with gratitude, and study with profit, the positive work which Kant has accomplished. He has, in principle, already determined the nature, conditions and limitations of "pure physical science" or sensible knowledge. He has also shown that the knowledge of the human spirit is not to be compassed by the methods of such science or by any mere analysis accomplished through empirical psychology. And by showing that knowledge, even upon its lowest, sensible terms, implies a combining and illuminating activity of mind, he has done the work of a hero in undermining sensational psychology and, even, the dogmatic metaphysics, which rests on it, and in which, also, Kant himself continues, in too great a measure, complacently to rest: he is really, however unconsciously, pointing all the while in a way which is most significant for the thoughtfully observant mind, to the philosophic conception of being, as ideal, universal, spiritual, and self-knowing power, and not merely atomic, impenetrable, and unknowable "substance." Whither Kant thus pointed, his successors did their best — and that was not a little! — to follow, and so, in spite of all *apparent* differences and contradictions, — nay, rather by very virtue of them, — became his truest continuators.

CHAPTER V.

THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENCE.

THE term science, in the title of this chapter, is to be taken in the restricted sense, for which Kant has been preparing us and which has now become confirmed by prevalent usage. By science we mean mathematical and physical science, the sole subject-matter of which is found in sensible phenomena or in their conditioning and universal forms.

The "principles of science" are the universal and necessary laws of sensible phenomena. Sensible phenomena are conscious or known phenomena. They are "objects," regarded as entering into and forming a part of our consciousness, not as existing independently of it and "in themselves." They are an organic part of our knowledge, or must become such, in order to be anything for us. Their laws, therefore, belong to them only in so far as they are known or knowable. Their universal and necessary laws, or "the principles of science," are nothing but the universal and necessary laws of sensible *knowledge*. They flow from and are nothing but an expression of the essential and conditioning nature of such knowledge. They are determined from within, and not from without. The particular and apparently contingent laws of phenomena, on the

contrary, which are learned by special analysis and induction, and seem to be simply impressed upon our observing consciousness from without, are, as such, not principles of science, but only matter of scientific information. Yet they, too, turn out, upon examination, to be but special cases under and in conformity to the principles. They illustrate the principles and so illustrate the truth, which is *a priori* obvious, that the impress of the laws of sensible knowledge, *as such*, or considered *universally*, must appear in all the *particulars* of such knowledge. The accidental must bear the form of the necessary; the *a posteriori*, of the *a priori*.

Now, the necessary and universal elements of sensible knowledge, (the elements which determine and indeed make up its form or ineradicable nature,) have been "metaphysically" and "transcendentally" deduced in the foregoing chapters. They are — in dependence on the pure forms of sensible perception, or space and time,— the so-called categories, or pure and original conceptions, of the understanding. The necessary and universal principles of such knowledge, or "the principles of science," can therefore be nothing but another — expanded or generalized — version of these elements.* They are a completer or more definite statement of that which the categories imply. The categories are single notions, and elements of definite judgments. The principles

* In view of this their purely intellectual origin, Kant's expression for them is, not "principles of science," but "principles of the pure understanding."

are these judgments themselves. Our work in the present chapter must accordingly be not so much a labor of exploration, as of developed statement and application.

When the term "understanding" is not employed as a general designation for mind or intellect as a whole, it denotes, according to Kant, one of three principal faculties or functions of knowledge, which are termed Understanding, Judgment, and Reason. Corresponding to this division and arrangement, ordinary logic treats, under different heads, of Conceptions, Judgments, and Syllogisms or Inferences. In discussing and "deducing" the categories, we have, accordingly, treated of the first part of our "Transcendental Logic," and at the same time furnished what might have been termed a "Transcendental Science of the Understanding," in the more special sense of this term. What we have now before us is, correspondingly,— and is termed by Kant,— the "Transcendental Science of Judgment."

Common logic does not teach us, through its doctrine of "Judgments," what we ought to judge true or false. It simply declares what logical forms our judgments must assume, whether they be true or false. "A right judgment in all things," or even in any particular thing, is not learned by studying logic, as thus understood, but, the rather, by practice. That part of "Transcendental Logic," on the contrary, which treats of judgment, undertakes, and with good reason, to prescribe certain definite, yet universal, judgments respecting matters of fact —

respecting the true and the false for us — which we must necessarily adopt. It treats of what we must judge, as a condition of our judging anything aright, in matters of scientific knowledge. It leaves nothing to "mother wit." There is no place in it for mere inductive probabilities. The reason of this is, that it has to do with conceptions and relations which are logically prior to all contingent experience; whence the judgments founded on them must be removed from the uncertainties of *a posteriori* or contingent demonstration, and must be as necessary and universal for every human intelligence as are the conceptions themselves.

Before developing these judgments — the principles of all "science" — Kant deems it necessary to answer explicitly a preliminary question. In the preceding chapters a number of so-called "pure conceptions of the understanding" have been deduced and demonstrated as necessary "forms of thought," with which all objects of sensible knowledge must be invested in order really to be known at all. If such investiture be both necessary and universal, it must surely needs be possible! But the question has not been expressly raised and answered, How is this possible? The question is certainly and visibly one that may well seem adapted to excite a curious interest, owing to the circumstance that sensible perceptions, in the form of which objects are given, and pure conceptions of the understanding are ostensibly quite heterogeneous. Sense and understanding are, by our original hy-

pothesis, completely opposed to each other, like fire and water. How can one be successfully "applied" to the other? Or, to state the case more technically and exactly: the forms of thought are conceptions, under which sensible objects are to be subsumed. Such subsumption implies that both the conception and the object are homogeneous. Thus I can subsume the sensible object, called a dinner-plate, under the geometrical conception, named circle, and say that the plate is round or circular, because the conception and the perceived plate are homogeneous: "the roundness, which in the former is thought or *conceived*, in the latter is visibly *perceived*." But the case is apparently quite different when we come to subsume sensible phenomena under any of the pure conceptions of the understanding, such as, for example, causality. How can I affirm of one phenomenon that it is the cause of another, when, "surely, no one will say that causality can be perceived by the senses and is contained in the phenomena"? The question seems thus to have a serious, as well as a merely curious, interest attached to it, since, unless a satisfactory answer can be found for it, the principles of science, or the necessary judgments of the understanding respecting phenomena, will remain, in one important respect, enigmas, though none the less, for this reason, matters of demonstrable fact. Indeed, Kant goes so far as to declare that the special object, for which a transcendental science of judgment is needed, is just to clear up this point and to "show how pure conceptions of

the understanding can be applied to phenomena as such."

Perhaps Kant rather exaggerates the importance of this question, nevertheless,— or, rather, its new importance just at this point. The question certainly has its importance, if sense and understanding are so antithetically opposed, as Kant at the outset assumed. But the progress of the discussion has tended only to overthrow this assumption. Sense, on that side of it which alone was really recognizable and definable, namely, on the side of its form (space and time), has been found to be the creative work of that same power of mind, or of understanding in the larger sense — functioning here under the name of imagination — which otherwise manifests itself in the special form of intellect, or of understanding in the narrower sense. It would be an occasion of wonder if these different manifestations of the same power were not essentially homogeneous, rather than heterogeneous. And homogeneous we indeed found them to be, in this sense, that they were organically one and inseparable. The dry light of the understanding (considered as a factor in sensible knowledge) was "empty" and invisible — i.e. a pure abstraction — until broken and filled with at least the general outlines of possible objects in the form of "syntheses of the imagination." The categories — which we are constantly to think of, in this discussion, as categories of sensible knowledge only — are "functions of unity," yet not for themselves, but only for the twin-sister of the understanding, the

sensible imagination and its products. They simply define and name the most abstract and universal types or relations of synthetic unity in the forms (of space and time) which imagination — itself also, when taken by itself, an abstraction — blindly creates. Sense, therefore, viewed with reference to its intelligible form, is imagination, and as such is no more separable from understanding than understanding from it. Both are inseparable children of the same parent,— different aspects of one, organically complex, mind-originated process of real knowledge, which cannot be decomposed, so that its parts may be isolated and separately considered, except upon the same condition on which all anatomy depends, namely, that life be previously banished and the "parts" under contemplation be thus deprived of that vital and organic relation which constitutes their characteristic nature. Instead, therefore, of asking how one can be "applied" to the other, it were more pertinent — if it were not wholly absurd — to ask how one can be effectively separated from the other, or how, being once separated, any mechanical process of "applying" one to the other is to restore the living union, which is the condition of the existence of each.

But, it may be said, the question is not at all concerning the applicability of the categories to the mind-generated forms of sense, but to the "matter" or "content" of sense, namely, particular sensations. The answer to this is, that the content of sense has been shown to be nothing for us, prior to its being

received and moulded, or "combined," by the understanding in the aforementioned forms. If you mean by "phenomena," in the question under discussion, the content of sense, independently of its form, we must tell you that you are dealing with an abstraction. Phenomena, in this sense, are never given. They are not known or knowable, and consequently we have nothing to do with them, or to say about them, until we think them; and by the very act of thinking them we put the mark of our understandings upon them, or, what is the same thing, subsume them under the categories. How can we know or imagine that there is, or can be, a pure content or object of sense, which has not, by very virtue of its meriting this description, already had the pure forms of the understanding "applied" to it? The supposition has long since been shown to be absurd, and to raise the question how the pure conceptions of the understanding can be applied to such content, when we can neither know nor imagine a content to which they have not been applied, and of which, *as given*, these conceptions are not already the universal life and soul, seems like nothing else than mere trifling. Kant's own illustrations, above cited, were therefore misleading. It was inexact and misleading on his part to state that the roundness of the plate is *perceived* by the senses, and that *thus* there is homogeneousness between what is sensibly perceived and the "pure geometrical conception of a circle," under which the perceived object is subsumed. For, as in substance we have just seen, pure sensible percep-

tion of a plate, or of any other object, is impossible and an abstraction. The plate and its roundness are not really perceived at all until they are conceived or "thought," and the roundness (in particular) is conceived only through and by means of the general conception, under which it is subsumed. The homogeneousness is, consequently, here, not between a perception and a conception, but between a general conception and a particular case in which the conception was already applied, before we knew or could know anything about it. Nor does the other supposed case, of two phenomena, of which one is said to be, in the scientific sense of this term, the cause of the other, differ at all in essentials from the foregoing. There is indeed no purely sensible perception of a "causal" relation, or of a definite and irreversible order among phenomena. But neither is there any such perception of the phenomena themselves. The purely perceived phenomena which Kant here sets over against the understanding and its functions, are, according to Kant's own logic, unreal abstractions. They become really perceived phenomena only when they have been conceived, and by so much as they cannot be conceived except as under the relation above described, by so much can they never be really perceived except in the same relation. Kant has thus answered his own question beforehand, by showing its substantial irrelevancy. The terms which he contrasts, "pure conceptions of the understanding" and "phenomena," have been already shown by him to be — so far as they desig-

nate anything real and actual in the content or process of our *knowledge* — not incognate, but organically one. So far, on the contrary, as they are viewed in absolute and mechanical contrast, they are unreal fictions. This way of viewing them is therefore thoroughly artificial and false, and, so far as Kant indulges in it, the reader will have no difficulty in tracing it to its source in Kant's πρῶτον ψεῦδος, or fundamental error, whereby he is led to view the subjective and the objective as existing, universally, in a relation of purely mechanical and unreconcilable opposition.

Let us now abandon the strain of critical comment, and briefly see what answer Kant makes to the question raised by him, as to how the pure conceptions of the understanding can be applied to sensible phenomena. Such application, he declares, is impossible, unless there be a *tertium quid*, in which conception and phenomenon agree, or which is "homogeneous" with both. This *tertium* must therefore be, on the one hand, intellectual, to agree with the nature of the conception, and, on the other, sensible, to agree with the nature of the phenomenon. These requirements are fulfilled in the idea of time. This idea is formal and universal, *a priori* and synthetic, like the conceptions of the understanding, and is thus homogeneous with them. "On the other hand, it is homogeneous with phenomena, inasmuch as time is included in every empirical idea of a sensuous aggregate" or given "object." Through this idea, then, and to the extent now

described, there is homogeneousness between conception and phenomenon, or between understanding and sense. Further, the "transcendental qualifications of time," i.e. its inherent relations, or the various ideas or modes immediately involved in it, correspond severally with the four different classes of categories. These "qualifications" are the necessary ideas of time as (1) a *series*, (2) filled up with something, or having a *content*, (3) involving a fixed *order* of succession, and (4) a *whole*, including "all possible objects." In these ideas, now, the four classes of categories are severally "realized." Through them the categories first receive "significance" and a possible "relation to objects." They furnish the universal form, content, or, as Kant scholastically terms them, "schemata," of the categories. It is necessary to remember that, along with and under time Kant here includes space. Space is the form for "external sense." But external sense is itself a part of internal sense, whose form is time. Time is therefore the form for "all objects of the senses whatsoever," and so, by necessary inclusion, of space itself.

The first three categories are categories of Quantity. The conception of quantity is that of a whole, whose elements may be homogeneous. The acquisition of the conception involves, ideally considered, the successive apprehension and enumeration of these elements and their combination in one whole. The pure "schema" of this operation, considered in its greatest abstraction, is furnished by the "trans-

cendental qualification" or idea of time as a *series* of indivisible moments, or, rather, by the conception of number, which is founded directly upon this idea.

As to the categories of Quality (reality, negation, limitation), these obviously acquire for sensible consciousness a significance only in reference to that which fills time, or to its *content*. This content is sensation, which is capable of varying degrees of intensity, and is held to denote Being or Existence in time.

Under the head of Relation, we have, for the "schema of Substance," or that which the category of substance denotes, persistence in time; for the schema of Causality, regular succession, and of Reciprocity, or action and reaction, regular coexistence.

Finally, under the head of Modality, the schema of Possibility is agreement of a combination of ideas with the universal conditions of time; of Existence, actual presence of an "object" to sensation at a definite time; and of Necessity, existence of an object in all time.

This is what Kant terms the "Schematism of the pure conceptions of the understanding." As will have been perceived by the reader, little or nothing is therein added to the accounts previously given of the categories and of their significance, except in the way of formalities of classification and detailed statement.

Repeating, therefore, Kant's reminder, that what we now have before us, and all that we have before us, is the categories — their nature and the condi-

tions of their application — in reference only to sensible consciousness or pure physical science, let us go on to see, in detail, what "principles of science," or what necessary and universal, and hence *a priori*, laws of phenomena, they immediately involve.

It has been demonstrated that no knowledge of what is called a sensible or physical object is possible, except the understanding intervene to combine the separate impressions which the object is supposed to produce. It has also been shown that the supreme combination of the understanding is the synthesis of all other syntheses in the all-comprehending unity or synthesis of self-consciousness. This combination was the condition of all other combinations. And the highest principle of all use of the understanding in sensible knowledge was, accordingly, that all knowledge of sensible objects is subject to any conditions which may be necessary in order to make it consist with the unity of self-consciousness. This is termed the highest principle of "all synthetic judgments," and the principles of science must be subject and conformed to it.

The categories expressed the fundamental forms of synthetic unity which the understanding, as a faculty of self-conscious unity, established among impressions, as the immediate and necessary condition of their being anything for us, or, what is the same thing, entering into our knowledge. "To the table of the principles" of science, which are but an expansion of the categories into the form of synthetic judgments, or of "rules respecting the objective

employment" of the categories, "the table of categories gives us the very natural clue. All principles of the pure understanding," or all of the first principles of scientific knowledge, "are, accordingly:

1. Axioms [respecting the *form*] of Perception.

2. Anticipations [respecting the *content*] of Perception.

3. Analogies [respecting the *order*] of Experience.

4. Postulates of all empirical Thought."

1. All "axioms" (*a priori* truths, or principles of science) "respecting the form of perception" are warranted and suggested by the categories of Quantity, and are summed up in the following principle: All sensibly perceived phenomena have magnitude of extension, or "are extensive quantities." This is evident from the fact that they are all in space and time. Space and time are the common form of all of them. None of them can exist, i.e. none of them can come into sensible consciousness, except as occupying a definite space or time. But no consciousness of space or time is simply given. It is "produced" by "combination of homogeneous elements." That is to say, no definite space or time can be thought, except as containing in itself an indefinite number of homogeneous parts, and resulting from the addition of these parts to each other. All space and all time are thus a "synthesis of the homogeneously manifold." The same synthesis is therefore necessary to the consciousness of anything of which space and time are the form, i.e. of all sensibly perceived phenomena, or all objects of physical science.

And this same synthesis, also, is but another, scientific description for *extension.*

Kant calls attention to the fact that all phenomena are, when viewed alone in the light of the above principles, mere aggregates. The parts are independent of the wholes, which latter are, accordingly, nothing but mechanical, artificial wholes, whose parts are held together, not by any force inherent in themselves, nor by the power of an organic, ideal, and unifying force which permeates them all and puts them in vital relation to each other and to the whole, but simply by what seems to us as the arbitrary law of our subjective intuition. The principle of the "axioms of perception" marks, therefore, one may say, a most important limitation of physical science, in so far as the latter is restricted to pure sensible consciousness as the only source, for it, of objective knowledge, and to the *forms* of space and time as the necessary and all-determining conditions, and hence limitations, of our conceptions of physical objects. It indicates, namely, that life, power, spirit, all of which are organic and synthetic and denote more than mere aggregates — or "extensive quantities" — are beyond the range of such science, and that the chase after either of them, guided by the pre-suppositions and methods peculiar to physical science as such, is absolutely quixotic.

The principle of the "axioms" has an important bearing on the relation of mathematical to physical science, or the application of the truths demon-

strated in mathematics to the "objects of sensible experience"; in view of which Kant terms it the "transcendental principle of the mathematics of phenomena." Can pure geometry, for example, which relates only to lines and figures conceived in ideal perfection, furnish any assistance to the investigator of nature, where no such perfection is to be found? The principle under discussion provides for this question an affirmative answer. The objects of geometry are products of pure syntheses of space (or "spaces") in time. But, as pointed out in the exposition of the principle, it is only through the creation of such syntheses, all of which are nothing but purely "extensive quantities," or quantities of extension, that any phenomena can be apprehended. It is consequently on the same condition that "all external experience, and hence all knowledge of the objects of experience," depends, and whatever pure mathematics proves concerning the condition, the same is also necessarily true, *mutatis mutandis*, of that which depends on it. The entrance to the scientific knowledge of nature is thus by the door of geometry.

2. Of the pure conceptions of the understanding, those which were registered as categories of quality relate to the matter, content, or object of perception, and give us *a priori*, axiomatic warrant to "anticipate" that all perception, on its material, "real," or "objective" side, will be measurable, not as an "extensive" but as an "intensive quantity," or by the degree of its intensity, and to state, as a necessary principle of science, that this is and must be so.

What we term actual perception is simply sensible or "empirical" consciousness. This is more than the merely formal or "pure" consciousness of space and time. It is the latter consciousness *plus* particular sensations. Sensations are "simply subjective ideas, through which we are only conscious of an affection proceeding, as we suppose, from some real object." Sensations, then, represent the element of reality in our consciousness. It is in our sensations that peculiar *qualities* are found, "e.g. colors, tastes, etc." These are, however, all empirical, and incapable of being determined or anticipated *a priori*. The sensational or material element in consciousness may apparently be termed the purely qualitative element, and the formal element — space and time — the quantitative one. About the former element only one thing is *a priori* certain, and this is its variability in intensity. If I have a definite sensation of redness, for example, I am aware that an indefinite number of different possible degrees of redness exist between my present sensation and the complete absence of all sensation of redness. I may say, therefore, that my sensation possesses — not "extensive quantity," for in sensation, considered on its material side (*Empfindung*), there is no intuition of space or of time — but "intensive quantity," and "correspondingly I must attribute to all objects of perception, so far as the latter contains sensation, intensive quantity, i.e. a definite degree of influence upon our sensibility."

Now, there is no perception, and consequently no

empirical consciousness, of "objects" without particular sensations; "for time and space are in themselves no objects at all of perception." We may therefore with absolute certainty predict *a priori*, and "anticipate," that "in the case of all phenomena, the real object of sensation will possess intensive magnitude" or denote a "degree."

The historical student in philosophy will observe that the one thing which Kant thus makes *a priori* certain about sensations, or the "Quality" of consciousness, and the statement of which is elevated to the rank of a principle of science, is the same which Hume, too, asserted. For Hume our "perceptions" differed only — in addition to their numerical distinctness — with respect to their "vividness."

Kant points out, as the most obvious use of this principle, its adaptation to prove that there can be no possible experience, and consequently no experimental proof of the existence, of absolutely unoccupied space or time.

He shows further, by an examination of both extensive and intensive quantity, that all quantity whatsoever is continuous; and closes with an observation, which is significant in connection with the history of post-Kantian philosophy and its method: "It is remarkable," he says, "that, respecting all *quantity* whatever, we can know *a priori* only a single *quality*, namely, its continuity, and that respecting all *quality* (the real element in phenomena) we can in like manner know nothing but its intensive *quantity*, or that all sensible phenomena are

marked by a degree of intensity: all else is left to experience."

The principles enunciated under the two foregoing heads relate directly to perception and its form. Here we start directly from perception (*Anschauung*), or its form, ending with the conceptions which the principles express. These principles are therefore specially mathematical in their nature and application. Upon them rest the possibility and, within the sphere of all possible sensible experience, the objective validity, of the pure mathematical sciences, and they are unconditionally necessary.

Under the two following heads we proceed, on the contrary, "from conceptions to perception." Here we start with certain categories, those of Relation and Modality, the use and application of which depend upon certain conditions of experience being supplied, which are as such contingent. Let there be given in perception the definite, but not *a priori* necessary, elements or material of experimental knowledge, and we are to see what our categories have to do in connection with them, or what relation they have to "empirical thought." The resulting principles will be indeed *a priori* necessary, but only on condition that, through perception, "objects" are given, to the knowledge of which they may be applied. Practically, therefore, or within the range of our present subject of inquiry — which is only that of sensible experience — these principles will be necessary without qualification. But inas-

much as they imply the above condition, they are termed, not mathematical, but dynamic.

3. The so-called "Analogies of Experience" are principles of science, the special cue for which is given in the categories of relation, namely, Substance, Causality, and Action and Reaction. They are all but different applications of a principle which has already been abundantly demonstrated, namely, that no sensible knowledge is possible without necessary, because *a priori* and mind-originated, synthesis of the elements of perception. Such synthesis has been shown indispensable, in order that we may have consciousness of any "sensible object."

It is obvious that the expressions, "sensible object," "real object of sensation," and the like, which occur often in the discussion, must be guardedly received. Objects — such is the language here employed by Kant — are given *through*, but not *in*, sensible perception. Sensible perception is interpreted and axiomatically defined as the consciousness of our being *affected*, or, as Hume would say, *impressed*, by some "object." (The view involved in this definition is a common-place of empirical psychology, which Kant adopts without critical discussion.) *What* the object is, that thus affects us, the perception — the only thing of which we are conscious — does not reveal. The object does not appear *in* perception. We are only mysteriously, but invincibly, persuaded *through* perception, *that* the object

exists and has affected us. It is therefore only by a loose use of language that objects can be said to be "given through perception." Objects are not really thus given, but only the persuasion that objects, as real but unknown and unknowable things, or "things in themselves," do really exist, together with the raw material, in the shape of uncombined elements of perception, out of which we, by combining them *after the "analogy,"* or subject to the law, of our own understandings and their functions, the categories, may frame for ourselves the only "objects"— namely, phenomenal objects — which we are capacitated to know. This work of combination is evidently equivalent to the introduction and establishment — *for us*, and as a necessary condition of the only kind of knowledge possible for us,— of relations among perceptions. The categories of Relation will therefore furnish the guide and prescribe the determining law for this work.

The deduction of the categories and the development of the laws of their "schematism" have already shown that the form in which all combination of perceptions must be effectuated, is Time. The elements of perception, considered abstractedly, have, as they are conceived to be given or "apprehended," a certain apparent relation to time. But this relation is purely accidental, and, for the purposes of knowledge, ineffectual. It is not a real synthesis. The elements of perception are given as distinct existences in mere and inconceivably rapid succession. This result of the speculation of sensational

psychology Kant, as we have repeatedly seen, adopts from Hume. But the order of this succession is purely arbitrary and fortuitous, and, as has been shown, is totally insufficient to produce the consciousness of a definite object. Indeed, since it is mere succession without duration; since, as one element comes, or "is given," another goes and leaves no trace behind it; it is obvious that it is really not a thing which we consciously experience, and so directly know. It is a matter of purely speculative, though necessary, hypothesis. Consciousness becomes objective for us only when its elements are combined in the specific forms or "modes" of synthesis, which are involved *a priori* in the nature of time itself, and which must be realized in our sensible experience, before time itself, and consequently consciousness, of which time is the universal form, and sensible knowledge, which is but a transcript of completed sensible consciousness, can be real for us.

"The three modes of Time are Permanence, Succession, and Simultaneity. Consequently there will be three rules of all time-relations of phenomena, by which the mode of existence of every phenomenon may be defined with reference to the universal unity of all time, and which precede all experience and alone render experience possible." This number agrees with the number of the categories of Relation, and the three modes severally correspond to the categories themselves.

(a) *Substance.*— Time is a permanent and abiding

unity. It is not two-fold: it is not a thing of which there exist more specimens than one. Nor is it discontinuous. Its parts are not separated by intervals in which there is no time. It is not capable of increase or diminution. Strict, unchangeable permanence and unity are inherent attributes of time. Without them, as is obvious, the two fundamental relations of time, succession and simultaneity, would be impossible. The permanent unity of time is a synthetic notion; it expresses the absolute combination of all time in one whole. Or rather, since time, taken purely by itself, is an imperceptible abstraction, this notion is simply the frame-work or form of a notion, which, like time itself, must, in order to be realized, be taken in connection with, or applied to, the perceptible content of time — i.e. to the elements of perception, which are the elements of phenomena, and which are capable of combination in the form of objects, or of one universal object, only because they are in time. It is not strictly correct to speak of a "synthesis of time" as such. Time itself is synthesis, not of itself, but of that which is in time, or of the elements of perception. Apart from perception — i.e. separated from all content or matter of perception — time is therefore nothing and its modes are nothing.

It is obvious, then, that all phenomena, as having the form of time and deriving thence the form of their combination, must appear and must be viewed under the synthetic aspects or relations which are obvious and necessary modes of time, and so first

under the aspect of essential permanence and unity. To view them thus is to regard them as Substances, or as making up one absolutely permanent and unchangeable sum total of Substance.

The notion of Substance is thus a synthetic notion, the whole nature of which is derived from the form-element of time. It is "the condition of all synthetic unity of perceptions, i.e. of phenomena." We speak of phenomena as co-existing and as succeeding each other. But coexistence and succession are modes of time, and are indistinguishable and indeed inconceivable, except in relation to the one unchanging and permanent time which includes them both in its indiscerptible synthesis. So phenomena can be conceived and known as coexistent or successive, only as contained in one sum total of all phenomena, which itself is permanent and unchanging. The very notion of change, which all phenomena illustrate, implies the notion of permanence. Indeed, says Kant, "paradoxical as it may seem, it is only the Permanent which can suffer change." Whenever there is change, there is a subject of change which remains, after the change, what it was before. Now nothing can suffer change and yet remain the same in the same respect. It must be changed in one respect and remain the same in another. This other respect, in the case of sensible phenomena, is their quantity, or, as it was above termed, their unchangeable "sum total." No apparently new phenomenon can come into existence, except by simple emergence out of the womb of the

sum total of preëxisting phenomena, in which, in another form, it was already contained. No phenomenon can disappear, except it leave behind it its quantitative equivalent, though in another form. Absolute generation and annihilation are physically inconceivable. The disturbance of the unity and permanence of substance, which they would imply, would be tantamount to a disturbance of the unity and permanence of time and space. To account for it, we should have to postulate two specimens (so to speak) of time, and to define absolute generation or annihilation as transference of the subject of generation or annihilation out of one time into another time. But the postulate of time as two-fold in its nature, and not essentially one, is absurd, and hence the notion of absolute generation or annihilation is equally absurd.

It is to be noticed, now, that the physical notion of substance, as here developed, is purely quantitative and applies only to phenomena. It is not a conception of the nature of things in themselves. It is a conception of nothing, but of quantitative permanence, stability, unity. It is the simplest and most universal form of combination among our sensible impressions. It is the first condition of these impressions' becoming for us actual, experimentally known phenomena, or objects of consciousness. It is an "analogy of experience" or an analogical rule of experience,— which is to say, that no experience of sensible objects is possible, except these objects follow, in our consciousness, the "analogy," or

adopt the notional form, of substances. In other words, no sensible experience is possible unless there be some aspect of it, or of its "objects," which is permanent. And this permanence is nothing but an absolute time- (and space-) relation, which therefore, like time itself, is of "subjective" or mental origin, and has no absolute "objective" significance. What objects are, independently of sensible consciousness and its forms, this conception of substance does not in the least enable us to determine.

The conception of "existence," which physical science is thus entitled, and even compelled, to affirm, is not that of material substance, as an absolute entity occupying absolute space. It is only that of a sum total of actual or possible conscious phenomena, clad in the mental forms of time and space, of which sum total all particular phenomena are parts and to which all such phenomena are said to bear the relation of accidents. It is a conception only of appearance and relation, not of being and power. It is indeed not a philosophical conception, but only a mathematical one, founded upon the nature of the governing forms of our sensuous consciousness, and it implies only that the mathematical expressions (if these could be found) for the successive total states of phenomena ("configuration and motion," in modern phrase) throughout the *sensible* universe must have a constant value. This purely formal and *insubstantial* conception of *substance* may seem like the play of Hamlet with the title-rôle left out. Yet there can be no doubt that,

from the data in hand, which are those of pure sensible consciousness, or (what amounts to the same thing) of pure mathematical and physical science, it is correctly deduced and defined by Kant. It simply illustrates the truth that terms, having otherwise a philosophical or ontological significance, retain only a secondary and emasculated meaning, as viewed and employed in phenomenal science. Such science does not attain to *being*. The next "analogy of experience" and principle of science will show that it does not attain to power.

The following is Kant's theorematic version of this first "Analogy of Experience":

"Amid all the change of phenomena, their substance persists, and its quantity is neither increased nor diminished in nature."

(b) *Causality.*— The second mode of time, and the first and simplest of its two fundamental relations, is Succession. Time does not stand still. It is in incessant and continuous progress. It may be ideally divided into parts, called instants, which follow in necessary and irreversible order. Through this fixed and unchangeable series of instants, time moves noiselessly, steadily, necessarily on.

Such, at least, appears to be the case, when, by abstraction, we objectify time and seem to contemplate it by itself. But really we cannot, from the point of view of mere sensible consciousness, thus contemplate time. Time is no sensible object. It is no sensible element of an object. It cannot literally be *perceived*. It is not one grand perception,

nor is it an infinite and incessant line of successive perceptions, called moments, stretching from eternity to eternity. Time, for sensible consciousness, *is* nothing, simply because it cannot be sensibly perceived. Time, as a form of sensible consciousness, is nothing but an ideal relation, the ideal motion or succession, of perceptions themselves. It were an idle tautology to say that time is successive. As well might one say that succession is successive. Time is itself nothing but the succession of perceptions, or of "phenomena." It is this "form,"— not of itself, or of its fancied "instants,"— but of sensible phenomena, or sensations. Moreover, it is a synthetic form of phenomena. It does not flow from the nature of phenomena themselves, viewed on their characteristic, or sensuous, side. In phenomena thus viewed, there is, strictly, as we have seen, no synthesis, no relation, whatever, for they all stand in elementary isolation from each other. Time notes simply the result of the activity of conscious mind — or the mode of its activity — in combining the elements of perceptions, or of phenomena, to the end (as has been seen) that connected or real experience may be in any way possible or actual for us. Now, in time, or succession, abstractly considered, there is obviously present this element of irreversible order. The concrete fact is that this order is — not among the unreal and impossible parts of time, but — among the phenomena of which time is the form. And this order is the first and essential element in the physical relation called cause and

effect. *Physical* "causation" is irreversible, and in this sense necessary, sequence among perceptions or — what amounts to the same thing — among phenomena.

The relation of causation, as thus deduced, is, like all relation, of "subjective" or "mental" derivation or origin. Hume's difficulty about causation had consisted in his inability to discover among perceptions or their imagined objects any real or necessary connection. What he missed was, any power, virtue, efficiency, or reason, lodged in an antecedent perception or phenomenon, in consequence of which this phenomenon must necessarily be followed by a given phenomenon of another description, so that the former could be truly regarded as a constraining and producing cause, and the latter as a necessitated and produced effect. Not being able to find this, he declared that causation was nothing but habitually observed sequence. In any alleged case of causation, there was no reason discoverable in the nature of the phenomena concerned, why the relation might not be reversed and the alleged cause might not become the effect, and *vice versa*. Thus, so far as we could see, "anything could be the cause of anything." Real, efficient causation was a fiction of the imagination, and consequently, he argued, we know, and can know, of no necessary sequence among phenomena.

Now Kant, as we have seen, does not deny Hume's premise, though he controverts his final conclusion. Hume's premise, broadly viewed, is nothing but the

result of sensational psychology, regarded as analysis of the purely material element of sensible consciousness. This result Kant adopts, and argues triumphantly that not only is there no real connection, but also that there is no apparent connection, even, discoverable among the material elements of sensible consciousness,— i.e. among perceptions or phenomena,— considered as such, or on their purely material side. All connection or relation is synthesis, and there is no synthesis in the pure matter of sense, or in perceptions. *A fortiori*, there is no synthetic *power* in a perception to effectuate a necessary connection between itself and a subsequent perception, by forcing (as a cause) the latter to follow or accompany it. The question of power or force has nothing to do with the question of physical "causation," and must be excluded from the discussion.

But even if we must renounce — from the point of view of our present discussion — all expectation of finding synthetic, causative power in perceptions or phenomena, yet in our consciousness of them there is certainly connection. And this connection must be there, before we can "habitually" observe it. If, as has been demonstrated, it is not in the phenomena themselves, regarded as the *material* of consciousness, no observation of them, as such, can reveal to us a connection in a single instance,— to say nothing of habitual connection. The consciousness of connection does not come from consciousness of phenomena. It results from self-conscious-

ness of the mind-originated form in which we combine phenomena. This form is twofold, consisting of time and space: or, since external consciousness, of which space is the special form, is but a modification of internal consciousness, of which time is the universal form, it may be said that time includes space, and that the universal form of all our combination of phenomena is time. But that which, like the ideal activity that we term time, is native to the knowing mind, is inalienable from mind and its operations: it is necessary and universal for them. For this reason, and for other reasons detailed above, the consciousness of time and of its necessary modes of synthesis — among others, that of irreversible and necessary (not merely "habitual") sequence — must pervade all our consciousness of phenomena. The real and necessary connection is there, not flowing from the nature of phenomena, considered as the *material* element of sensible consciousness, but only, so far as the limitations of our present point of view will enable us to determine, from that nature, activity, or mechanism of our minds, regarded as knowing-machines, which is necessary to the very constitution of consciousness, and consequently to the recognition of phenomena, if not as "things-in-themselves," yet as definite phenomenal "objects," or parts, of sensible consciousness. Sensible consciousness acquires at least a quasi-objectivity, only because and so far as it is actively dominated and moulded by a "subjective" form. This form is as necessary and uni-

versal as sensible consciousness, or sensible experience, itself. From this source, indeed, such experience acquires all its necessity and universality, or fixed order, and if irreversible sequence is a mode of this "form," and if this mode may be called causation, then necessary and universal causation obtains throughout the whole realm of sensible experience.

The irreversible sequence of phenomena means their sequence "according to a rule." It is only through such, *regular*, succession that we are able to realize in conscious phenomena,— or apparently to find realized in them — the indispensable conception of time. And it is only through the same circumstance that the world of sensible consciousness becomes in any sense objective to us, and differs from "a mere dream." Our apprehension and "synthesis of phenomena" never occur instantaneously, or *en bloc*, but extend through a series of successive acts. In looking at a fixed object, like a house, we take in the object by a sweep of the eye and a corresponding succession of apprehended impressions. We may, indifferently, begin at the foundation and proceed thence to the roof, or follow the opposite order. There is nothing to determine the order of our apprehension, but in any case it is successive. The order of this succession we recognize as purely subjective, since it depends on mere accident or on an arbitrary determination of the mind. But now let it be supposed that all our apprehension of phenomena were of this nature: suppose that it merely

depended on our fancy whether we should apprehend water as flowing up-hill or down-hill, whether we should regard the forest as falling before the tornado strikes it or afterwards, what conception should we have of time? Would time be the form of phenomena? In time, considered abstractly, each instant has its definite place with reference to the preceding and following instants. But since time and its so-called instants are, when considered by themselves, pure abstractions, since time is the form, not of itself, but of phenomena, and since its instants with their definite places are nothing but the instants and the definite places of phenomena in their succession, it follows that the phenomena, of whose order alone time is the expression, must have their definite and unchangeable places in the order of their succession, i.e. that they must follow according to necessary rule, if time is to be a real form of our sensible consciousness. Suppose it were otherwise: would time then be a reality for us? Would it even possess contingent reality? Obviously it would not, and it is equally obvious that we should receive no suggestion that our sensible consciousness was any sort of transcript, whether phenomenal or absolute, of an "objective world."

"If, therefore," says Kant, "it is a necessary law of our sensibility, and consequently a *formal condition* of all perceptions, that the preceding time necessarily determines the [place of the] following time (I cannot get at the following time except through and by way of the preceding), it is also an

indispensable *law of our empirical apprehension* of events in time, that the phenomena of the preceding time determine whatever exists in the following," and this, not through any power or purpose in the former, but simply in accordance with an invariable and necessary "rule" of order, which connects them. Only on this condition can time be continuous and hence real for us; for (says Kant in substance) it is only in the continuity of phenomena that we can empirically or in actual consciousness be aware of the continuity of time. When the place of a phenomenon in the order of time is thus determined, so that it is independent of our fancy or arbitrary determination, it first acquires for us the value and dignity of an object. We know where, "by a rule," to "find" it "in the context of perceptions." It now consists with the coherent, synthetic, orderly unity of consciousness. Consciousness, when all phenomena or all perceptions are thus fixed, can no longer possibly be a mere subjective jumble of chaotic impressions — such as, taken by themselves, would after all be insufficient to constitute consciousness. Consciousness is now real, because fixed and determinate, and hence it is objective — for this is all that, from our present point of view, the term "objective" can signify for us.

The law of Causality, then, considered as a principle of Physical Science or of Sensible Consciousness, is purely a law of "order in time," and not of power or efficiency, purpose or reason. The terms "cause" and "effect," as employed in the

statement of the law, must therefore be carefully understood accordingly. They have not here a philosophical or ontological significance. Philosophically considered, the notion of "causality leads to the notion of action, and the latter to the notion of force, and *so* to the [true, trans-phenomenal, metaphysical] notion of substance," or of real, active, efficient being. This is elsewhere designated by Kant as the true notion of causality, of which, however, since it is not directly illustrated in *sensible* consciousness, Kant admits us to possess only "practical," not "theoretical" or exact, knowledge. No, the term causality, like the term substance, has here, where we are inquiring simply into the nature, conditions and limits of sensible consciousness, and consequently of *pure physical science*, only a secondary significance, and not its primary or complete experimental and philosophical significance. It denotes simply the fact of regular phenomenal sequence. Taken in connection with the other "Analogies," it is identical with the conception of *scientific law*. The law of physical "causation" does not state what particular laws or cases of "causal" sequence we shall find upon investigating the phenomena which are presented to us. These must be learned by special examination and induction. But it dictates beforehand that we shall and must find such laws, and this on the ground of an examination of the nature and conditions of sensible experience. It declares, on this ground, as a necessary and *a priori* truth, that we can have no sen-

sible experience unless our perceptions are governed by such laws. The *special laws* we learn. The *principle*, being a synthetic one, and "the condition of experience itself," is one which we, by the very act of our knowledge or form of our consciousness, introduce into the given field, or contingent sensuous material, of our experience, and which must "therefore precede *a priori*," or determine the final form of, all such experience.

The "Second Analogy of Experience," therefore, as a principle of Pure Physical Science is — subject to and in accordance with the foregoing explanations — the following "Principle of *Successive Order in Time*": "All changes take place in accordance with the law of the connection of cause and effect."

(c) *Reciprocity*, or *the Law of Coexistence in Time*.—The third mode of time, Simultaneity, points at once, and clearly, to the necessary and inseparable involution, in each other, of time and space, or of time and sensible phenomena and perceptions. On contemplating it, we perceive at once that time, at all events in this mode of it, is purely formal, and that it is the form, not of itself, but of phenomena, whose other and secondary form is space, and apart from which time is a purely unreal, and, absolutely considered, an impossible abstraction. We needed, as has above appeared, to argue somewhat with ourselves, in order to make it clear to ourselves that it is not time which is successive, but that succession belongs only to phenomena and is only one mode or aspect of that universal form *of phenomena* which we

name time. But no such argument is necessary in order to make it apparent that time is not simultaneous, but that simultaneity belongs only to phenomena, of which time is the form. Simultaneity cannot be predicated of one thing only, or of that which, like time, we can by no effort of abstraction or imagination conceive as more than one. There are no simultaneous times, for there is and can be only one time. There are only simultaneous events or existences in, or in respect of their form of, time.

We say that things exist simultaneously, when the order of the succession of our perceptions of them is indifferent. Thus we may look first at the earth and then at the moon, or first at the moon and afterwards at the earth, and because both orders are equally possible, we say that moon and earth exist at the same time. But on what ground? Not because we perceive them at the same time. Sensible perception, if it told us anything, would simply reaffirm itself, and say of each of these perceptions, that "it is in the subject [in consciousness] when the other is not, and *vice versa*, but not that [these perceptions are objective, and that] their objects exist at the same time, i.e. that when the one is, the other is also in the same time, and that this must necessarily be so, in order that the perceptions may be able to follow each other in any order." In sensible perception there is no synthesis. Coexistence is synthesis, and it is synthesis which alone gives to perceptions an objective character and significance. We do not literally *perceive* the coexistence of objects, or phe-

nomena; we *conceive* it. What is the condition and what the substance of our conception? The condition and the substance are the same. The substance of our conception is, as we have just seen, a reversible order in the succession of our perceptions. The order is reversible, and yet it is none the less an *order:* it is definite, fixed, and has the form of a rule or law. In considering the category of physical causality, we fixed our attention only upon cases of irreversible order of succession among perceptions, and treated these as alone exemplifying and constituting the substance of the causal relation. But our procedure in this respect was arbitrary, as will at once appear, if we recur to the result of our inquiry. We found physical causation to consist in a fixed and determinate order of succession among perceptions. The fixed and determinate order, or "rule," of succession was the essential thing and constituted the real substance of the conception. That the order was also irreversible — this was only an accidental peculiarity of the particular class of cases which alone we then had occasion to consider. For we now see that an order, or rule, of succession may be fixed and determinate and yet reversible. Its reversibility, or, so to express it, its bi-polarity, does not interfere with its fixity and determinateness. Would we contemplate earth and moon as coexisting, either earth or moon may come first in the order of our perception. But whichever comes first, the other must follow. The order of succession in either case is fixed, determinate and "inviolable."

The first term in the order of succession ideally determines the second, and that according to a "rule." We may say then, indifferently, that we here have before us a case of scientific law or of physical causation, i.e. of fixed order or rule in the succession of our perceptions.

We are now prepared to understand Kant's meaning, when he declares that the condition of our conceiving phenomena as simultaneous or coexistent is, that they shall stand to each other in the relation of reciprocal causality; and since all the phenomena, which are conceived to coexist in any instant, constitute the physical universe, the category of reciprocal causality must be universal. The sense of this is simply that we cannot conceive, and hence cannot perceive, a universe as made up of coexistent parts, unless we conceive, and in the order of our temporal experience perceive, these parts as standing in definite relations to each other. All must be conceived as cohering in a plan, or order, or consistent whole, all the parts of which, as in a perfect piece of mechanism or in an organic structure, imply and logically "determine" each other. Every part, viewed in its ideal relations, will thus be, in Leibnitz's phrase, "a mirror of the universe."

Thus the category of Reciprocity unites and completes the categories of Substance and Causality in the conception of a Universe of Phenomena, or of "Nature" as One, as One Whole, and the scene of one vast system of mutually consistent laws or "causal" relations, by virtue of which alone Nature

consists or subsists for us. And as there is no particular sensible experience which does not involve coexistence, there is no such experience which is not logically dependent on the conception in question. The Analogies of Experience, taken all together, teach, says Kant, that "all phenomena are included in *one* Nature, and must be thus included, since without this *a priori* unity no unity of experience, and, consequently, no determinate recognition of objects in experience, would be possible."

Kant speaks of the reciprocal relation of phenomena as a "dynamic" one, or as a relation of "action and reaction" (*Wechselwirkung*). The notion of agency, force or influence is not contained among the data of Kant's deductions, and can, of course, not legitimately reappear in their results. Kant's employment of such language as the above must be regarded in the light of an accommodation to practical belief, and illustrates the well-recognized necessity, which physical science is under, of associating with its categories conceptions of which it — namely, pure physical science, considered as an analytic transcript of purely sensible consciousness — can render no account. The Analogies, together with the categories, of the meaning of which the former are but an amplified and explicatory version, have relation to and "express," not absolute reality, nor force; they "express," in Kant's language, "nothing else than the relation of time (considered as that in which all [sensible] existence is comprehended) to the unity of self-consciousness,

which unity [in its relation to pure sensible consciousness] can only subsist and be maintained through the synthesis [of impressions] according to rules [= "laws" of succession in time, or of "causation"]."

Kant's statement of the Third Analogy, which he terms the "Principle of Simultaneity, according to the Law of Reciprocal Action and Reaction," is as follows:—"All Substances, so far as they are capable of being perceived simultaneously in space, act and react universally upon each other."

4. The "*Postulates of all Empirical Thought*" are principles of science, which relate not to objects, materially considered, but to the "modality" of our knowledge of them. Whether we look upon a physical object as only possible, or as real, or necessary, the immediate scientific definition or description of the object remains unchanged, and the only difference is in our mode of regarding it. The "postulates" are founded upon the three categories of Modality, and require little or no explanation. They are as follows:—

a. Anything which is consistent with the formal conditions of experience, i.e. with the necessary forms of perception and conception as heretofore demonstrated, is possible.

b. Whatever "coheres with the material conditions of experience"—i.e. is given in sensation—is real.

c. Anything, the reality of which follows, according to the universal conditions of experience, from

the reality of something else already perceived to exist, is necessary — or will necessarily be found to exist.

With regard to the last postulate, Kant explains that by the necessary he means simply and only whatever may be regarded as an effect. When we know "the empirical laws of causality," or of fixed sequence, among phenomena, we can affirm, from the observed presence of given phenomena, called causes, that certain others, called effects, will "necessarily" follow. This necessity is not a creative necessity. The effects in question are not new "things" or "substances," but only new states or conditions of things which previously existed; cause and effect are but different successive aspects of the same phenomenon or thing. Nor, as we have seen, is the necessity one of demonstrable and recognizable constraint. No *power* is discovered forcibly determining and maintaining the observed and irreversible order of cause and effect. The necessity is one of intelligence. It is a "law of possible experience"— i.e. a mind-originated law, on which the possibility of sensible experience or physical knowledge depends — that the place, in the order of phenomena (which is the order of our perceptions), of every event shall be *a priori* determinable through its regular and invariable relation to a given antecedent, termed its cause. This law of synthesis is the central and essential condition of all intelligence of "Nature." Nay, it is the application, by intelligence, of this its law to the confused materials of perception, which

alone constitutes for us that universal object of intelligence which we term Nature. The necessity in question is therefore simply the indispensable hypothesis of intelligence. Says Kant: "Every event is hypothetically necessary. This is a principle, which brings all change in the world under a law, i.e. a rule of necessary existence, without which there would not even be such a thing as nature. Hence the proposition, Nothing occurs by blind chance (*in mundo non datur casus*), is an *a priori* law of nature. And so also is the following: No necessity in nature is blind necessity, but, the rather, conditioned, and hence intelligible (*non datur fatum*). Both are laws, by which the play of changes is made congruous with a Nature of Things (considered as phenomena), or, what amounts to the same thing, with the unity of understanding, subject to whose laws alone these changes can become joined in synthetic unity and so be made possible objects of human experience."

In connection with the second Postulate, Kant, upon whom the first edition of the *Critique* had brought the accusation of "idealism" (meaning thereby denial of the reality of the external universe), introduced into the second edition a brief "Refutation of Idealism." It consists in showing that the immediate empirical consciousness of time involves necessarily, and hence proves, the presence in us of a like consciousness of space, and of the existence of external "things." To the "realistic" student, who has not gotten beyond the Kantian and the common psychological conception of "ideal-

ism," and who recalls Kant's doughty assertions of the purely "subjective" nature of both time and space, this "refutation" is likely to appear far from satisfactory. To the philosophically-minded student, on the other hand, who has gone far enough to perceive the shallowness of this conception, it is chiefly interesting for the remote suggestion which it contains — not of the absurd fancy that time and space are independent of Mind and, in this impossible sense, objective, but — of the truth, which is also especially implied in the Third Analogy, that the conception of space is by dialectical implication contained in the conception of time.

Recapitulating, now, we may bring together in the following table the Principles of Pure Physical Science, or of all Experimental Knowledge of Sensible Nature: —

1. All sensibly perceived phenomena have magnitude of extension. (See above, p. 149.)

2. In the case of all phenomena, the real object of sensation possesses intensive magnitude, or is variable in respect of the degree of intensity of the sensation through which it affects us (p. 151–3).

3. Amid all the change of phenomena, their substance persists, and its quantity is neither increased nor diminished in nature (p. 162).

4. All changes take place in accordance with the law of the connection of cause and effect (p. 171).

5. All substances, so far as they are capable of

being perceived simultaneously in space, act and react universally upon each other (p. 176).

6. Anything, which is consistent with the formal conditions of experience, i.e. with the necessary forms of perception and conception, is possible.

7. Whatever coheres with the material conditions of experience — i.e. is given in sensation — is real.

8. Anything, the reality of which follows, according to the universal conditions of experience, from the reality of something else already perceived to exist, is necessary, or will necessarily be found to exist.

CHAPTER VI.

THE LIMIT OF SCIENCE.

HAND in hand with Kant's demonstration of the nature of sensible knowledge has gone, thus far, the constant implication and oft-repeated assertion that the range of such knowledge is less extensive than the field of absolute reality. Sense-conditioned knowledge, Kant is ever reminding his reader, does not extend to "things-in-themselves." It reaches only to conscious appearances, to phenomena. This truth has all along been implied or asserted as a sort of negative principle of science. And this principle is, obviously, the principle of the *limit of science.* It is with obvious reason, therefore, since it is in the interest of systematic completeness that Kant appends to his account of the positive principles of science an emphatic and explicit restatement of this negative principle. This he does in the course of a brief discussion of "The Reason for Distinguishing all Objects whatsoever as either Phenomena or Noumena." The term "Noumena," borrowed from Greek philosophy and rehabilitated in modern usage, before Kant's time, by Leibnitz, is here used as a substitute for the expression "Things-in-themselves," which has hith-

erto been employed by Kant to denote the trans-phenomenal.

The introduction of such a discussion at this point, and for the purpose above indicated, is manifestly pertinent. For unless there be a distinction between phenomena, considered as the objects of "pure physical science," and something which transcends phenomena, it is superfluous to speak of a "limit" of such science. If the realm of phenomena were coextensive with the whole realm of existence, whether real or conceivable, the restriction of science to phenomena would be equivalent simply to its restriction to *that which is;* and this would be, manifestly, not a limitation, but the perfection, of science, and not properly to be termed a restriction. We need, therefore, to know by what right, if any, the distinction between phenomena and that which transcends them has hitherto been made, in order to be sure that the asserted limit of science means anything, and what it means.

What Kant will tell us on this point will prove far from sufficient for any one who desires a complete account of the ground and nature of the distinction between phenomena and noumena. Here, as elsewhere in Kant's work, we may observe the transitional, and hence mixed, character of his thought. And here, as elsewhere, our method will require us to distinguish between that in Kant which is matter only of dogmatic presupposition, and that which logically flows from the positive results of Kant's inquiries. The outcome will be

but a repetition of that lesson of Kant which has already been before us,— the lesson of the untenableness of all ontological theories, which are colored by materialism, and of the truth of philosophy's universal doctrine concerning the exclusive primacy of spirit in the world of absolute reality.

Kant, we have observed, has hitherto employed the expression "things-in-themselves" to denote the trans-phenomenal, while now he introduces the term "noumena," which he proceeds to use henceforth for the most part interchangeably with the former expression. Has this circumstance any significance? Are the two expressions historically and intrinsically synonymous?

One thing is certain, namely, that there exist two radically different conceptions respecting the nature of the absolutely real, and that these are in direct correspondence with two distinct conceptions respecting the nature of knowledge, or of that process in and through which knowledge consists. We have contemplated in our Introduction, and have had occasion in the further progress of our exposition to illustrate, the distinction between the two conceptions of the process of knowledge, which we have termed, respectively, mechanical and organic; the one founded on first appearance only, and the second resulting from more careful examination of all the facts of the case, as presented in conscious experience. We have seen that the mechanical conception *implies* a materialistic notion of the nature of subject and object, while the organic one, taken

together with the facts on which it is founded, *reveals* subject and object as in their nature, not primarily, sensible and material, but intelligible and spiritual. Mechanism, I say, presupposes subject and object in purely mechanical relation to each other, and so implies for them a purely materialistic and sensible nature. But it finds in the end amongst the only data of knowledge which it admits, namely, amongst the contents of purely sensible consciousness, no ground for the mentioned presupposition and implication. Theoretically considered, the continued maintenance of the presupposition is therefore logically untenable, and the pure sensationalist must regard the phenomena or contents of sensible consciousness as coextensive with the whole realm of being. Failing to do this, he will of necessity continue to think of the unknown absolute subject and object, or of the whole realm of absolute, trans-phenomenal reality, after the analogy of the known, i.e., according to the mechanistic hypothesis, of the sensibly known. He will conceive it as consisting of a "world" or aggregate of objects, such, in kind, as are apparently revealed in purely sensible consciousness. These objects will be for him *per se* sensible objects,— objects fitted to be known by sense, and by sense alone. Only, for man, with the accidental limitations of *his* sense, they will be non-sensible. A being endowed with superhuman sense might perceive them. They are not *noumena*, or objects of *intelligence;* they are simply *sensibilia*, whose only peculiarity is that they do not

enter into the peculiarly limited sensible consciousness of man. They will be identical with those unperceivable "substrates," wherein Locke conceived the real essence of material and thinking "substances" to consist.

Now, it is further certain that if the sensationalist were looking about for an appropriate expression, whereby to designate collectively these supposed but inaccessible objects, none could suggest itself to him as more natural than the expression "things-in-themselves." And indeed there can be no doubt that a direct connection is to be traced between Kant's adoption of this term and his study of the British sensational psychologists. And we have had evidence before us already that so far as he connected with this expression any definite significance, he conceived the thing-in-itself after the materialistic manner of his foreign instructors.

On the other hand, the term *noumena* is perfectly adapted to express that notion of reality which corresponds with the organic conception of the relation of the real factors of knowledge. And in as much as the organic conception, founded on and flowing from a consideration of all the facts involved in the process of knowledge or of conscious experience, is implicitly or explicitly the conception adopted by all philosophy proper, whether ancient or modern, the notion of *noumena* as distinguished from *phenomena*, or of the *mundus intelligibilis* as distinguished from the *mundus sensibilis*, is in substance as old as all deeply reasoned and comprehensively experimental

philosophic thought. But noumena and phenomena do not constitute for philosophy two separate and distinct "worlds" of objects or things. No such duplicity of worlds is found in conscious experience, of which alone philosophy is the interpretation. To suppose the case to be otherwise, and to regard phenomena as one set of objects for knowledge, and noumena as another wholly different set of objects, mechanically independent of phenomena, were simply to assimilate noumena to phenomena, or, rather, to the things-in-themselves of mechanical sensationalism. This is what Kant by implication does when, in the title to the section of his work now under consideration, he proposes to discuss "the reason for distinguishing *all objects* whatsoever as *either* Phenomena *or* Noumena." And in accordance herewith the constant presupposition which we shall find underlying the polemic against "metaphysics" in the following chapter, is that metaphysicians claim to have knowledge of a distinct class of objects called *noumena*, but which, by virtue of the logic of this very presupposition itself, must, and can only be, regarded, and are by Kant regarded, as identical, generally, with *things*-in-themselves. No, philosophy does not distinguish noumena and phenomena as two separate worlds, but as noting different aspects of the one universe of being in which man is consciously placed. Of these aspects, the one — the intelligible aspect, the so-called "world of noumena," — is found to be fundamental and determining, the other — the sensible aspect, or "world of phe-

nomena,"— derivative and dependent. The two are organically one. The sensible world is the manifestation of the intelligible world. The one is the world as given, or sensibly presented (*phenomena*); the other is the same world, as it, with all that of which it is the "manifestation," is known (*noumena*). The intelligible world is the key to the philosophic comprehension of the sensible world. In the "intelligible world" the one present world of man's actual experience is recognized. Here *Being* — i.e. the being, the reality, the essence of *the world*, of *our* world *in its entirety*, for the word Being means, and can mean, nothing else — is self-revealed. It is revealed as the "explanation" at once of itself and of its phenomenal manifestation. It leaves no room, and furnishes no occasion, for the supposition or postulation of another world independent of and "behind" itself, and which is fantastically supposed to be more essentially a world than it, or to have resident in it a more essential kind of being than belongs to it; and this because the only conceivable ground for such supposition, namely, the mechanical aspect of apparent opposition and absolute distinction between subject and object in knowledge, is taken away by the recognition of the organic unity of these factors, along with which recognition comes the recognition of the intelligible world itself. All opposition of "worlds" is thus seen to be but relative and superficial and to be contained within, but not to transcend, the one world of our actual, complete thought and experience. And this intelli-

gible world, present in, and identical with the true essence of, the sensible world,— this world, immediately in, through and for which the "sensible world" has its being, is revealed as a world of spirit. Only on condition that it be such a world is it capable of entering, as object, into organic unity with the spiritual subject, in the process of knowledge. To this individual self, as we said in a previous chapter, the true objective world comes, as a revelation of his larger self. As the one is spiritual, so is the other. And so the "self-revelation of Being" is the revelation of Being to itself. It is the self-recognition of being. It is spirit taking cognizance of its own nature, and finding therein what "pure physical science" presupposes, but in its arbitrarily limited province nowhere finds, namely, force, the causal explanation of phenomenal law, and such other "noumena" as Life, Purpose, and a universal organism of effective Intelligence. Here the human spirit finds itself, not as an atomic substance, but as the dependent centre of an ideal life, which is supported in the last resort only by a life divine.

As to a reason, now, for distinguishing between phenomena and something which transcends or absolutely conditions them — be it called noumenon or thing-in-itself — pure sensationalism can, as we have seen, render none. The reason must be found, if anywhere, in our conscious experience, that is to say, in the nature and process of our actual knowledge. Otherwise the distinction is purely fanciful and arbitrary, and is no subject of science whatever.

If knowledge consisted in a purely passive receiving of "ideas" or (in the favorite language of sensationalism) in a simple, blank and brute, "having" of ideas, if it consisted in this and nothing else, no distinction of phenomena from the metaphenomenal, as objects of knowledge, nor of subject and object as factors of knowledge, would ever be made. It is because knowledge is more than this, whether one choose theoretically to admit it or not, that the sensationalist instinctively posits both distinctions — and then wonders how he ever came to do it! Philosophy, starting without wilful presuppositions and simply striving to take account of the whole process and nature of knowledge, finds that knowledge is indeed a *process*, and not merely a product or result. It does not consist in the mere brute fact of "having ideas" or "receiving" sensible impressions. It includes this fact, as one aspect of the case, but it also transcends it. Sense, the conscious state, is found to be a conditioned product. It is not also the conditioning process. The latter is intelligence, an active spiritual function, whose works and ways are not, like sensibly conscious states, (or "phenomena,") *opaque*,— or mere blank, inscrutable and contingent facts,— but self-illuminating, self-explaining, and the ever-present light and life of all real *experience*. Sense is individual, intelligence is universal. The same relation exists between consciousness and self-consciousness. The former gives to knowledge the individual, particular, relative, apparent, the latter the concretely universal and real.

The one is conditioned, the other conditioning (with reference to the former) and also self-conditioning. The one is phenomenal and dependent, the other noumenal and absolute. Such is the relation of the two, and such is the relation of the conceptions of being or of absolute reality which correspond to both.

This is the *experimental* doctrine of philosophy, and it is because Kant contributed so powerfully toward its rehabilitation, in an age which had been clouded by sensuous or dogmatic prejudice, that his work created so great an epoch in the history of modern philosophic science. To this end Kant contributed by every step in his Æsthetic and Analytic, whereby he demonstrated anew that intelligence is the ever-present, directive, and even constitutive, condition of "sense," or active self-consciousness of passive sensible consciousness. He was prevented from perceiving and acknowledging the full scope of his "discoveries" only through the individualistic and mechanistic prejudices which he imbibed from his age and could never throw off, and through the restricted nature of the problem which, in consequence of these prejudices, he alone set himself to solve. The prejudices in question determined him to consider man, the knowing agent, as purely individual, atomically and independently distinct from all but himself, mechanically separate from all objects of his possible knowledge. Knowledge was thus for Kant — as Schelling afterwards put the case — simply "something peculiar to the

human subject," a mere accident of the constitution of *human* nature, as differentiated from all other, real or possible, knowing "natures." In other words, knowledge was conceived generically after the same fashion, in which it is conceived by pure sensationalism, namely, as a purely contingent and inexplicable product or phenomenon. Subject was mechanically separated by an impassable chasm from the whole world of absolute objectivity, and was only brought into (a *quasi*) relation with the latter through mechanical "sensible affections." No knowledge, therefore, except through or in dependence upon sensible affections, no true science except "pure physical science" of phenomena! This conviction was dogmatically fixed in Kant's mind at the beginning of his inquiry and remained so to the end. It determined the limit which he set upon "theoretical," i.e. upon all scientific or real, knowledge, or upon knowledge proper. "Metaphysics," *as an objective science*, was a delusion, and Kant's inquiry respecting its possibility (as reported in the following chapter of this book) was intended from the beginning to demonstrate its possibility only as an illusion. His positive problem, in connection with which alone he performs a professedly constructive or positively demonstrative work, was, accordingly, only the problem respecting the possibility of pure (mathematical and) physical science. In connection, now, with this problem, Kant demonstrated, as we have seen, the necessity of intelligible factors for the existence of pure physical science or

sensible knowledge. But, not looking beyond this problem, being prevented by his prejudices from seeing that any ulterior problem could exist for theoretic knowledge, the intelligible and conditioning factors, whose presence and necessity were demonstrated, sank, as we have also seen, to the level of merely formal or logically necessary, but purely "subjective" and ontologically non-significant conditions, of sensible knowledge, and of this alone. It was not perceived that and how they led directly away from and tended to overthrow the individualistic subjectivism of the starting-point, and so, by a broader, but direct, implication, to overthrow the mechanical opposition postulated as existing between subject and object and to demonstrate their organic unity, and so, again, by a further, but also direct, implication, to prove the hollowness of the sensationalist's conception of "things in themselves," inaccessible to knowledge, and to redemonstrate the philosophic conception of "noumena," or of intelligible and absolute reality, present and self-revealed *in* knowledge, and that, too, in all, even in sensible knowledge.

It was only, therefore, through an arbitrary and prejudiced predetermination to regard the necessary and universal elements of knowledge as purely "subjective" and "formal,"—i.e. as, after all, *contingent* upon the accidental structure of the mechanism of cognition in the human subject,—that he was prevented from seeing that they are also objective and the key to a noumenal world of trans-

phenomenal, because trans-sensible, reality. And may we not trace the circumstance that Kant, in the heading to the chapter now under consideration, employs the expression "Noumena," instead of "Things-in-themselves," to the influence of an instinctive sense, on his part, of the real tendency of his own previous demonstrations respecting the nature and process of knowledge?

We have said that the distinction between phenomena and the trans-phenomenal is founded upon and interwoven with the distinction in our conscious experience, or in the nature and process of knowledge, between sense and the intelligible, or, better, the spiritual, conditions of sense, or between "consciousness," the sensible or "felt" and particular product, and "self-consciousness," the universal and conditioning process. The latter distinction is to the former as root to branch. And we have said, in effect, that Kant contributed conspicuously to lay bare the root, but was so blinded by mechanistic prepossessions as not clearly to see the branch. But if this is so, and if the only scientific basis for the distinction between phenomena and the trans-phenomenal is the distinction, just mentioned, in knowledge, it might be suspected beforehand that Kant would have little that is instructive to say respecting the former distinction, which nevertheless constitutes the express subject of that section of his work which we now have before us. And this is, comparatively speaking, indeed the case. What little Kant has to say on the subject in ques-

tion is rather in the form of crude and fragmentary suggestion and assertion than of intelligent discussion. Thus he remarks that, when we term sensible things *phenomena*, having in mind the peculiar way in which they appear to our perception, we immediately imply a distinction between *them*, on the one hand, and, on the other, either the same things as they are or may be in their true and undistorted nature, independently of our perception, or "other possible things, which are in no sense objects of our senses," but are "simply conceived by our minds," and that the "objects" thus distinguished from phenomena, being at least putative objects of the understanding, are to be termed "noumena." Undoubtedly, when we *say* "phenomena," we imply, for we presuppose, the distinction between phenomena, or "appearances," and that which appears, or between "manifestation" and that which is manifested or manifests itself. But herewith no account is given of the reason, the ground in experience, which leads us to say "phenomena," and to make the distinction in question. And on the ground of the purely mechanical subjectivism, to which Kant "theoretically" adheres, no reason can be given.

Again, Kant mentions that the conception of the existence of "things-in-themselves" involves "no contradiction"; explaining that by this he means that it is not contradictory to suppose that there may be possessed, by some intelligence superior to man, a peculiar kind of perception, whereby things-

in-themselves, lying beyond the range of that sensible perception with which alone human beings are endowed, may be perceived and known. Here Kant implies the truth of the universal, experimental doctrine of philosophy, that knowing and being are strictly correlative. Things-in-themselves, it is argued, may exist, if they may conceivably be known. And it is conceivable *that*, if not *how*, they may be known, because, by hypothesis, our knowledge, "our sensibility," is, and from the beginning has been, assumed to be something *peculiar* to the constitution of the *human* mind. Thus a distinction has been presupposed between the nature of human knowledge and the nature of knowledge *per se* or without qualification. Human knowledge was regarded as but a peculiar kind of knowledge. There might, it was thus implied from the outset, be other kinds of knowledge than ours, and hence other kinds of known or knowable existence, than the sensible phenomena which alone we are held to know. Kant's present argument is therefore but a restatement of his original hypothesis, in which the distinction between different kinds of possible knowledge and so of possible being was contained, and not an explanation of the "reason" for first making the hypothesis, with the included distinction. Observe, further, that while the philosophic distinction between phenomena and noumena, as, respectively, dependent and absolute forms of reality, rests upon a distinction *within* our knowledge or conscious experience, the distinction which Kant makes between phenomena and

noumena, or things-in-themselves, rests, according to him, on a distinction *without* our knowledge or (as he conceives it) our possible experience. But if this were strictly so, the origin of the distinction in our consciousness would be nothing less than miraculous, for all grounds of knowledge and all reasons for making distinctions can only be founded *in* experience; and the value of the argument founded on such a distinction would certainly appear very questionable.

However, at various places in the *Critique* Kant suggests a theory respecting the possible nature of the superhuman knowledge, by which things-in-themselves might be known, founded, as of course it must be, to some degree, on a distinction lying within our experience. Kant has distinguished between sense and understanding. By virtue of the former we perceive objects, and through the latter we conceive them. Perception and conception are shown to be inseparably and necessarily combined in our sensible knowledge. And it is only through sensible perception that we are held to become aware of the existence, though not of the absolute nature, of objective reality. Now, suppose that the conceiving understanding were to some being also a faculty of perception. Such a being would possess the power of "intellectual intuition," or of perception through the understanding. While, now, such perception is denied to man, Kant suggests that it may be an attribute of the Divine Being, and its peculiarity would consist in this, that, by the same act whereby

this Being had a perception, he would also "create" its "object." He would, it is assumed, know that perceiving and creating were in his case identical acts, and so be sure that his perception was adequate and extended to the "thing-in-itself." This theory in its crudity can only seem like a burlesque on the true and experimental theory of knowledge. But it is highly significant for us, and that in more ways than one. First, it shows that it is on the basis of a distinction which lies within human experience — the distinction between sense and understanding — that Kant has a conception of objective knowledge as something which might be acquired through understanding *per se*, as well as through sense *per se*. But, secondly, it also shows that the notion of the fixed and complete mechanical opposition between subject and object, which leads Kant to deny to human understanding the faculty of material (in distinction from purely formal) knowledge, is carried over by him into his conception of absolute knowledge, leading him to represent the latter as consisting in a constant series of mechanical creations, i.e. of absolute miracles. The subject, in perceiving its object, creates it, and so forcibly bridges over the chasm which, for human knowledge, is held to separate subject and object. But all this is purely unthinkable. The words convey no meaning. It is no wonder, therefore, that Kant declares that while we cannot say that "intellectual intuition" is impossible, we can in no fashion conceive how it is possible.

In the theory of "intellectual intuition" Kant operates with two pure abstractions. The one of these is the conception of pure subject, and the other of pure object. Here pure subject is conceived as creatively perceiving pure object. Now, pure or absolute subject and pure or absolute object constitute together that alleged, "unknowable" realm which Kant generally terms indiscriminately the realm of "things-in-themselves," or of "noumena." But so far as Kant, on the whole, or in particular places, practically makes or implies a distinction between noumena and things-in-themselves, it is important to note that by noumenon he means pure subject, and by thing-in-itself pure object. Thus, among the marginal notes written by Kant in a copy of the *Critique* kept for his private use (and recently published), we read, as one of the notes to the section of the *Critique* considered in this chapter, the following definition of "Noumena": "Beings, which themselves have understanding, which through the operation of their understanding can cause [create] the objects of their understanding [or knowledge] — i.e. are endowed with will — and of which all other categories may be predicated in like manner, — in short, pure intelligences." These "pure intelligences," or "noumena," are nothing but pure subjects. The objects which they creatively know, or which by knowing they create, are pure objects, or "things-in-themselves." But both noumena and things-in-themselves, as thus conceived, are, we repeat, pure abstractions. In thus

conceiving them, Kant quits the field of experimental reality — or of knowledge, as a conscious and experimental process — and trusts himself to those wings of a suppositious imagination, with which all false metaphysics essays to make its flights. A pure subject or a pure object is not only unknown, but inconceivable. It is pure nonsense. It is no wonder, therefore, that if the realm of "things-in-themselves" or of "noumena" (or both) is made up of pure subjects and pure objects, they are "unknowable," and that, as Kant declares, "it is impossible for us to conceive *how*, even if we cannot deny *that*, they exist."

Kant, now, confusing *this* conception of noumena, or things-in-themselves, or both, which is nothing but the illegitimate and irrational product of an essentially sensationalistic "metaphysics," with the philosophic and experimental conception of noumena, declares that the conception of noumena (or things-in-themselves: Kant here employs these terms indiscriminately), is a purely problematic one. It is not positive, but negative. The "understanding" is compelled to think it, but, in thinking it, it adds nothing to knowledge. How a reality, corresponding to it, is possible, we cannot conceive. But, not being able to evade the emergence into consciousness of the notion of such reality, and finding that the *notion* does not contradict aught that we positively (i.e. sensibly) know, we must admit that such reality may possibly exist. But if so, then pure physical science has possibly a positive limit, or there may

exist a sphere of reality beyond the possible reach of such science. To science this possible sphere will only be negatively definable as the sphere of "not-phenomena." But since the only objects of (physical) science are phenomena, it is obvious that if, upon some other grounds than those of (sensible) knowledge, we find reason to hold definite "beliefs" respecting the nature of the trans-phenomenal, science will have as little power to interfere for the correction or interdiction of our beliefs, as for their confirmation. Thus the establishment of the Limit of Science is but tantamount to demonstrating the existence of a "vacant space" in our ideal of possible knowledge, which may and can only be occupied — in view of the restriction of all our really possible knowledge to pure physical science — by a "rational faith." This space, then, Kant proceeds in his subsequent *Critiques* to fill, locating in it such noumena as God, the free and responsible Soul of Man, and a World of Beauty, and of intelligent Order and Design.

One cannot but be struck with the arbitrariness of the distinction introduced by Kant between knowledge and faith, when absolutely considered. But we must always bear in mind the point of view of narrow, mechanistic, sensationalistic prejudice, from which he starts, and against which he, as the representative — the Moses — of his age is leading in a good fight. He is leading in a fight against this prejudice, but only as one who is still entangled in its wilderness mazes. He comes in the end to

the border or limit of the wilderness, but never gets out of its shadows. In other words, his constructive work ceases before he has achieved a complete science of knowledge, or of man's conscious experience. Hence alone it is that what is not of sense is for him a matter of faith and not of knowledge. But it was much — nay, it was the first and indispensable thing to be done, in order to make it possible that philosophy should exist on a scientific footing in modern thought,— to define the precise nature and sphere of sensible knowledge or of pure mathematical and physical science. This being done, philosophic science would — and did — soon enough ascertain what was its peculiar method and field. Without it, scientific thought must remain enslaved to the mechanistic prejudices of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and instead of coming, in the guise of philosophy, into the free and pure air of living reality, must remain asphyxiated in the artificial vacua created by a thoroughly sense-determined and dogmatic "metaphysics" — the metaphysics which Kant demolishes in the following chapter.

In view, then, of the fact of the incompleteness of Kant's work, considered as a scientific examination of the nature, conditions and actual content of the whole of conscious experience or knowledge, it will not surprise us that he is compelled to recognize a portion of experience which, in default of its having been explored and recognized in due scientific fashion, has an air of apparent mystery surrounding it, and is called an object of unexplained and in-

explicable, though necessary, "faith," and of faith alone. This remains to him only as a region of "practical," and not of "theoretical," experience. Such a distinction between the practical and the theoretical is thoroughly artificial, not founded in the science of knowledge, and it introduces the appearance of conflict and opposition, where none in reality exists. This will be especially illustrated in the following chapter, as it also finds illustration throughout Kant's other *Critiques*. It is enough to note that Kant, by recognizing the region of "practical" experience and finding in it the noumena before mentioned, shows again that the distinction of noumena and phenomena is really or virtually founded by him, as it must be by every one, upon a distinction within and not without "experience." Moreover, the noumenal objects vindicated, or to be vindicated, for "faith," are all of a spiritual, ideal, intelligible nature, and have, *per se*, nothing in common with the materialistically conceived things-in-themselves of sensational metaphysics. These are neither objects of a "rational faith," nor of knowledge, nor of aught but a false and impotent imagination. While, therefore, this conception of things-in-themselves is the one with which Kant has seemed to be working throughout the constructive portion of his work, as set forth in the preceding chapters, yet the practical outcome, as well as the inherent logical tendency of the whole, is away from this conception and toward the opposite, spiritualistic one of noumena. Still further: our noumena are

called objects of a *rational* faith, a faith of reason. But what is reason? Not sense, nor understanding as a mere factor of sensible consciousness as such, but the faculty of knowledge revealed in universal, active self-consciousness. Of "pure reason," as thus understood, Kant's work is not the "*Critique*." It is only the *Critique* or scientific examination of sense and understanding as factors of specifically sensible knowledge, or as factors of "pure physical science." This is that limitation of Kant's problem which we have before noted. Had Kant carried his work far enough to examine and recognize all that self-consciousness is in itself, *instead of stopping short with the mere recognition of the "formal" or "logical" necessity of self-consciousness to sensible consciousness*, his practical conception of noumena would, on the one hand, have been less incomplete and mechanical, and, on the other, instead of being merely practical, it would have been also theoretical; "faith" would have been transformed into, or recognized as, knowledge.

And so, indeed, the fruits and works of self-consciousness as elements of knowledge, and not simply of a faith which is only practically, but not scientifically, justifiable, actually appear in the midst of Kant's most "critical" inquiries. Thus, in the section given to the deduction and definition of the conception of physical causation, after identifying the latter with *determinate sequence* or *rule of successive order*, he continues: "This causality leads to the conception of doing [*handlung*], and the latter

to the conception of force, and, through it, to the conception of substance. * * * Where there is doing, and consequently activity and force, there is also substance, and in this alone must we look for the fruitful source of phenomena."* Kant does not qualify his statement by saying that physical causation, which is simply rule of succession, and not force, "practically" leads to the conception of agency and force, or that substance, as identified with such agency and force, is only "practically" substance, and is only "practically" to be regarded as "the fruitful source of phenomena." Yet this is what, in consistency with the position which we have seen him assuming, he should only say. He has no right, in view of the sensible limitations which he places on *knowledge*, to make these statements, as he does, without qualification. Force is known only in rational experience. It is known through self-consciousness alone, and never through sensible consciousness as such. No one has done more than Kant to make this truth a matter of demonstration. If, therefore, "knowledge" is to be limited to the phenomenal revelations of purely sensible consciousness, as Kant has decreed, force can only be recognized as an object of "practical" faith.

* Thus far, away from pure sensational "scepticism," and toward the recognition of the intelligible as the cause, source, and true reality of the sensible, Kant is followed by Mr. Herbert Spencer, who treats physical phenomena as manifestations (? *occultations*, rather, in Mr. Spencer's view,) of a "persistent," though indeed persistently "unknowable," because non-sensible, "Force."

Force and agency, as realities which philosophic science alone discovers and comprehends,— to pure physical science and agnostic "philosophy" they are confessedly "inscrutable" and "unknowable,"— being found only in and through that self-consciousness of ours, which is at once individual and universal, and which is itself an *active process*, and not, like sensible consciousness, a mere passive, *forceless product*,— force and agency, I say, thus known, are purely intelligible and not sensible; they are functions of spirit and of life. They are *known* only as "energies of mind." In defining substance as "activity and force," and declaring it thus to be "the fruitful *source* of phenomena," what is Kant doing but defining the true "thing-in-itself," the absolute reality, in accordance with all truly experimental philosophy, as true *noumenon*, and hence as Spirit? This becomes more directly clear when, in another passage, distinguishing *causa noumenon* from *causa phenomenon*, he ascribes "true causality" to the former alone, and discovers the immediate type of a *causa noumenon* in the rational, morally free and responsible spirit of man. The employment of such language by Kant, without the qualifying explanation that force, agency, *causa noumenon*, are only objects of practical conviction or of a "rational faith," *may* be looked on as *lapsus linguæ* on Kant's part. They may be more truly regarded as evidences that Kant's distinction between practical and theoretical is purely arbitrary, and that it could not be constantly maintained ex-

cept through a sustained strain against fact and against *knowledge*, which was too great even for so energetic a will as Kant's.*

We repeat, then, in conclusion, that the whole movement of Kant's *Critique* is away from the materialistic or sensationalistic pseudo-conception of absolute reality as *thing*-in-itself, and *in the direction of* the philosophic, spiritualistic and experimental conception of it as true *noumenon*. He is carried in this direction by the logic of his own advance upon the purely sensational theory of physical science itself, and by the moral impetus of his practical convictions. His work is not complete, or philosophic science is not completely established

* One of the earliest criticisms directed against Kant had relation to his doctrine of "sensible affection." Sensible affection had been ascribed by Kant to the agency of things-in-themselves. In this way we were made aware *that* things-in-themselves exist, but not *what* they are. It was argued, now, that Kant, in thus holding, violated his own principles. All of the categories, he had maintained, are of "use and significance" only within the sphere of phenomena. None of them can be predicated of things-in-themselves. Among the categories is numbered causation. Things-in-themselves can therefore not be regarded as causes, and sensible affection is not to be attributed to their agency. *This* alleged evidence of their existence is therefore no evidence. This criticism upon Kant must of course be regarded as completely justified, if Kant is to be held to the letter of his own "theoretical" statements. Theoretically, or as a category of strict science or knowledge, the conception of causation has, according to Kant's constant allegations, no meaning but that which it has for "pure physical science." It denotes only regular sequence among phenomena. We cannot with it transcend the realm of phenomena. It is obvious that Kant, in assuming the position, which was subjected to the above criticism, simply confused his "theoretical" with his "practical" conceptions. For the quasi-"causation" of mere law of order in time, which is alone known to "pure physical science," he substituted by implication the true causation which implies "activity and force," and which is mentioned above in our text.

and vindicated by him, simply because the science of knowledge is left by him in an incomplete state. It is arbitrarily cut short, when the nature of pure *physical* science is established.

We have treated of Kant's doctrine respecting the distinction between Phenomena and Noumena under the title of the "Limit of Science." Kant's main or immediate object in this discussion is accomplished in the erection and establishment of the conception of noumena merely as a "*Grenzbegriff*," or as noting a limit or boundary-line, beyond which the conditions of sensible knowledge are not and cannot be supplied, and of which, consequently, no science is possible. The field of strict Science — such is the doctrine — is limited to sensible phenomena. All science, as relating either to the form or the matter of phenomena, is either mathematical or physical science. We are taught, then, by the "limit of science," that when mathematical and physical science, with their peculiar presuppositions, conditions and method, have accomplished their utmost, they have only accomplished the analysis of sensible appearances. They have advanced by no step toward knowledge respecting the absolute nature of things. They have not answered, they can never answer, philosophy's simple question, What is? All "metaphysics," therefore, which, like the prevalent metaphysics of modern times before Kant, seeks to find answers to ontological, or strictly philosophical, questions, while adopting the presuppositions and employing the peculiar categories and method of

sensible knowledge (or, in other words, of purely mathematical and physical science), is a delusion. Its results are simple dogmatism, and in no sense science. Its last word must, in logical consistency, be the same as that by which pure physical science, reaching the final limit of its inquiries, expresses its relation to the invisible Beyond, namely, agnosticism. That this is so, Kant seeks further to demonstrate in the "Transcendental Dialectic"— which thus itself appears simply as a new, but indirect, demonstration of the "limit" of purely mathematical and physical "science."

CHAPTER VII.

THE FUTILITY OF "METAPHYSICS."

THE original inquiry of the "Critique of Pure Reason" was respecting the possibility of "synthetic judgments *a priori*." It was found, in the first place, that mathematical and physical science actually contains such judgments. All truths of pure mathematics — as it appeared,— and at least some truths of pure physics, find their expression in propositions, in which the predicate is not derived from the subject by mere analysis of the latter, and in which the connection between subject and predicate is, by general admission, necessary and universal. This state of things was further found to be impossible, on the supposition that all thought and all knowledge are the product of purely receptive, sensible experience. For in such experience, strictly considered, it was seen that there is contained no synthesis, or combination of impressions or ideas, whatever, whether necessary or contingent, universal or particular. There was no alternative, therefore, but to assume (in agreement with obvious fact) that knowing is more than passively receiving blows of "impression," and is an activity, and that in this activity we must look for the explanation of the

synthetic, and of the necessary and universal, character of the judgments in question. From this source of constructive and synthetic activity were then derived those forms of perception (space and time) and of conception (the categories) which were found to underlie, and to be essential for the possibility of, all kinds of synthesis whatsoever in sensible knowledge, and which, in their application, furnished the stated, fixed and universal principles of all science of sensible objects. In short, Synthesis, in knowledge conditioned whether by the forms of sense (mathematics) or by its matter (physical science), meant Mind. But Mind knew itself, in its synthetic activity as exhibited in the process of mathematical and physical, or sense-conditioned, knowledge, only as a form-giving and form-determining activity,—an activity determining the form which sensible "*objects*" of knowledge, considered as distinct from itself, the true *subject*, must take, in order in any way to become objects *for it*. What itself was or might be in its own intrinsic nature, it had no direct occasion to inquire. The result was, to show how mind *appears* in sensible knowing, not what it is in itself. The like was found to be true with reference to the objects of sensible knowledge.

Thus answer was given to the first two of the four special questions into which the main inquiry was subdivided (see above, pp. 52–3). And the whole result of the special inquiry, by which the answer was found, was a determination of the most universal principles of mathematico-physical science, and,

at the same time, of the merely phenomenal nature and, consequently, of the absolute limitation of the field of objects, in the cognition of which these principles find application.

The two remaining questions were respecting the ground in human nature, or in the structure of human reason, for man's ineradicable, though hitherto ineffectual, tendency to indulge in "metaphysics," and respecting the conditions within which metaphysics as a true science is possible. To the former of these questions Kant's answer is given in the portion of the *Critique* entitled "Transcendental Dialectic," forming the second main division of the "Transcendental Logic"; the latter is considered in the "Transcendental Methodology." We have now to deal only with the former.

Kant's professed conviction of the futility of all metaphysics, or philosophy, in the strict and proper sense of these terms, rests on such grounds as are set forth in the preceding chapter. By as much as all things-in-themselves, or noumena, are unknowable, metaphysics considered as *science* of such objects is, of course, impossible, and was there so declared. The "Transcendental Dialectic" is mostly taken up with the examination of alleged arguments, currently employed in metaphysics to prove the existence and nature of such ultra-phenomenal realities as the human soul and God. The demonstration of their insufficiency consists, in substance, in simply holding them up in the light of certain principles heretofore either demonstrated, or else dogmatically

adopted as final conclusions, and showing that they violate these principles.

"Transcendental Dialectic" is, according to Kant, a "Logic of Illusion." Moreover, and especially, it is a logic of *transcendental* illusion. This means — in agreement with the explanation of the term transcendental in Chapter I — that it is the logic, theory or explanation of an illusion, which has its source in the very nature, mechanism or structure of human knowledge. The illusion in question is, thus, not wilfully produced, but springs up naturally and inevitably. That it *is* illusion can be pointed out and demonstrated, but the appearance of it is not thereby removed. Thus the astronomer cannot prevent the moon's appearing larger to him at its first rising than when it is in mid-heaven, though he knows and can prove that this is only an illusory appearance.

The "transcendental illusion" is one, in consequence of which we are led, at first sight, and until critical examination has convinced us of our error, to attribute to certain ideas and principles of reason absolute validity, and so to suppose that through and in them we are brought face to face with absolute reality, or into the knowledge of certain "things-in-themselves."

The seat of this illusion is in the Reason. Reason is distinguished by Kant from Understanding. Both are indeed cognitive functions,— functions, operations, or modes of knowing mind; and both of them hence illustrate and share alike the nature of all

cognition. Cognition, or knowledge considered as an active process, is synthesis, and both reason and understanding are faculties of synthesis, or of "synthetic unity." But their immediate subject-matter is different. The subject-matter of the understanding is phenomena, which it renders knowable by *combining* their otherwise disconnected elements (sensible impressions or affections) according to the law or "rules" of the categories. Accordingly, the understanding is termed, by Kant, the "faculty of rules." The subject-matter of reason, on the other hand, is these very rules of the understanding themselves. Reason would unite these principles of synthetic unity, which flow from the nature and operation of the understanding, together with the manifold special sciences which spring up in accordance with or subject to the same, under still higher, and hence fewer, principles. In short, reason seeks an absolute and all-inclusive unity, and absolute and all-inclusive principles. It is, accordingly, *par excellence* the "faculty of principles," and is so defined by Kant.

Further, conceptions of the understanding are distinguished, as immediate products of reflection, from conceptions of the reason, which result from a mediate process of inference. The direct result of attending immediately to phenomena is that they are brought *to a stand* — fixed — under necessary and inviolable relations, which issue from and constitute the very frame-work of *understanding*. Reflection, on the part of the understanding, concern-

ing what it thus does and is, discloses immediately the pure conceptions of the understanding, termed Categories. Conceptions of the reason, on the other hand, are founded on or imply a process of *reasoning* or inference.— of which process, however, they constitute from the beginning the concealed or implicit motive. They serve to comprehend (*begreifen*), or to bring, as it were, to convergence in a common centre, all other conceptions. To them, exclusively, Kant appropriates the name Ideas (*Ideen*).*

The logicians, Kant remarks, have long since defined reason as the faculty of indirect or syllogistic inference. But in the case of all such inferences, what is it that reason does? Not, what is the syllogistic process, or *form* of procedure, described in terms of major and minor premise and conclusion; but, what is the larger or more general description of the conduct of reason — its aim or motive impulse — in following the syllogistic process? The aim of reason, when it syllogizes, is to identify the "conclusion" with some larger truth (expressed

* In an excursus, in which Kant indulges in some suggestive comment on the Platonic Ideas, he recalls the transcendent significance which once alone attached to the term Idea, and contrasts with this the far different and quite indiscriminate application, which has been made of the term in modern times, to denote any mental state or phenomenon whatsoever. Kant justly remarks that to him, who has once become accustomed to the thought of Ideas, as conceptions of the reason, which transcend all possibility of sensible experience, it must seem unendurable to hear the sensation of red termed an "idea." The Germans to this day are rarely guilty of such barbarism. In English, unluckily, the case is different, and in order to prevent confusion it will be necessary for us to print the word Idea, when it is used as an equivalent for Kant's "*Idee*," with an initial capital letter.

in the major premise). "Cajus is mortal." This special truth (the conclusion) is connected, through the minor premise ("Cajus is a man"), with the major premise, which is universal in form and substance ("All men are mortal"). The exhibition of this connection constitutes the "proof." The particular conclusion is shown to stand in a relation of logical dependence to a "universal rule." This rule is a "universal condition" of the truth of the conclusion. In short, the movement of reason in the syllogistic process is but a special case of the characteristic movement of mind in all knowledge. It is a movement in the direction of unity and universality. A limited fact or truth is merged in another and less limited one. But now, if this latter is itself still limited and conditioned,— if it is not absolute, unlimited, unconditioned,— the movement of reason is not completed, and reason does not rest satisfied until it has, whether by one or more "prosyllogisms," merged it in a final principle, or major premise, which is absolute in form and nature,— which is itself unconditioned, and is at the same time the condition, and, by logical inclusion, the totality, of all other conditions. Or, otherwise expressed, the result of all labor of the understanding is conditioned knowledge; and the *rationale* or implicit motive of reason (in logical "*reasoning*") is this: "to find, for the conditioned knowledge of the understanding, the Unconditioned, and thereby to complete the unity of all knowledge." This is the "logical maxim" or "principle

of pure reason." It requires us, in the presence of conditioned knowledge, to go back from condition to condition, till the whole series of conditions is exhausted, and we stand face to face with the Unconditioned. This is a synthetic principle *a priori*, and a principle of pure reason,— not of the understanding. It is the universal principle of pure reason.

Now, of the syllogism, or of "reasoning," there are three peculiar forms; and just as the twelve forms of logical judgment, or of the operation of the understanding, furnished the clue to the corresponding table of twelve categories of pure understanding, so, argues Kant, we may expect to find corresponding to the three forms of the syllogism a like number of peculiar Ideas of reason. Each of these transcendental Ideas will be a peculiar form or expression of the Unconditioned.

The process, by which Kant connects the Ideas with the several forms of the Syllogism (categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive), has a somewhat artificial appearance. Suffice it here to say, that there is a correspondence, in his view, between each one of these forms and one of the three only possible relations which, according to him, our ideas can have. These relations are (1) to the subject, (2) to objects considered as phenomena, (3) to "all objects of thought whatsoever"; by which latter expression, as the context immediately shows, noumena are meant, and more especially God, as the noumenon of all noumena, or being of all beings. The transcen-

dental Ideas are, accordingly, (1) "the absolute unity of the thinking subject" (or the Soul), (2) "the absolute unity of the series of conditions of phenomena" (or the World regarded as a *sum total* of all phenomena), and (3) "the absolute unity of the condition of all objects of thought [noumena, or 'things-in-themselves'] whatsoever" (or God).

There is no doubt, now, that these Ideas constitute the natural and logical goal of reason. Is the goal ever reached? Does reason ever attain to the *knowledge* of the soul, the world as a totality, and God? Kant answers that it does not and cannot. There is no knowledge, properly so called, of aught which is not presented to consciousness in and through sensible affections; — this is the arbitrary major premise which we have seen running through all of Kant's ontological reasonings, and which he maintains to the end. The soul, the world as a whole, and God, are not, and cannot be, thus presented. Therefore, they are not, and cannot be, known.

But is there not a class of persons, called metaphysicians, who profess to know, and logically to demonstrate their knowledge, respecting these "objects"? Undoubtedly; and justice to them and a due regard for the importance of the subject-matter require that their arguments should be examined and that the defects of the arguments be pointed out in detail. And this Kant proceeds to do with great minuteness. In considering Kant's work in this connection, one or two things must be borne

in mind: First, that the principle upon which his criticism rests, is the one above noted, namely, that there is no knowledge for man, in the strict sense of the term, except of that which is mechanically, i.e. sensibly, presented in consciousness. Secondly, that all of the notions, with which Kant operates, are shaped accordingly, i.e. they are exclusively the categories of sensible knowledge or of "pure physical science." Thirdly, that his employment of such notions in the representation of ultra-physical, or spiritual and living, reality, can only be called — as Hegel calls it — "barbarous"; so, for example, when he speaks of the soul and God as "things." Fourthly, that he attributes to all metaphysics the real possession and employment of no other categories than those which he admits. Fifthly, that, to the greatest extent, the metaphysics of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in which Kant was nourished, did indeed blindly and fatuously attempt to work with purely or prevailingly mechanical and physical conceptions; so, for example, Descartes and Spinoza, and especially the British metaphysicians; — and that Kant's criticisms upon metaphysics, as thus understood, are just. Sixthly and lastly, that genuine metaphysics, or — since the term metaphysics, in view of its evil associations, had perhaps better be dropped — philosophy, operates with conceptions of another order than those above described; they transcend, but do not annul, the conceptions of mechanism, — just as life and reality transcend, but do not annul, the phe-

nomena of mechanism; and their scientific legitimacy, for the sphere of philosophic knowledge, is demonstrated in the *completed* science of knowledge,—just as the scientific legitimacy of the conceptions of mechanism, for the sphere of purely physical or sensible knowledge, is established by that *part* of the science of knowledge which alone Kant seeks, and with a large measure of success, to construct, and which takes account only of the mechanical or purely sensible aspect of consciousness. Kant's criticism, therefore, absolutely fails to touch the real foundations or the real superstructure of philosophy.

Corresponding to the three transcendental Ideas, "metaphysics" is represented as seeking to erect three sciences, termed Rational Psychology, Rational Cosmology, and Rational Theology.

I.

RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

The soul is (1) a substance, (2) simple in quality, (3) numerically one, and (4) in relation to possible objects in space. Such, according to Kant, is the metaphysical definition of the soul, in terms borrowed from the table of categories of the mathematical and physical understanding. Each of the four elements of the definition rests on a separate, pretended demonstration; and on the basis of such demonstration metaphysics is alleged to build its doctrine of the immateriality, incorruptibility, spiritual personality, and immortality of the human

soul. But the whole basis of demonstration is paralogistic, and therefore incapable of supporting the superstructure of doctrine built upon it.

The soul cannot be made the subject of definition and demonstration, unless it be first in some way given — or, at least, apparently given — as a subject of knowledge. Men do not wittingly seek to define and demonstrate nought. Where, then, and how — in what consciousness or knowledge — is the soul thus given? In self-consciousness. But what is self-consciousness? Is it the definite consciousness *of* a real something, of a definable reality, which may be denominated self? No, says Kant, it is a "mere consciousness, which accompanies all conceptions. Through this 'I,' or 'he,' or 'it' (the thing), which thinks, nothing further is represented than a transcendental subject $= x$, which is known only through the thoughts that are its predicates, and of which, taken by itself, we can never have the slightest conception." No sensible perception, no particular feeling or conscious state, corresponds to the pronoun I. Self-consciousness is only the necessary formal aspect of all consciousness or knowledge. The notion of self (or the "*Vorstellung des Ich*") is an "altogether empty" one.

All these conclusions follow, indeed, and must be accepted, if, with Kant and the metaphysics which he criticises, we accept the mechanical relation between subject and object, as it first appears in sensible consciousness, as the fundamental and exclusive relation of all consciousness. For then subject and

object are conceived only as absolute opposites. Whatever is purely and absolutely objective can then in no way be subjective, and *vice versa*. But knowledge is only of the objective, or at least of that which is apparently objective;— whatever is known must be *object* of knowledge. The absolute *subject* can, by the present hypothesis, therefore not, as such, become object. If it becomes an apparent object, its nature is thereby absolutely changed or concealed. It can therefore not be known. It is an "altogether empty" notion. It is reduced, as we have abundantly seen heretofore, to the quality of a mere form, or logically necessary aspect of our knowledge of (phenomenal) objects.

The soul, then, which seems in self-consciousness — or in the consciousness that "I am thinking," which "must really or potentially accompany" all other consciousness — to be given as an object of knowledge, and consequently of further possible definition and demonstration, is only apparently given. In this consists the "transcendental illusion." It is an Idea, and so only a "problematic conception," which has no given content, but for which metaphysics seeks to find and demonstrate one, by means of four paralogisms; arguing as follows:—

1. The soul is a substance. For it is identical with the one, unchanging, logical subject in all thought, or with that which is termed "I," "self," "the thinker." In this subject, as a substrate, all particular thoughts inhere as predicates; and this relation cannot be reversed, so that we should con-

ceive the subject as the predicate of the thoughts. It is therefore a true substance, an independent "object" or entity.

This, according to Kant, is a false inference. Substance is one among several categories which the understanding supplies for the sole purpose of introducing synthetic unity among sensible perceptions. These latter are the materials, and the only materials, of objects of scientific knowledge. The conception of substance is one of the forms under which such materials become objective to us. But the soul is not given in sensible perception; it is by hypothesis only the *subject to which* simple perceptions are given, and cannot, without absolutely changing its nature — ceasing to be subject and so ceasing to be soul — become an *object* and thus capable of being given in sensible perception. The true "data" are, and, from the nature of the case, always must be, wanting, on which to found the conclusion that the soul is a substance. The argument for the substantiality of the soul confounds the purely abstract logical relation between subject and predicate in the proposition "I am thinking," or the relation between subject and object in sensible consciousness, with the relation between substance and accident; whereas this latter relation obtains *only within the sphere of the object in sensible consciousness.* So far, therefore, as the thoughts which were alleged to inhere in the subject, because they could be logically predicated of it, inhere, or denote a relation of inherence, in any thing, they inhere, or denote such relation of in-

herence, only in and among objects presented in, or constructed from, the materials of sensible perception,— materials which, as above remarked, always come to the subject, but never proceed from it, and which hence reveal, if they reveal anything, not the subject which receives them, but the object whence they proceed. The argument for the substantiality of the soul must therefore be abandoned as paralogistic. "The soul is a substance only in Idea, but not in [*sensible*] reality."

Kant's criticism of the argument in question is excellent and conclusive, as against any attempt to conceive the soul under purely physical analogies. On the basis — as Kant clearly shows — of the purely mechanical or sensational theory of consciousness, the soul, the human spirit, the "I," can never be known as anything but a mere aspect of conscious phenomena; — an aspect, which is, indeed, logically necessary, but which can never become for us the instrument, occasion, or vehicle of objective knowledge respecting the soul itself. The soul is not and cannot be demonstrated to be a *thing*.

The soul is nevertheless for Kant a necessary, though transcendental, Idea. It is a problem, flowing from the nature of human reason. The problem is for Kant a theoretically insoluble one, because his science of knowledge is only a science of sensible knowledge, which separates, or seeks to separate, the object in consciousness sharply and absolutely from the subject, and restricts knowledge exclusively to the former. If, as is the case, this is only a partial

science of knowledge, and if a completer science, founded on comprehensive examination of all the facts in the case, warrants and substantiates a different and loftier conception of the soul, than the one combated by Kant and maintained by the "metaphysics" which he combats, this conception, and the ground of evidence on which it rests, are not at all touched by Kant's criticisms.*

The foregoing illustrates the nature of the conceptions which Kant criticises in all of the four psychological "paralogisms," as well as the common theoretical basis of his criticism in each case. The remaining paralogisms may, therefore, here be more briefly treated.

2. Since the logical subject in thought — the "I," that thinks — is necessarily singular, it is inferred that "the thinking I," or soul, is a simple substance. But if the soul is not a "substance," it is idle to argue that it is a simple one. Simplicity, for the rest, is a physical category, having no use or significance, except as applied to given and *objectively* ori-

* For the rest, Kant is in possession of this loftier conception, not only practically, but also theoretically. We have seen him, in the passage cited near the end of the last chapter, advancing the non-phenomenal and philosophical conception of "substance" or absolute reality as consisting in force and agency. As regards the soul, now, or the "I," the "thinker," the whole drift of Kant's advance upon Hume and sensational psychology is toward the demonstration that the subject of knowledge is an *agent*. It *thinks*; it not simply *has* its thoughts, as predicates or accidents which inhere in it; it *has* them only because it *thinks* them. Through his successful criticism of the arguments, which conceive the soul, or the human spirit, after sensible and static analogies, Kant in fact clears the way for the truer and experimental conception of the soul in ideal, dynamic, spiritualistic fashion, just as it is revealed in the active process of self-consciousness.

ginated perceptions. The same reasons, therefore, which made it impossible to predicate substantiality of the logical subject in consciousness, or the "soul," forbid us to attribute to it simplicity. Its simplicity is, at the best, only the simplicity of absolute emptiness; emptiness, that is to say, of all *perception* of itself or of all *material* for *knowledge* concerning itself. To say that the soul is simple, is, therefore, to make a purely negative statement. The statement amounts to a declaration that the soul is not-sensible, but does not convey the slightest positive information respecting the real nature of the soul.

3. A precisely similar line of criticism is to be employed against the argument for personal identity, founded upon the pretended demonstration that the soul, as a "simple substance," is numerically one and ever the same. We must be able to *see* the soul as a substance, before we can determine that it is always *one*.

4. The logical subject of thought, called soul, is certainly to be distinguished from its corresponding object or "objects." But rational psychology errs in inferring thence that this subject can exist independently of all objects. The subject must cease to be subject; it must abandon its nature and become an object or thing presented in sensible perception, before we can judge of its ability to exist independently. But the fulfilment of this condition would be the realization of the impossible and absurd.

Thus fail the attempts of "metaphysics" to find for "that emptiest of all ideas, the idea of self" (to

repeat Kant's words), a real objective content. They fail, because, limiting the nature of the soul at the outset to the purely subjective, or, at all events, having nothing but the purely subjective to start with, they seek to define it in terms of its antithetical opposite, namely, of the purely objective, the sensible, the phenomenal. And since, according to Kant's dogmatic assumption, this is the only way in which the accomplishment of the main end in view can be attempted, the "theoretical" knowledge of the "soul" is declared to be forever impossible. The soul is knowable at most only as a phenomenon or an aspect of phenomena, but not as a thing-in-itself. This state of things is a fortunate one in Kant's view, since, as nothing can either be proved or disproved respecting the soul *per se*, those "practical" reasons which we have for holding to the freedom and immortality of the soul, and which alone have weight with the world at large, are left in full, exclusive, and indefeasible possession of the field.

II.

RATIONAL COSMOLOGY.

Rational Psychology sought for an unconditioned, or absolute, or *pure subject* of (sensible) consciousness, and found it not. Rational Cosmology seeks for an unconditioned, or absolute, or *pure object* of (sensible) consciousness, and not only finds it not, but becomes inevitably involved, through the search, in a maze of contradictions, which it has no means of solving.

The object of sensible consciousness is the phe-

nomenal universe. Rational Cosmology would demonstrate its absolute nature. The phenomenal universe, as such, is given for knowledge only as an indefinite and complex series of dependent conditions. Rational Cosmology would discover and demonstrate for it independent and absolute conditions. In this way it would arrive at knowledge of "the absolute unity of the series of conditions of phenomena" and realize its transcendental Idea of the World as a whole, or as a completed or absolute *object* of knowledge.

The absolute synthesis of the series of conditions of phenomena, which Rational Cosmology seeks, is termed by Kant a "regressive" one. It is a synthesis, proceeding "*in antecedentia*," and not "*in consequentia*." Starting from a given point in the series, it goes back from condition to condition, till it either arrives at one first condition, on which all others depend, or else discovers that the series is infinite; in the latter case, "all the members of the series without exception will be conditioned," while yet the "totality of them" will be necessarily regarded as "absolutely unconditioned."

The series of physical conditions is complex, having as many aspects as there are classes of physical categories, namely, four. The inquiry of Cosmology after absolute unity, will therefore take four different directions and seek for the realization or demonstration of four "cosmological Ideas," all included in, and together constituting, the transcendental Idea of the World.

The four aspects of the series of "objective" phenomena are Quantity, Quality, Causality, and Contingent Existence.

Under the head of Quantity, we note that phenomena are subjects of quantitative apprehension and description only by virtue of their relations in space and time. The search for an absolute or total synthesis of the quantity of phenomena will therefore be identical with the search for such a synthesis of space and time. Now space and time are first given or conceived, as *quantities*, in the shape of an indefinite number of parts — spaces and times. The corresponding Cosmological Idea will seek to gather these parts into a whole, and to define this whole, whether as finite or as infinite.

Phenomena, viewed quantitatively, are regarded upon their formal side. Under the head of Quality, on the other hand, they are contemplated on their material side, or as possessing "reality in space." Here, then, we find what is called "matter," given in all cases only as a *compositum*, or as having parts, which parts are its "inner conditions." These parts, again, have similar "inner conditions" of their own, or, in other words, are themselves capable of subdivision. Cosmology seeks to determine how far this subdivision can go on, and to prove, either that it has an absolute limit, or that it is absolutely without limit. The cosmological Idea in this case is that of "absolute completeness in the division of a given phenomenal whole into its parts."

The third cosmological Idea has respect to cau-

sality in the phenomenal universe. Cosmological metaphysics attempts, accordingly, to determine absolutely what are the conditions and what the possibilities of causation in the world. The object of its search is "unconditioned causality," or "absolute completeness in our account of the genesis of phenomena."

Finally, all phenomenal existence is contingent. Examine it at any point and you find it limited, dependent, insufficient of itself alone either to explain or to maintain itself. Is the chain of such existence infinite and so, while all of its separate links are dependent, yet itself, taken as a whole, independent and self-conditioning; or, is there a form of being, the existence of which alone is necessary, and on which all that is contingent depends? In raising these questions, and endeavoring to answer them, metaphysics seeks to fulfil the requirements of the fourth cosmological Idea, whose transcendental object is "unconditioned substantial existence," or "absolute completeness in our account of the conditions on which changeable, phenomenal existence depends."

Now the fate of metaphysics, in dealing with the cosmological Ideas, is peculiar. In dealing with the problem suggested by the psychological Idea, metaphysics found all arguments pointing only in a single direction and to a single result, namely, to the assertion of the soul's existence. The arguments were illusory, but the illusion was single or simple in nature. But in working out each of the problems

suggested by the cosmological Ideas, metaphysics — so Kant alleges — finds equally decisive arguments, leading it to conclusions which are contradictory, the one to the other, so that it is impossible to rest in either, without wilfully shutting one's eyes to the considerations which substantiate the other. Here the illusion is double, and pure reason becomes involved in a four-fold "antinomy," or conflict with itself.

The contradictory conclusions, in which each antinomy consists, may be set over against each other as thesis and antithesis. The several antinomies, thus expressed, together with their respective proofs, summarily stated, are as follows:

FIRST ANTINOMY.

THESIS.	ANTITHESIS.
The world has a beginning in time and is also limited in regard to space.	The world has neither beginning in time nor limit in space, but is in both regards infinite.
PROOF.	PROOF.
Were the world without beginning in time, we should be compelled to say that an eternity has now elapsed, that an infinite series of past "states of things in the world" is now completed. In other words, we should have to ascribe a present limit to that (namely, a series) which by defi-	The world must have existed from eternity, or it could never exist at all. If you suppose it to have had a beginning, you must suppose an anterior time, in which naught was. But in such time the beginning or origination of aught — of a world — is impossible. For such beginning would im-

nition (namely, as *infinite*) has and can have no limit,—which is absurd. Hence a beginning of the world is a necessary condition of its existence.

Secondly, were the world not limited in regard to space, it must be given or conceived as an infinite whole. It is not thus given, as an object of perception. Nor can it thus be conceived. An infinite world is an "infinite aggregate of real things." To "think" such an aggregate, we must make a complete survey of it, by enumerating all the parts. But in order to do this, we must have had an infinite past time at our disposal,—which is impossible. The only world which we can know or think is thus necessarily limited in regard to space.

ply a cause or reason for its occurring at the particular moment, when it did occur, rather than at any other. At no moment in an absolutely vacant time could such cause or reason exist. The world is, therefore, *a parte ante*, eternal.

Secondly, if the world is limited in space, it is surrounded by unlimited empty space, to which it must be conceived as standing in relation. But empty space is nought, and the supposed relation of the world to empty space is its relation to nought, i.e. is absurd. There is therefore no empty space to limit the world, and the world is of infinite extent.

SECOND ANTINOMY.

THESIS.

Every composite substance in the world consists of simple parts, and there exists nothing but that which is simple or composed of simple parts.

ANTITHESIS.

No composite thing in the world consists of simple parts, and nought that is simple exists anywhere in the world.

PROOF.

This thesis seems so tautological as scarcely to require or admit of proof. Will any one deny that a composite substance consists of parts, and that these parts, if themselves composite, must consist of others less composite, and so on, until at last we come, by a compulsion of thought, to the conception of the absolutely simple as that wherein the substantial as such consists? It is not the fact of their composition, which renders composite substances substantial. Composition is only an accidental relation of or in substances, and is not itself substantial. When we abstract from the accident of composition, we do not abstract from substantiality, which still remains with the attribute of essential simplicity.

PROOF.

Each of the simple parts supposed by the thesis, must at all events be in, and so occupy a portion of, space. This condition of their existence is a direct disproof of their possibility. A simple substance would have to be supposed as occupying a simple portion of space. But space has no simple parts. The supposition of such a part is the supposition, not of space, but of the negation of space. It is the supposition of a mathematical point, which denotes merely the positing of a limit in space, but constitutes no portion of space. The smallest part of space, in order to be space, must possess the essential attribute of all space, namely, extension. But in any extension whatever there is contained ideal multiplicity of parts external to each other. A simple substance, therefore, in existing and occupying any portion whatever of space, must contain a real multiplicity of parts external to each other, i.e. it must contradict its own

nature,—which is absurd. The supposition that aught exists with the attribute of essential simplicity, is therefore baseless.

THIRD ANTINOMY.

THESIS.

The causality of natural law is insufficient for the explanation of all the phenomena of the universe. For this end another kind of causality must be assumed, whose attribute is freedom.

PROOF.

All so called natural causes are themselves, in turn, effects of other and similar preceding causes. Go back in the series of such causes as far as you will, and you will never light upon a cause which is simply a cause, and not also itself an effect. You find thus only a regressive series of conditions, of indefinite extent, but no "first beginning." You never arrive, in this way, at an adequate description of the cause of any phenomenon whatsoever. And yet the central

ANTITHESIS.

All events in the universe occur under the exclusive operation of natural laws, and there is no such thing as freedom.

PROOF.

The conception of a free cause is pure nonsense; it is a wilful and "empty creation of thought." It contradicts the very law of causation itself. This law requires that every occurrence shall stand in orderly connection with, and follow upon, some preceding occurrence or state of things. Now free causation, if there be such a thing, is surely an "occurrence." It is the active beginning of a series of phenomena. And yet the action of the supposed free cause must be conceived as

requirement of natural law is, that nought shall occur without a cause capable of such description. Consequently we are obliged to assume a cause, or causes, whose action is absolutely spontaneous, being independent of predetermining conditions, and in this sense free; — causes, capable independently of beginning series of phenomena, which, when once begun, proceed thenceforth according to natural laws.

standing out of all possible relation to any preceding occurrence in, or state of, the cause itself. It is without law, motive, or reason. It is wholly blind, and its action would be the complete realization of lawlessness, i.e. of disorder, of confusion. Not only, therefore, is "transcendental freedom" contrary to the law of causation, but the supposition of it is in conflict with the experimentally known order and unity of experience. We must hence content ourselves, in the explanation of all phenomena, with causation by or according to natural law, and transcendental freedom must be pronounced an illusion.

FOURTH ANTINOMY.

THESIS.

There belongs to the world, whether as its part or as its cause, some form of absolutely necessary existence.

PROOF.

Phenomenal existence is serial, mutable, contingent. Every event is contingent

ANTITHESIS.

There is no absolutely necessary existence, whether in the world as its part, or outside of it as its cause.

PROOF.

Of unconditionally necessary existence within the world there can be none.

upon a preceding condition. The conditioned presupposes, for its complete explanation, the unconditioned. The whole of past time, since it contains the whole of all past conditions, must of necessity contain the unconditioned or "absolutely necessary,"—be this regarded either as identical with the whole series of cosmical conditions, or only as a first link in the series. In either case, it must be remarked, the necessary existence in question must belong to the sensible world, since, agreeably to the premises of the argument, it is in time.

The assumption of a first, unconditioned link in the chain of cosmical conditions, or of a first and unconditioned cause among cosmical causes, is self-contradictory. For such link or cause, being in time, must be subject to the law of all temporal existence, and so be determined—contrary to the original assumption — by another link or cause before it. Equally illegitimate is the ascription of necessary existence to the whole series of conditions in the world. If each of these conditions is itself conditioned, and so contingent, how can the whole series of them acquire the contrary character and be unconditioned and necessary? Finally, the supposition of an absolutely necessary cause of the world, existing without the world, also destroys itself. For, being outside the world, it is not in time. And yet, to act as a cause, it must be in time. This supposition is therefore absurd.

In the foregoing Antinomies, the theses constitute the teaching of what Kant terms philosophical Dogmatism. The antitheses are doctrines of philosophical Empiricism. As to the proofs, those on the one side are declared to be as good as those on the other: that is to say, all good for nothing. On the side of the theses is engaged the hearty practical interest of "every rightly-disposed man, who understands his true interest." They express (however crudely) doctrines, which are "so many foundation-stones of morality and religion." But these doctrines must fall, if they have no better support than is furnished in the foregoing "proofs." On the other hand, the counter-assertions of empiricism, in the antitheses, are equally baseless and hence equally dogmatic.

What, then, is the common defect of all these proofs? It is that they treat the relative object of sensible knowledge as if it were an absolute object, the phenomenal as if it were noumenal or thing-in-itself. They pretend to deduce ultra-sensible conclusions from purely sensible premises. Founding on data which are given in and belong only to sensible experience, they seek in their results to transcend such experience.

The common method of procedure in all the proofs is substantially as follows. As a major premise the principle is adopted, that, when the conditioned is given, the unconditioned is also given or implied. In the minor premise attention is fixed upon some aspect (see above, pp. 227–9) of that series of sensible phenomena which is, by general admis-

sion, only a series of conditioned conditions. The conclusion then exhibits or defines that form of the unconditioned which, it is argued, is given or implied in the particular aspect of the series under discussion.

Now, as a matter of abstract logical principle, it is very true that who says condition, says thereby, by implication, the unconditioned. This is an axiomatic principle of absolute thought. Furthermore, whatever is true in the realm of pure or absolute thought, is also true in the corresponding realm of pure or absolute being, i.e. of noumena or things-in-themselves. Now, provided it is given us to know in immediate experience the realm of absolute being, we are quite justified in applying to the cognition of it the aforesaid principle — which is the principle of the major premise in all of the cosmological arguments; nay, more, we are under necessity so to do. But the cosmological arguments start from and have to do with, not the realm of absolute being or of things-in-themselves, but the realm of mere simulacra of being, or phenomena. And before arguing about these latter on the basis of our major premise, we must take into account wherein the simulated being of phenomena consists and how it is made known to us. Perhaps it may then appear that the principle of the major premise has here no legitimate application at all, or that the right to apply it is subject to very important limitations. Such is indeed found to be the case.

The world is nothing but the indefinite sum total

of sensible phenomena. The universal form of all phenomena is time. This is the same as to say that phenomena are simply sensible perceptions. For time is intrinsically nought but the conditioning form of our sensibility, and can be the form of phenomena, only so far as these latter are identical with the content of our sensible consciousness. Phenomena, therefore, are known or knowable only as they are or may be immediately given in our sensible experience. Here they are immediately and only given as a temporal series, of indefinite extent. In this series each term or phenomenon is conditioned by a preceding one, and this by another preceding it, and so on indefinitely. Here, then, the conditioned is indeed given, but the peculiarity of it is that it is given *in the form of time*. Now this is precisely what distinguishes the phenomenally conditioned from the absolutely conditioned, or from the conditioned as it would have to be conceived in a world of absolute reality or of things-in-themselves. In such a world time is not. If the conditioned be here given, there is given along with it, immediately and eternally, the unconditioned. The above principle of the major premise is here unconditionally applicable and true. But in the world of temporal phenomena the case is different. Here, as above remarked, the conditioned is given only in the form of an indefinitely extensible temporal series. We cannot say, therefore, that the presence of the conditioned here implies the presence of an unconditioned, which is of like nature with the condi-

tioned and is given (at least to thought) along with it. Here the rational principle of the above major premise (namely, that when the conditioned is given, the unconditioned is also given or necessarily presupposed) declines from the rank of a principle to that of a mere requirement. It calls upon us, only, and incites us to go back as far as possible along the temporal series of phenomena, using whatever aids are compatible with the conditions of experience,—such as history, the principle of physical or serial "causation," the wings of sensible imagination, etc., —in order to see, if possible, whether the series contains a term which is unconditioned, or whether the series, taken as a whole, is unconditioned, i.e. is infinite. But it does not authorize us to assume that we shall find the unconditioned in either of these forms.

In reality, we are not only not authorized to make this assumption, but to make it would be nonsense. Were the sensibly phenomenal world in possession of absolute reality, were space and time consequently forms of things-in-themselves, and not merely of our perceptions, it would indeed be legitimate for us to declare beforehand, in the spirit of the first antinomy (for example), that the world is and must be either finite or infinite in regard to space and time. But since that supposition is false, since the world is for us only as it is given in sensible perception, a third alternative is possible, to wit, that the world is, in respect of time and space, neither infinite nor finite. And this alternative

critical philosophy finds to be in correspondence with experimental fact. Following back the line of sensible phenomena as far as we can, we neither find a limit nor do we find that the series is unlimited or infinite. We only find that it is of indefinite extent. Now the phenomenal world, *qua* phenomenal, *is* only as it is *given* and as it is *knowable*, namely, in sensible experience. Since, then, it is given only as an indefinitely extensible series, we must declare both thesis and antithesis of the first antinomy false. And what is thus true of the first antinomy, says Kant, is true of all the others.

The "critical" solution of the antinomies consists, then, in showing that, and why, both the theses and the antitheses are baseless. It is "shown that they are simply dialectical, or a conflict of illusions, which spring from the circumstance that the Idea of absolute totality, which has no application except to things-in-themselves, is here misapplied to phenomena, which exist only in sensible consciousness and, when they constitute a series, in the successive [or time-conditioned] *regressus* of such consciousness, but otherwise have no existence at all." On the other hand, Kant urges that the antinomies may render a valuable service through the indirect proof, which they may be made to furnish, of that doctrine of "the transcendental ideality of phenomena" which the *Transcendental Æsthetic* sought to establish by the way of direct demonstration. "The proof would consist in the following dilemma: If the world is a whole which exists *per se*, it is either finite or in-

finite. Now the former of these suppositions, as well as the latter, is false, as shown by the above proofs of the antitheses, on the one hand, and of the theses, on the other. The assertion is therefore false, that the world — the sum total of phenomena — is a whole which exists *per se*; whence follows the truth, which the phrase 'transcendental ideality of phenomena' was designed to express, namely, that phenomena universally are, apart from our perceptions, or our perceptional ideas, nothing. This observation," Kant continues, "is of importance. It reminds us that the proofs employed above were not sophisms, but logically valid and conclusive, provided only that we could admit the tacit presupposition on which they all rest, namely, that phenomena, or a sensible world, which includes them all, are things-in-themselves. But the conflict of conclusions thence deduced discovers to us that there was error in the presupposition, and so brings us to the discovery of the real nature of things, as objects of the senses. The *Transcendental Dialectic* thus by no means favors scepticism, although it does illustrate the value of the sceptical method," etc.

So, then, it appears that in, or in connection with, the series of phenomenal conditions, no unconditioned is to be found. The principle, that the series of such conditions constitutes an absolute and demonstrable totality, far from being axiomatic, is the rather purely dialectical, and, when thus stated without qualification, is altogether indefensible. It is an illusion, and, since it flows from the normal

play of human reason, it is an unavoidable illusion. Now that this, its mirage-like nature, has been pointed out, we shall no longer be in danger of being deceived by it. But has not the principle another side, whereby it may still become a serviceable beacon-light and true guide to science? This it has; for, while, in Kant's language, it is not and cannot be a "*constitutive* principle of reason, whereby we are enabled to extend the conception of the sensible world beyond the bounds of all possible experience," it may and must be a "*regulative* principle of reason." It prescribes a necessary *rule* for our procedure in all scientific investigation of the universe on its phenomenal side. It sets up as an ideal, or proposes to science as a problem, "the greatest possible extension and continuation of experience." It requires us to carry back the series of phenomena as far as possible, allowing "no empirical limit to be accepted as an absolute limit." In short, it is a principle, whose impulse is in the direction of the greatest possible, systematic completeness in our empirical knowledge.

The critical solution of the antinomies, whereby theses and antitheses were alike discovered to be false, applies to the first two antinomies without qualification. These are termed the mathematical antinomies, and relate to series, the terms of which are all perfectly homogeneous and all alike purely phenomenal. With the third and fourth antinomies, which are termed dynamical, the case may be different. In a dynamic series, the terms may con-

ceivably be heterogeneous. There is always the possibility, or at least the conceivable possibility, that the phenomenal effect may, in addition to its so-called phenomenal or natural "cause," i.e. its regular antecedent, have a true and noumenal cause, which is the real ground of the existence of the phenomenal effect; and that phenomenal substance may depend upon a super-phenomenal and necessary being.* It may be, therefore, that if you take into account the foregoing possibility, both thesis and antithesis, in the third and fourth antinomies, will or may be true, though in different senses. Theoretically and scientifically we shall not be able to prove that this is the case, for the beginning and end of all theory or science is constantly held by Kant to be phenomenal. It will still remain true that, theoretically considered, both thesis and antithesis in these antinomies are false. Our new demonstration will rest wholly on practical grounds, and will consist only in showing that, and how,

* As matter of fact, the very supposition that the series of phenomena is a dynamic one, is itself tantamount to the supposition not only that the series may have, but that it really has, a noumenal or super-phenomenal cause. To pure physical science (pure sensible knowledge) the series of phenomena is not given or known as a *dynamic* series, but simply as a *regular* series. To call it dynamic is, therefore, to go beyond the phenomenal fact and introduce the metaphysical or noumenal conception of force, with all that this conception implies. In this case, as in so many others, Kant's intelligence is confused by the ambiguity of a *word* — of the word *cause*. He forgets that "natural causation" (causation as regarded by "pure physical science") is only regular succession, and strictly contains no notion of influence, efficiency, or force. Hence he terms it dynamic, not perceiving that by this very act he has transformed the series from a merely phenomenal into a noumenal one.

thesis and antithesis may, without contradiction, be conceived as true at the same time — but not that, as matter of *theoretical* knowledge, we can assert them to be true.

Take, first, the Third Antinomy, the antinomy of causation. Here the proof of both thesis and antithesis was founded on an analysis, or on the application of the conception, of "natural causation." The result in both cases was conclusions, which were alike illusory, because alike destitute of any foundation in real or possible sensible experience, which is the only sphere for which the law of "natural causation" is valid. But now suppose that there be other, "practical" grounds for supposing the reality of another kind of causation, namely, noumenal causation, or the agency of non-sensible, intelligible, spiritual, rationally endowed, causes, possessing "transcendental freedom." If this agency can be shown not to conflict with the universal presence of natural causation (= rule or law) so far as sensible experience extends or can extend, then we may conceivably with equal truth assert, in the thesis, noumenal freedom, and, in the antithesis, natural "necessity," or the universality of law.

Now, man has a double knowledge of himself. On the one hand, he knows himself "theoretically" or "scientifically," as a sensible being, part and parcel of phenomenal nature. On the other hand, he is known to himself *practically*, as possessing a rational nature, which brings with it peculiar possibilities and responsibilities. In the consciousness

of his obligation to render obedience to an absolute moral law of reason, he has no alternative but to regard himself as free, or as a *causa noumenon*, capable of exercising "true causality." Scientific demonstration that he is free, or even that freedom is *per se* possible, is of course out of the question, since such demonstration is possible only respecting the nature and order of sensible phenomena, and not, as in the present case, respecting that which by supposition is a purely supersensible, ideal, noumenal activity. The only question is, can such activity consist with the universal presence of natural law? Can man, as a supersensible being, become the independent cause of effects, which appear in the sensibly phenomenal world and which, as such, must stand under the law of "natural causation"? Kant answers this question in the affirmative. The question supposes the case of a *causa noumenon*. The proof of the antithesis in the third antinomy objected to the conception, or to the admission of the reality, of such a cause, on the ground that it would not be subject to the law of natural causation, or to the law of determinate sequence *in time*. A *causa noumenon*, it was held, would be virtually a sequent without an antecedent, which is absurd. But this objection is wholly irrelevant. The law of time is the law only of phenomena, of which alone, and not of noumena, time is the universal form. The objection, therefore, is only equivalent to a reminder that a *causa noumenon*, if such exist, is, at all events, not like a *causa*

phenomenon, and that its law, if law it have, must be different from the purely temporal law of phenomenal "causation." What the nature and law of a noumenal cause may be, it is impossible positively to know or state. For such a cause would be a thing-in-itself, and, as such, unknowable. We can only describe the conception negatively and say that a noumenal cause cannot, like phenomenal causes, be itself a sequent and dependent on an antecedent, by which its place in time is determined. No temporal relation whatever can be predicated of it, since it and time have nothing to do with each other. We can only say that a noumenon, which is, as such, *physically* indefinable and hence "unknowable," may at the same time be a cause of some kind or other,— a cause, of a kind which will itself also be physically indefinable and unknowable, although it cannot for that reason be pronounced non-existent. While therefore there is no positive theoretical, i.e. physico-phenomenal, evidence of the existence of noumenal or non-sensible causes for phenomenal effects, there is also nothing in the way of our assuming their reality, if for any practical reason, such as man's moral experience, we find occasion to assume it. The thesis, then, if understood as asserting noumenal causality, may be true.

But, on the other hand, the antithesis too must be true, not in its negative part, as absolutely denying noumenal causality, but in its positive part, as affirming the universal presence *among phenomena*, viewed as such, i.e. as in time, of that which is

called natural causation. The action of the noumenal cause must not be so construed or conceived as to interfere with the universal operation (to speak in a figure) of natural law. In so far as phenomena universally are viewed as having the efficient ground of their existence in the noumenal, this limitation can cause us no embarrassment. The law of natural causation is not the law of the *production* of phenomena, but only of their order in time. No prejudice whatever is done to the universality of this law by the hypothesis that each phenomenon, taken singly, or all phenomena, taken collectively, have the productive ground of their existence in a noumenal realm of real causes. On the contrary, the phenomena, on this hypothesis, being dependent for their existence on the noumenal cause or causes, the law of their order must also, in the last resort, be derived from the same source. And so, in the case of man, in particular, we shall have no difficulty in regarding the "intelligible character" of each individual as the true and noumenal cause of the "empirical character." Since, now, it is only the empirical character which is involved in sensuous conditions, or appears in, and as part of, the phenomenal universe, man in his intelligible character is independent of these conditions. In this negative sense he may possess "transcendental freedom," or a power of determining "the series of phenomenal conditions" by a kind of causality which is absolutely independent of such conditions.

The only remaining question, which involves an apparent difficulty, is this: Can man, in his intelligible character, as a true and noumenal cause, really will and effectuate a phenomenal result which was not predetermined or predeterminable by natural law? Is there any particular, visible action of his, which could not have been predicted by any one possessed of an intellect capacious enough to take in all the data of the phenomenal universe at any preceding moment and then to calculate beforehand, on the basis of his knowledge of purely natural laws, what must be the whole state of the universe at the time when the particular action in question should occur, or become "visible"? And if not, is man, can he be, really and properly free?

To this, Kant's only reply consists in the reminder that phenomena, not being things-in-themselves, are also "not causes-in-themselves," whence we are apparently to draw the conclusion that no visible action of man, any more than any other phenomenon, is strictly caused or necessitated by preceding phenomena as such. Causation, strictly speaking, is not a phenomenal or sensible conception, and the same is to be said of the conception of necessitation or restraint. In spite, therefore, of the universal reign of law, man's freedom, which belongs to him only as an intelligible being, and not as an empirical or phenomenal one, is declared to be negatively possible, or not in conflict with natural law. For a cause can be hindered or constrained in its action only by that which is like

itself, i.e. by another cause; and neither phenomena nor the laws of phenomena are real causes.

Thus both thesis and antithesis of the third antinomy may, it is argued, possibly be true.

Finally, the conflict of assertion in the Fourth Antinomy is capable of receiving a solution similar to that given to the third. The possible truth of both thesis and antithesis may be maintained, if we confine the assertion of the former to things noumenal, and that of the latter to things phenomenal. Phenomena are not things, but "ideas (*Vorstellungen*) of things." Phenomena are all contingent, and, on the other hand, "their very contingence itself is only a phenomenon." There is no alternative given us but to regard them as such, without exception,—each phenomenon contingent upon a preceding phenomenon, and so on in a *regressus* of indefinite extent. From such data, the antithesis is right in denying the possibility of proving the reality of some absolutely non-contingent and necessary form, whether of phenomenal or of noumenal existence. The insubstantial is as such no proof of the absolutely substantial. But, on the other hand, it furnishes no disproof of it. Only, if we assume, for whatever reason, the existence of absolute substance (or of a "necessary being"), we must assume and assert it as purely intelligible, and not phenomenal or sensible. With these limitations, we may assert, without contradiction, in the thesis the noumenal reality of a necessary being, and, in the antithesis, its phenomenal unreality. Both *may* in

this sense be true. But the truth of the thesis is incapable of theoretical demonstration. Such demonstration, nevertheless, metaphysics has attempted by a number of arguments which must now be considered under a separate head.

III.

RATIONAL THEOLOGY.

In attempting to prove *that* God exists, *what* does metaphysics attempt to prove? How does it conceive and define the object of its proof? What is its notion of "God"? Of what object, real or alleged, is "Rational Theology" the real or pretended science?

In the interest of *philosophy* and of the living fact on which alone philosophy can rest, we must, before attending to Kant's criticism of Rational Theology, be permitted to say that God can be conceived, defined, and demonstrated, only as he is first known. And he is and can be known only as Spirit. And he can be and is thus known by man, only because man is spirit. Man, considered *per se*, or according to his true intention and characteristic nature, is a spirit, his knowledge is the process of a spirit, or is spiritual knowledge, and the perfect object of his knowledge, as such, must and can only be of kindred nature. The real, positive and instructive purport of all that Kant accomplishes for the science of knowledge, in the earlier, constructive portion of his work, consists, as must have been perceived, in the demonstration that that which is

called physical knowledge, and which appears at first to consist only in a mechanical relation between knowing subject and known object, implies, as its condition, spiritual knowing, or the unifying, illuminating, all-pervading activity of *self*-consciousness. All of man's knowledge is thus spiritually conditioned. He knows the world — this lesson we may derive from Kant — only because and so far as he finds himself in the objects which the world presents, i.e. only because and so far as the world is steeped in and exists through the present power and life of spirit, and so exhibits, in object-fashion, the rational and orderly, or synthetic, forms which can alone correspond with the forms of a spirit's subjective knowing activity. Further, his knowledge of the physical universe is a relative, incomplete, imperfect, non-absolute kind of knowledge, in this sense, namely, that man does not find in the universe as such the whole object which his nature fits and requires him to know. He finds there, in other words, the life and power and forms of spirit, but not spirit *per se*, not absolute spirit, complete and without qualification. In his knowledge or consciousness of the world, man finds indeed his "other"; but this other, while *his*, i.e. while formed of the web and woof of a spiritual nature which is *his* also, is yet less, in point of fulness of spiritual being, than himself. On the other hand, in his knowledge or consciousness of absolute Spirit, if such he have, man finds again his "other," but truer and more complete than before. He finds

not only himself, he finds that which is more than himself, by as much as the perfect is more than the imperfect. For man is imperfect spirit; he is spirit in process of self-realization; and in his consciousness of absolute Spirit he is conscious of the transcendent, living ideal and type of his true, completed, spiritual self. (It is on the hypothesis of this consciousness that the rationality of such a requirement as the following alone can rest: "Be ye perfect, as your Father in heaven is perfect.") He is conscious of a divine Self, which is the precondition and goal, not only of his own, but of all real being. If there exist such consciousness, there exists the consciousness of God. And then God is known and conceived as a Spirit. If there be no such consciousness, then there is neither knowledge nor notion of God, but only of a vainly imagined abstraction (not a spirit), the reality corresponding to which can never be given in experience, and needs to, but never can, be "proved."

We repeat, there is no valid notion of God which is not founded on "experience," i e.. in this case, on man's most characteristic self-experience in his spiritual life and activities, and on the ground of such experience no notion of God, except as a Spirit, can be framed or can justly be presupposed in behalf, or for the purposes, of "proof." And when the notion is thus presupposed, the "proof" of its objective validity — or, that God as a Spirit "exists" — does not consist in deducing from given and known premises, whether by direct or indirect demonstration,

a conclusion respecting an extramundane being who is far off, and out of the immediate reach of all premises, because out of the reach of all experience, and of whom nought is knowable except in this roundabout way; it consists — to express the matter in substantial agreement with Aristotle and with all positive religious philosophy — in clearing up the mental vision, so that the human spirit may become explicitly aware of that which is implicitly contained in its own living experience, or so that it may really see what it knows and know what it sees. "Demonstrable" means "capable of being *shown*" or "immediately *pointed* out"; and in the way just described, God, as a Spirit, comes to be recognized as the present and immediate, universal, living and *demonstrable* precondition and goal of all our life and all our consciousness, be the object of the latter ostensibly man, God, or world.

Moreover, the process, by which religious philosophy recognizes and demonstrates God as a Spirit, is founded in the science of knowledge as a spiritual process, and not merely, as sensational psychology regards it, a mechanical one. We have seen heretofore that the act of knowing, as a spiritual process, i.e. in its true and completed nature, is an act whereby those terms of apparent opposition, subject and object, which at first thought seem to be only and absolutely opposed and incapable of conjunction, are brought into harmonious union and identity of nature. And the further analysis of the case shows that this reduction of opposites to unity is not an

arbitrary act on our part,—such that, without the act, the opposed terms would have remained in eternal and absolute opposition. No, the finite act of knowing, on man's part, is simply equivalent to a demonstration that from the beginning and from everlasting the opposition was only relative, and that the appearance of absolute opposition would not have existed for us, but for the original restriction of our point of view within purely mechanical, sensible, and finite limits. So God, as a Spirit, and as the absolute object of knowledge, comes to be conceived and known, not as pure subject, nor as pure object, but as the everlasting precondition of the distinction between subject and object, as the present condition of their possible synthesis in *our* knowledge, and as the one in whom this synthesis is eternally and completely actualized. In short, God, as a Spirit, is that which only a spirit is capable of being; he is in his nature subject, *plus* object, *plus* the absolute organic unity and identity of both in an everlasting synthesis of life, which is absolute energy of mind and of love. Thus alone is he capable of being the "author" of the "world," which, ideally and strictly defined, consists, first of all, in nothing but the apparent and partial diremption of subject and object, and, then, in a *process*, the law of which is but the law of the restoration of the separated terms to that unity in which alone the true nature of each is completed. God, as a Spirit, is the author of a world which is nothing but a process of the evolution or realization of spirit.

Quite otherwise is it with the preconceptions and method of that "rational psychology" of dogmatic, mechanical, sense conditioned "metaphysics," which Kant describes and combats. This "metaphysics" does not first know and acknowledge God as a Spirit. And this because it is not in possession of the completed science of knowledge and of experience, as a spiritual process. Its categories are all mechanistic. They are suggested by the apparent relation of opposition between subject and object, which subsists in sensible consciousness. God, therefore, not being subject in this relation, must be object. Not being identical with the immediate, and, as such, necessarily phenomenal object of sensible consciousness, he must be a "particular object," distinct and separate from the former; he is a "transcendental *thing*"! Such is the constantly recurring phraseology of Kant — who, it need scarcely be said, agrees with the "metaphysicians" that, if God is to be "theoretically" or "scientifically" demonstrated, it can only be by the way which they have chosen.

Space was shown in the *Transcendental Æsthetic* to be the precondition of all figures in space. The latter were conceivable only as "limitations" of a space already given. In like manner, "metaphysics" argues that all objects possessing "reality" exist and are possible only as limitations of an original *plenum* of reality. This way of looking at things is, as Kant argues, perfectly legitimate, when the object of our contemplation is the phenomenal world;— though even here the *plenum* would have

to be considered, not as absolute, but only as indefinitely great. But metaphysics looks upon phenomena as things-in-themselves, and so transfers, illegitimately, the above conception into the unknown realm of noumena. Thus it forms for itself a notion of absolute substance, which, as containing within itself the sum of all reality, may be termed *ens realissimum*. This *ens* is, however, at this point, incapable of further definition or description than this, namely, that it is absolute object. But then the consideration of the contingency of everything in the universe leads metaphysics to look on this being as *ens originarium*, or as the unconditioned ground, cause, or reason of the possibility and of the dependent existence of the finite universe, from which latter it is deistically considered as absolutely separate. Thus "hypostatizing our Idea, we go on to define the original Being as one, simple, all-sufficient, eternal, etc., being guided in our definitions by nothing but our conception of supreme reality. The conception of such a Being is the transcendental conception of God." It is "the Ideal of pure reason" and "the subject of a transcendental Theology."

The proofs of the existence of *such* a being, as *thus* defined and conceived, can be no stronger than the general theory of knowledge and of being, on the basis of which the conception is framed. Kant has little difficulty in showing that this basis is insufficient to support the theological structure ostensibly reared upon it. God is viewed as an abso-

lute "object." The conception of a pure object can only come from a mechanico-sensible theory of knowledge, and it can consequently only obtain or be (partially) realized in that realm of existence or experience in which alone this theory finds its relative justification. This is the realm of sensible experience, or of phenomena. Accordingly, if the existence of God as an "object" is to be proved, the proof must consist in pointing out that such an object is given in sensible experience. But this condition cannot be fulfilled, since, by hypothesis, God is a "transcendental" object, "outside the world" of phenomena, and consequently incapable of being "experimentally," i.e. *sensibly*, demonstrated. Were he thus demonstrable, he were no longer what he was defined to be, namely, not a phenomenon, but a thing-in-itself. Of the existence of such a "transcendental thing" neither proof nor disproof is possible.

This is the substance of all of Kant's criticisms upon the arguments for God's existence. Of these arguments he enumerates and considers three, the Ontological, the Cosmological, and the Physico-theological (or Teleological).

1. The Ontological Argument is alleged to assert that it is at least possible — not contradictory *in se* — to frame the notion of an *ens realissimum*. This being is conceived as possessed of all reality. Hence it must be conceived as possessed of existence, for "all reality" includes "existence." To conceive it as not existing, were to conceive it as possessing

less than all reality. The "thing" corresponding to this conception (namely, "God") must therefore exist, since it cannot be conceived as not existing.

Kant replies, in substance, that the conception of existence and the fact of existence are two very different things, so that no inference is possible from the one to the other. Whatever I conceive (= sensibly imagine), I necessarily conceive as though it were existing. Though my pocket be empty, I may conceive it to contain a "hundred thalers." If I conceive them there, I conceive them and *can only* conceive them as *existing* there. This is a truism. But the fact that I am under this manifest necessity of so conceiving, by no means, alas! carries with it the necessity that a hundred thalers should really be in my pocket. Whether they are really there or not is a matter of fact, which I can only determine by sensible experience. In no other way can the question of fact, as to whether an *ens realissimum*, corresponding to the conception of such a "being," exists, be determined; and this is the same as to say that the question is altogether incapable of determination.

2. The Cosmological Argument contends (in Kant's language) that "if anything exists, there must also exist an absolutely necessary being. Now, at least I myself exist; hence there exists an absolutely necessary being." This is the argument called *a contingentia mundi*. It is founded on our observation of the contingency of all particular existence, and is identical, in this regard, with the argument

by which the thesis of the Fourth Antinomy was supported. The contingent, it is maintained, is an effect, depending on an antecedent condition, which is its cause. The same is true of the whole series of contingent effects, which it is not allowable to conceive as infinitely extended and which must therefore have a "First Cause." Having thus jumped to this conclusion, the cosmological argument then falls back upon the ontological argument, which has already been disproved, and identifies the "First Cause" with the *ens realissimum*, as the only *ens*, the conception of which meets the requirements of necessary existence.

The objections to this argument were summed up in the proof of the antithesis in the Fourth Antinomy. The substance of them is simply this, that advantage is taken of the law of physical "causation," which "is of significance only within the sensible world," to conclude to the existence of a cause lying outside of this world, existing before it, and operating only at the beginning of it. This is a valid objection to the cosmological argument, so far as the latter is made to rest on the law of "physical causation" as a premise. Such a law, as we have often enough seen, is not enough of itself to lead to the cognition of any cause whatever, whether intra-mundane or extra-mundane, particular or universal. Such a law is but a restatement of the given order of phenomena. On the other hand, it is just to repeat (and this also agrees with the spirit of Hegel's criticisms upon Kant) that, as

soon as we have recognized the true conception of causality, we have already transcended the sensible world. We are already in the "intelligible world," the world of power, life, and spirit, and are led to the recognition of a "First Cause," not as an antecedent unconditioned condition of all contingent conditions, but as an ever-present "First" in power and being.

3. The Physico-theological or Teleological Argument proceeds, not from general, but from particular, experience. It is the argument "from design." Nature discloses manifold signs of wise intention and harmonious order, and these are held to betoken a divine designer.

Kant declares that "this argument deserves always to be mentioned with respect. It is the oldest and clearest of all proofs, and best adapted to convince the reason of the mass of mankind. It animates our study of nature," etc. "It were," he says again, "not only a cheerless, but an altogether vain task, to attempt to detract from the persuasive authority of this proof." He has "nought to urge against its rationality and utility." He only questions its claim to "apodictic certainty."

How much of design do we find in the world? An indefinitely great amount, no doubt, but not enough to warrant the assertion that a being less infinite and necessary in his nature, than God is supposed to be, might not have caused it. Besides, the "design" in nature affects, (to speak materialistically,) not the substance of things, but only the

form. It could at most, therefore, only warrant the inference that there exists an *architect* of the universe, but not a *creator*. Further, who shall say that the things of the world might not have given themselves the apparently intended order, in which they exist? To meet this difficulty, the teleological argument (as Kant asserts) has to fall back upon the cosmological argument, which makes all finite existence contingent, and must then proceed, *via* the defective ontological argument, to identify its world-architect with the supposed absolutely necessary being. Thus the teleological argument, logically insufficient by itself to prove its intended conclusion, has to seek a stay in other arguments, which, themselves also, have been shown to constitute but a rope of sand.

In short, then, all arguments to prove the existence of God, must, in order to be theoretically valid, start from specifically and exclusively sensible or phenomenal data, must employ only the conceptions of "pure physical science," and must end with pointing out (= "*de-monstrating*") in sensible experience an "object congruous with," or corresponding to, the "Idea" of God. This senseless and barbarous requirement can obviously not be met. Consequently the existence of an absolutely necessary "object," called "God," cannot be "scientifically" proved. Nor — and this is the point on which Kant's main interest is concentrated — can it be disproved. Hence place is left open for us to give whatever weight we please, in our "faith," to any other,

"moral," though non-"scientific," proofs, which may present themselves to us. With this subject ethics, the science of practice, or of practical reason, will have to deal.

CHAPTER VIII.

METAPHYSICS AS A SCIENCE.

OF the four particular questions, into which the main inquiry of the "Critique of Pure Reason" was subdivided, the last was, How is Metaphysics as a Science possible? To this question Kant's answer is given in the last main division of the *Critique*, which bears the general title of *Doctrine of Method*. The materials for the answer are supplied, as Kant remarks, in the foregoing chapters. What sort of a metaphysical structure "science," in Kant's view, will permit, or enable, us to erect, how high and how firm, has already been substantially determined. The only question remaining concerns, not so much the material, as the plan, or form, of the building.

Still, when we reflect on the negative result of Kant's foregoing criticism of "metaphysics," the outlook for metaphysics as a *science* must at first appear very unpromising. Kant has ostensibly demonstrated that metaphysics, as an alleged objective science, has no demonstrable content. According to this result, metaphysics cannot be the positive science of metaphysical objects, such as the human soul and God. Still the Ideas of these objects thrust themselves upon the mind inevitably and according

to a peremptory law of reason. They are, and will always remain, with us and in us, and if, as Kant has sought to show, they tempt us to essay the impossible and to seek to demonstrate by "theoretical" arguments that objects corresponding to them do or do not exist, we shall always need some science to teach us convincingly the futility of all such attempts. Accordingly the first part of Metaphysics as a science will consist in, and is by Kant entitled, the "Discipline of Pure Reason." It will consist in the systematic proof that metaphysics can scientifically demonstrate nothing whatever, whether *pro* or *con*, respecting the existence of its ideal objects.

The section on the "Discipline of Pure Reason" contains, first, an emphatic affirmation and demonstration of the truth that "geometry and philosophy are two very different things." The first grand service rendered by Kant to philosophy consists precisely in the fact that he brought the aforesaid truth clearly into the consciousness of the modern mind. Leibnitz, before Kant, had been aware of it, and had distinctly uttered it. But in this respect he stood alone among the leaders of modern thought. Descartes and Spinoza, Hobbes and Locke, Wolff, Leibnitz's own nominal successor, and many others, had been, either expressly or practically, of a different opinion. The mathematical method, which is the ideal of method for physical science, must, they had held, be made the method of pure philosophy. Kant showed with absolute clearness that the mathematical method is applicable only within the science

of sensible phenomena as such, or of the forms of space and time, which are themselves but the universal, conditioning forms of sensible phenomena. Wherever this method is or can be applied, sensible phenomena and their universal forms of space and time are presupposed as already given. The inquiry is here not respecting the absolute source, cause or meaning of phenomena and of space and time, but simply respecting that which space and time ideally (as in mathematics) or empirically (as in physical science) contain. The inquiry thus excluded is exactly the one which occupies philosophy; philosophy, or metaphysics proper, asks not after the phenomenal, but after the noumenal which is assumed to be in or "behind," and to explain, the phenomenal. For the purposes of such investigation it is plain that the method of mathematics and pure physical science, which regards only the phenomenal and its conditions and serves only for analytic *recognition* of that which is already given in them, cannot serve at all. Any attempts to employ it for such purposes must end in logical discomfiture and illusion. And this is what Kant has really shown in his "Transcendental Dialectic."

The setting up of complete, initial definitions and of axioms, and the successful accomplishment of apodictic demonstrations, are possible for mathematics, because its objects are all given, or capable of being constructed and set immediately before the mind, in the forms of sensible imagination, and may be further illustrated by concrete figures and symbols.

Here definition and demonstration consist respectively, in stating and pointing out (showing, recognizing) what is contained in an object immediately given, or capable of being given, either in the matter or in the form of sensibly conditioned, objective consciousness. In philosophy, on the contrary, the subjects of discussion and proposed objects of demonstration are given, according to Kant, only in the form of pure conceptions, Ideas, or ideals. Here definition cannot, as in mathematics, stand at the beginning of the inquiry, since the objects corresponding to its pure conceptions are not, and cannot be, given or presented to the mind in the forms of sensible consciousness. For the same reason it is held that theoretical demonstration in pure metaphysics is impossible. Metaphysics can therefore only give partial or problematical definitions of its objects. Or indeed, to speak accurately, or from the point of view of pure theoretical (= in Kant's view, mathematico-sensible) knowledge, the ontological definitions of metaphysics must be purely negative and can only consist in attributing to the subject of definition, as predicates, the simple negation of the attributes of all that can strictly be known, i.e. of sensible phenomena and their subjective form-conditions of space and time. Accordingly, the ways of mathematico-physical science are not, as such, the ways of metaphysics as a science. But the former are the only ways of objective demonstration and of knowledge, in the exact and proper sense of the term. Hence it follows (1) that, on the basis of

mathematical and physical science and with its method, no metaphysical conclusions, whether *pro* or *con*, can be substantiated,—the premises are irrelevant to the conclusion; and (2) that metaphysics as an objective, theoretical science, furnishing positive, scientific knowledge of metaphysical objects, is impossible. Metaphysics, as a true science, can consist, in Kant's view, first of all, in nothing but the positive demonstration, such as the "Critique of Pure Reason" is held to furnish, of the foregoing negative conclusions.

But the practical result of this demonstration is for Kant by no means simply negative. It is not mere scepticism. Scepticism, he urges, is only a temporary halting-place for pure reason, not its final dwelling-place. Pure reason is not only theoretical, it is also practical. It is not only receptively cognitive, it is also legislative. Man finds himself confronted with one, and that indeed "the *only* fact of pure reason," to wit, the fact of conscious and absolute obligation to conform to a moral law, which is not of sense or nature, but of the mind and spirit; which is not, like natural law, simply declaratory of what actually and sensibly takes, or has taken, place, but of what ought to take place,—or of what man is under absolute moral obligation to do, even though he never do it; and which results from a legislation in which man's own reason autonomically participates. Hence arises for man the absolute practical necessity of regarding himself as possessing a nature, and belonging to a world, which are more than sen-

sible,—which are moral, and intelligible, and whose law is reason; a world, in which man is free and responsible, and the subject of an immortal destiny; and of which, finally, the monarch is God, who, by adjusting the conditions of happiness according to man's never-ending progress in the desert of it, makes possible for him the final attainment of his perfect good. But, also, on the other hand, there arises in the same way the absolute practical need of revising our conception of universal nature, so that we may regard it as a realm of purposes and find in it "purposeful unity," thus uniting practical with speculative reason. The demonstration in detail of these two consequences and of all that for Kant is involved in them, is furnished, respectively, in Kant's ethical works and in his "Critique of the Faculty of Judgment." Of these we have not to treat.* Suffice it to say here that while, according to Kant, no legitimate "theoretical use" of reason (as distinguished from the scientific understanding and from sense) is possible, there exists a broad field for its "practical employment." And the positive value of the "Discipline of Pure Reason" consists for him in the circumstance, that by it it is made forever impossible to close the gate of entrance into this field. Would any adversary seek to close it through demonstration of its non-existence — i.e. by theoretically demonstrating the non-existence of freedom, immortality, and God,— the

* These subjects are to be treated in separate volumes belonging to the same series with the present one.

aforesaid discipline at once lays him low. The same difficulties which prevent us from theoretically demonstrating the reality of freedom, immortality, and God, just as effectively debar the denier from any prospect of proving the contrary. Thus there is no obstacle whatever in the way of our building up, through the practical use of reason, a "rational belief," according to our moral necessities. For such practical use it will be the second part of the business of metaphysics as a science to furnish the "Canon," or "the system of *a priori* principles."

In the third place, all scientific knowledge is systematic, and takes the form of a complex, but orderly, whole. Metaphysics has, accordingly, for the third part of its legitimate work, to determine the systematic order and articulation of all rational knowledge, or of all the principles of pure reason, and of their various applications. This Kant briefly discusses under the title of "Architectonic of Pure Reason."

Finally, scientific metaphysics may consider the "History of Pure Reason." To this topic Kant devotes only three pages of the *Critique*, and with these concludes his work. Looking back over the century which has passed since it was written, and recalling with what conspicuous assiduity the study of philosophy in its history has during this time — in marked contrast with the neglect of the subject in the two preceding centuries — been prosecuted, the brief and, in itself considered, quite unimpor-

tant tribute to the importance of the subject, with which Kant ends his first great work, suggests peculiar reflections. It reminds us of the truth mentioned in our Introduction, that the horizon of Kant's views and knowledge in philosophy was not as broad as the horizon of philosophy's history, nor, consequently, as the horizon of philosophy itself. His horizon was principally determined for him, at the beginning, by modern physical science, and then, more especially, by the formalistic dogmatism of the Wolffian "metaphysics," the negativism of Hume, and the ethical empiricism of the British moralists. But then Kant's original horizon was as extended as that of his contemporaries and of his more immediate predecessors (Leibnitz being excepted) in modern times generally. For this reason, the service which Kant rendered was peculiarly a service relative to his times, or to the state of modern philosophy generally down to his time. For this reason, too, Kant's struggle, of which the "Critique of Pure Reason" is a partial history, with the powers of intellectual prejudice and confusion, was a struggle to become the intellectual redeemer of his times. In no other way could this redemption be accomplished than by an independent movement from within outwards,— that is to say, by a movement starting from the point of view of the time, however narrow this might be, and proceeding, with no other guide than the nature of the case under consideration itself, so far as this permitted itself to be immediately discovered, out toward the region of larger light and more catholic

comprehension. Such a movement we have seen Kant leading. And now, at the end of his first great critical work, we seem to see him catching a glimpse — more than half unconscious, it is true — of that land of historic truth which, truly considered, is, in its measure, the "region of larger light and more catholic comprehension" in question. The grand outlines and conditions of that perfected science of knowledge, and so of being, toward the reëstablishment of which Kant was unconsciously working, existed already in history. The grand problem, upon a part of which Kant was laboring, had already been considered and in essence solved by Plato and Aristotle. The modern reinvestigation of the problem was carried on, however, in comparative independence of history, by Kant's immediate successors, Fichte and Schelling (the latter in his earlier works). He who practically closed the discussion, (until it should be begun anew,) namely, Hegel, discovered and demonstrated that the new result was but the repetition, in completer form and richer detail, of an old one previously reached in substance. The new result confirmed the whole history of philosophy, broadly and scientifically considered, and the whole history of philosophy confirmed the new result.

Kant, with reference to his times and to the narrower point of view which his unhistoric age forced upon him, was undoubtedly in the right, when, in the last paragraph of his book, rejecting as ineffectual the "dogmatic method" of the "celebrated

Wolff" and the "sceptical method of David Hume," and practically treating these two as the only methods having historic existence, he confidently recommended the "critical way," and declared:

"The critical way alone is still open. If the reader has had the courtesy and patience to wander through it in my company, he may now judge whether, if he will contribute his share towards making this foot-path a highway, that, which many centuries could not accomplish, may not be attained before the lapse of the present century, namely, the complete satisfaction of human reason respecting those problems which have at all times aroused its curiosity, though hitherto in vain."

Fifty-one years after these words were written Hegel died. Meanwhile the world witnessed the most arduous, comprehensive and influential movement of philosophic thought which had taken place since the days of the classic Greek philosophy. The "courage of knowledge" was absolute. Kant's prophecy seemed to have been fulfilled.

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